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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the value relevance of goodwill that has been eliminated through
reserves in the year of acquisition. Specifically, it investigates the association beiween
goodwill reserve write-off and the value placed on the firm by the stock market. In so
doing, the thesis describes the relationship between the implied value of purchased
goodwill and that of other assets, and we seek to explain the underlying paffern of the
amortisation of goodwill over time.
The empirical method uses cross-sectional equity valuation models for the period 1994-
6. Based on the modified balance sheet identity, the equity valuation model
parameterises purchased goodwill and other assets separately, and a more
meaningful interpretation is given of the intercept term than in previous studies relating
to purchased goodwill.
The results confirm that the market incorporates information on the goodwill reserve
write-off in the valuation of a firm, and the results also show that the market: book ratio
is similar to tangible assets but its behaviour suggests a relatively higher amortisation
rate. Although the present study provides evidence supporting the requirement in FRS
10 (Goodwill and Intangible Assets) to capitalise purchased goodwill, the findings also
show that the incremental value of capitalised goodwill declines far more quickly than
FRS1O suggests, thus placing particular importance on the impairment test required by
FRS 10.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1	 Background and Objectives of the Thesis
This study examines accounting for purchased goodwill in a policy environment where the
choice of writing ott in the year of acquisition has been the prevalent accounting policy. In a
paper for the UK Accounting Standards Board (ASB), Arnold et a!. (1992) conclude that
"much has been written on the problem of accounting for goodwill during the past century"
but that "the solutions remain elusive", a point that is echoed in a historical review by Bryer
(1995). Indeed, Canning (1929) remarked on the breadth of the debate some 70 years ago:
"Accountants, writers on accounting, economists, engineers, and the courts, have all
tried their hands at defining goodwill, at discussing its nature, and at proposing means
of valuing it. The most striking characteristic of this immense amount of writing is the
number and variety of disagreements reached"
In more recent times, this issue has remained firmly on the standard-setting agenda. In the
UK, work started on this subject in 1974, which led to the publication of the first accounting
standard related to goodwill in 1985 (SSAP22 Accounting for Goodwill). This created the
situation underlying the analysis in this thesis, namely the requirement that purchased
goodwill (if positive) be eliminated through reserves in the period in which it is acquired.
SSAP 22 also allowed capitalisation followed by amortisation through the profit and loss
account, although this became very much the minority practice amongst financial statement
preparers. The recommended treatment of negative goodwill was to credit it to reserves at
the time of acquisition. Evidence that most UK companies have chosen the immediate
write-oft treatment is given by a number of studies, including Russell et aL (1989), Higson
(1990), Nobes (1992), Bryer (1995) and Gore etaL (1996). However, as noted by Russell
eta!. (1989), this policy was not prevalent elsewhere in the world:-
"Accounting for goodwill varies widely in different countries and it is certainly possible
to argue that the dominant British practice of writing off goodwill directly to reserves in
the year it was acquired is both inconsistent with the practices prevalent elsewhere
and theoretically unacceptable"
On the other hand, during the 1980's acquisition was increasingly used as a means for
companies to grow. As the relative size of acquisition increased, the amount and the
proportion of the purchase price assigned to goodwill also increased. This had a significant
effect on reported income, as mentioned by Bryer (1990 and 1995):
'From 1 977 a high level of merger activity continued virtually unabated, and from 1984
it grew to unprecedented heights. From a high of over £20 billion in 1972 prices, sales
of independent companies and subsidiaries have seldom fallen below £2 billion, and
since 1984 have grown from over £6 billion to an estimated £23 billion in 1988. In 1988
prices, in total over this period companies and subsidiaries costing £108 billion have
been paid for, £69 billion being paid between 1984 and 1988. As on average goodwill
was rarely less than 25% of the target's value, and rose from 51.2% in 1984 to 70.2%
in 1988, it could clearly have an important impact on the reported profits and pay out
ratio of many UK companies. On average over this period some 40% of the target's
value was goodwill. Therefore, crudely, if instead of writing off goodwill against
reserves, if it had been written off (say) 20 years, by 1988 the reported profits of UK
companies would have been some £2 billion a year lower"
The policy of immediate write-off, Le. elimination against reserves, soon created a further
problem. As acquisitions by companies increased in size, along with the amount and the
proportion of the purchase price assigned to goodwill, some consolidated balance sheets
started to show negative net worth, with elimination of goodwill against reserves finally
eliminating reserves altogether (Rutteman, 1990). In some companies, the policy on
goodwill made accounts look unacceptably weak, as gearing ratios became high enough to
breach covenants or to cause embarrassment when raising finance (Nobes, 1992). Certain
companies reacted to the "goodwill problem" by choosing to separate other intangibles such
as brand names from purchased goodwill. In 1988, when Rank Hovis McDougall PLC
capitalised brands, this contributed to a rethinking of the regulatory strategy with respect to
goodwill (In Appendix 1, we report a simple analysis of the effects on EPS, gearing and
reserves of a company by changing its goodwill accounting policy).
Soon afterwards, a report published by Woodhead-Faulkner (Brands and Goodwill
Accounting Strategies: 1990) mentioned at least 15 companies that had placed intangible
assets of this sort on the face of their balance sheet. After a sequence of exposure drafts
and discussion papers, the ASB has now published FRS 10 with the stated objectives of
changing the behaviour of UK firms with regard to the treatment of purchased goodwill and
intangible assets. The aims of the new financial reporting standard are to ensure that: (i)
capitalised goodwill and intangible assets are charged in the profit and loss account in the
periods in which they are depleted; and (ii) sufficient information is disclosed in the financial
statements to enable users to determine the impact of goodwill and intangible assets on the
financial position and performance of the reporting entity. In order to achieve its objectives,
FRS 10 requires purchased goodwill and other intangibles to be capitalised and amortised
as indicated, with impairment reviews if the carrying value is suspected to have fallen below
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the book value (FRS 11). Indeed, it could be argued that the success of FRS 10 would
mainly be based on the effectiveness of the impairment review.
One could, however, pose the question as to whether the controversy surrounding goodwill
is really important or whether the choices of accounting method just create 'noise' in the
security market. This situation merits further investigation in order to clarify this question.
One possibility is to examine whether the UK market perceives purchased goodwill as an
important variable in determining the value of a UK company. Therefore, against the
backdrop of the contemporary debate surrounding accounting for goodwill, the empirical
aims of this study are to investigate (a) the association between goodwill disclosures in
accounts and market values; (b) the relationship between purchased goodwill and other
assets; and (c) the implications of (a) and (b) for impairment reviews.
1.2	 Research Implementation
As discussed above, this study is concerned with accounting for goodwill in the UK. To
address the research question mentioned in Section 1.1, the approach followed is that
developed by Landsman (1986) who studied the relationship between market value and the
pension fund assets and liabilities of a firm. This model was developed further by McCarthy
and Schneider (1995) and by Jennings et a!. (1996) when they investigated accounting for
goodwill using data reported by US companies regarding the capitalisation and subsequent
amortisation of goodwill. The present study, however, is based on UK companies. Until the
implementation of the new Financial Reporting Standard for goodwill and intangible assets
in the UK (FRS 10), these firms have generally chosen to write off purchased goodwill in the
year of acquisition, as mentioned above. Therefore, a modelling framework is developed to
reflect the availability of data on goodwill elimination rather than on goodwill capitalisation.
Given the regulatory changes now under way in the UK, the findings of this study should be
important for those involved in the setting and monitoring of standards involving goodwill.
The research study was divided into four stages: -
Stage 1 - All the available articles on goodwill in the mainstream accounting research
literature were listed using the database search program FIRSTSEARCH. The main
purpose of this stage was to review the previous work done and to analyse the nature of
controversy surrounding accounting for goodwill in the literature, as well as the regulatory
history in the UK.
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Stage 2 - The main objectives of this study (as mentioned in Section 1.2) are to examine
whether the market perceives purchased goodwill as an important variable in determining
the value of a cortipany. The model for this study is based on the balance sheet identity, as
specified by Landsman (1986). Once again, other research using this model was identified
using the database search program FIRSTSEARCH. Our main interest was to review the
various applications of this model employing different variables in the balance sheet. In this
respect, it is shown that the model has been tested with regard to disclosures in corporate
reports concerning pensions, research and development, mortgages and purchased
goodwill, as well as to value net assets in the banking sector, all in the US.
Sta ge 3 - The data for this study were obtained from DATASTREAM for all company listings
under the total market segment (mnemonic - LTOTMKUK) as at 31 December 1996. All
relevant information needed for the model was recorded in MICROSOFT EXCELL 97
spreadsheets as a database. The final selection of companies included those which
reported purchased goodwill as an elimination for any year from 1994 to 1996 and which
had not recorded any other intangible assets during that period, and a control sample of
other firms not eliminating goodwill was also constructed. The size of the principal sample of
firms eliminating goodwill is 137 firms, providing between 275 and 404 firm-years for
analysis in the 1994 to 1996 period.
Stage 4 - The database was used to obtain the empirical results reported in this thesis.
Multiple regression analysis was used to test the theoretical model using a Market Value
Test Methodology. Data analysis and all the estimations in the model were carried out using
MINITAB, MICROSOFT EXCELL 97and MICROFIT.
1.3	 Main Empirical Results
The major goal of this thesis is to examine the empirical evidence concerning the
relationship between purchased goodwill and the market value of shareholders' equity. The
overall results of this study find that the market does incorporate information about goodwill
in the valuation of a firm. The empirical results also show that the market appears to
perceive purchased goodwill as an asset with a value at least equal to other assets. These
results are consistent with previous studies by McCarthy and Schneider (1995) and
Jennings et al. (1996) in the US.
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However, because the present study is based on UK companies which write-off purchased
goodwill in the year of acquisition, the analysis and interpretation is based on the
assumption that, by immediately writing off goodwill, a secret reserve would be created.
This secret reserve (if it exists) can be captured by the intercept term in the valuation model.
Results from various regression analyses show that the intercept term is significantly non-
zero for the first two years of cumulative goodwill. The findings also show that the intercept
decreases in absolute value and becomes zero as the purchased goodwill estimate is
increased by accumulating prior eliminations. Further analysis suggests that, although
purchased goodwill is recognised by the market, its value is reduced fairly quickly.
Given these findings, it is reasonable to claim that the implementation of FRS 10 is
justifiable for the following reasons: (a) Purchased goodwill is an important variable
incorporating information on the valuation of a firm; (b) The market appears to perceive
purchased goodwill with a value at least equal to other assets; and (c) Purchased goodwill
shows a decline in value which is relevant to the impairment test required by FRS 10.
1.4	 Summary Outline of the Thesis
At the outset, it is necessary to review the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of
accounting for goodwill in an attempt to clarify the issues that make goodwill a controversial
topic. Against this backdrop, it is also worth considering the history and regulation of
accounting for goodwill in the UK. Chapter 2 presents this review. The evidence presented
makes it clear that there is lack of agreement as to the definition of goodwill itself.
Consequently, it is not surprising that there are competing claims for the "preferred method".
Basically, opinion is divided as to whether goodwill should be "capitalised and amortised" or
"written off on acquisition", and both policies have their supporters. As a result, the history
and regulation of accounting for goodwill in the UK has followed the same pattern of
controversy and unresolved agendas.
Chapter 3 reviews the relevant literature on accounting for goodwill. Most of the earlier
papers that discuss goodwill issues are analytical and descriptive in nature. The main
objective of this thesis, however, is to provide empirical evidence on whether the market
takes into consideration the amount of goodwill write-off in the determination of the
company's valuation. In this context, we propose to apply a cross-sectional market value
regression model that is based on the modified balance sheet identity. Chapter 4 will review
some of the previous empirical work in accounting that employs market value and book
value relationships. Some of the methodological issues arising from this research,
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especially econometric problems associated with estimation of the model, will be highlighted
and discussed.
Chapter 5 begins with a discussion on the rationale of the proposed research followed by
the research design. The model for this study is based on the simple balance sheet identity
mentioned by Landsman in 1986. However, following Ohlson (1993), we have included a
variable from the income statement (earnings) to improve the model further. Given this
model, the chapter also reconsiders some of the methodological issues first discussed in
Chapter 4.
Chapter 6 is concerned with data collection and sample selection and discusses the
sources of data and criteria for selecting the sample. The chapter ends with an exploratory
data analysis.
The empirical work reported in this study is based on multiple regression analysis for the
model that was developed in Chapter 5. In order to assess the impact of goodwill write-off
on equity values, we regress the market value of the firms under consideration against the
book value of assets, liabilities, year to year cumulative goodwill and earnings of the
company. To make our analysis more robust, we rerun the regression model based on a net
asset model and reduced sample size. We also rerun the model taking into account year
and industry effects that might influence the overall results. Results from these are
presented in Chapter 7.
Our empirical work finds evidence that the market perceives goodwill as assets and
incorporates the information in the valuation of a firm. At the same time, it is obvious that
the market perceives purchased goodwill to decline in value a few years after acquisition.
Goodwill also appears to be perceived by the market with a value equal to other assets.
The interpretation and analysis of the results are presented in Chapter 7 and are
summarised in Chapter 8. Chapter 8 also presents a general comparison with previous
research relevant to this thesis. Finally, Chapter 8 suggests avenues for future research on
the topic of accounting for goodwill.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL, HISTORY AND REGULATION ISSUES
2.1	 Introduction
Goodwill has been referred to as "the most intangible of the intangibles" (Davis, 1992).
Despite having been the subject of a long debate held in the academic and financial
communities, accounting for goodwill remains a contentious and controversial problem1.
Arguably, the main problem of accounting concerning goodwill stems from the lack of
agreement in defining the real nature of goodwill. What is goodwill? And how should this
item be treated? Analysis shows that the arguments are split between two main schools of
thought. One school considers that goodwill poses difficulties and, unlike other assets, in
most cases cannot be separately sold. In these circumstances, to carry the asset in the
balance sheet is of little value to the users of accounts.
Consequently, this school maintains that purchased goodwill should be written off directly
against reserves on acquisition. The second main school of thought believes that goodwill is
an on-going asset that in principle is no different from any other asset. Thus, since goodwill
eventually has a finite useful life, it follows that purchased goodwill should be capitalised
and amortised through the profit and loss account over its useful life. In an ideal world, a
rational analysis of the conceptual issues might lead to a clearly preferred accounting
method that could be seen in the history and regulation of accounting for goodwill in the UK.
However, accounting for goodwill is one of the longest running and controversial accounting
issues in the UK. Although UK standard-setters started their work on this subject in 1974,
accounting for goodwill is still an issue in the 1990s. In June 1980, the Accounting
Standards Committee (ASC) issued their first Discussion Paper relating to goodwill.
Subsequently they published: (a) the Exposure Draft No. 30 (ED 30) in October 1982; (b)
the somewhat contentious SSAP 22 (Accounting for Goodwill) in December 1984; and (c)
yet another exposure draft (ED 47) in 1990. In July 1990, the ASC ceased to operate but
was able to pass on ED 47 and the responses to it to the Accounting Standards Board
Brunovs and Kirsch (1991) mention that commercial and legal references to goodwill can be found as early as
1417. In the accounting literature, goodwill has been discussed for more than 100 years. Lee (1971) said that in
1891, Francis More started the debate and those eminent accountants and academicians have continued it over
the years.
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(ASB). In 1993, the ASB issued a discussion paper entitled Goodwill and Intangible Assets
that a prompted mixed response, followed in 1995 by a new version of the discussion paper
with the same title. The ASB then published a Financial Reporting Exposure Draft (FRED
12) in June 1996 which was followed by Financial Reporting Standard 10 (Goodwill and
Intangible Assets) issued in December, 1997 which was to be applied to financial
statements relating to accounting periods which ended on or after 23 December 1998.
The "controversial" status of accounting for goodwill might be due to many factors. One of
the most important which has been suggested is the behavioural aspects of managers who
have personal interests 2 at stake and who consequently engage in lobbying to help
determine the standard practice of accounting in the UK (Grinyer et aL, 1992). Also, it was
reported (during the ASC era), that most of the members of the ASC were in a poor position
to resist lobbying because they were generally full-time employees of, or colleagues of, or
providers of services to interested parties (Nobes, 1992). This chapter will discuss the
above issues.
The first part will present the conceptual and theoretical issues, which make it clear that
there are competing claims for the "preferred method". Then, the historical and regulative
perspective will be presented in order to provide the backdrop to the conceptual issues of
accounting for goodwill in the UK.
The discussion is organised as follows. Section 2.2 provides the basic background of
goodwill that includes the concepts and definition of goodwill. Section 2.3 presents factors
that create goodwill as found in the literature. These factors are based on views that have
been proposed from various studies which have employed either survey or deductive
methodologies, with or without empirical analysis. Section 2.4 discusses alternative
accounting treatments for purchased goodwill that can be divided into three categories:
namely, capitalised without amortisation, capitalised and amortised and write-oft against
reserves, while Section 2.5 considers the arguments related to the question of why there
are such different treatments in the types of accounting for purchased goodwill which were
discussed in Section 2.4. Section 2.6, summarises the history and regulation of accounting
for goodwill in the UK by looking at the backdrop of conceptual and theoretical issues.
Finally, Section 2.7 briefly reviews the overall conclusions of this chapter.
2 They (managers who are most likely a policy.makers) wish to maximise both reported earnings and reported
assets because of the favourable effects on their companys share prices and on their personal compensation
and reputation (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978).
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2.2	 Concepts of Goodwill
As mentioned earlier, the issue of goodwill has been seriously debated by both academic
and practising accOuntants who have tried to define and evaluate goodwill over a number of
decades. However, the subject of goodwill remains a problem. In Australia, a statement by
Lord Macnaghten of the High Court, in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Muller & Co.'s
Margarine, summarised the difficulty in defining goodwill (Walpole, 1999):
'What is goodwill? It is a thing very easy to describe, very difficult to define. It is the
benefit and advantage of the good name, reputation, and connection of a business. It
is the attractive force, which brings in custom. It is the one thing, which distinguishes
an old established business from a new business as its first start. The goodwill of
business must emanate from a particular centre or source. However widely extended
or diffused its influence may be, goodwill is worth nothing unless it has power of
attraction sufficient to bring customers home to the source which it emanates. Goodwill
is composed of a variety of elements. It differs in its composition in different trades and
in different businesses in the same trade"
In earlier historical periods, before the proliferation of business entities, goodwill was
regarded as being of a personal nature; its existence in a particular business was due to the
personality, fairness and skill of the proprietors or partners. Goodwill would become a
commercial interest when a business was sold upon the death of a partner. Generally,
goodwill may exist in any business and how much there is varies as the business develops
and also in response to changes in the value of the business as a whole. Changes in the
value of a business may occur for many reasons; for example, changes in economic
expectations, in forecasts for that sector or in perceived value.
The value of goodwill may be constantly changing and is often highly volatile (Walker,
1953). It is therefore difficult to reach a valuation of goodwill at any point, particularly as
goodwill is by definition (refers to SSAP 22) not capable of being valued independently of
the business as a whole. The only time at which the value of goodwill may be known with
reasonable certainty is at the point where a cost is established in a transaction. This will
happen when the business and the goodwill inherent in it are sold. Basically there are two
types of goodwill: first, internally generated goodwill that results from a favourable attitude or
a good perception on the part of the customer toward the business, due to the business
person's reputation for honesty, fair dealing and etc.
Second, the value of goodwill exists with respect to a business, whether or not that business
is being sold or absorbed in a business combination. Moreover, when goodwill is
purchased, as the result of amalgamations, the cost of the goodwill acquired must be
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determined before deciding on the proper accounting treatment. The amount allocated to
goodwill is said to be the difference between the purchase consideration for the business as
a whole and the total fair value of its net resources that are identifiable and separable. The
Oxford Dictionaiy describes goodwill as follows:
"the privilege, granted by the seller of a business to the purchaser, of trading as his
recognised successor; the possession of a ready formed "connexion" of customers,
considered as an element in the saleable value of a business, additional to the value of
the plant, stock in trade, book debts, etc.".
From the legal perspective, the court's reference to the definition of goodwill can be found in
the United States case of Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co. v Clarke (Walpole, 1999).
Judge Swan said that:
"A going business has a value over and above the aggregate value of the tangible
property employed in it. Such excess of value is nothing more than recognition that,
used in an established business that has won the favour of its customers, the tangibles
may be expected to earn in the future as they have in the past. The Owner's privilege
of so using them and his privilege of continuing to deal with customers attracted by the
established business are property of value. This latter privilege is known as goodwill.
In an accounting context, goodwill can arise from a number of causes. However, it is usually
recognised in the accounts only when it is acquired through specific purchases/events.
Such events are as follows; the sale includes the conversion and amalgamation of a
business from one to another, and/or the change in the constitution of a partnership of a
firm as a result of admission, death, retirement, etc., of a partner; the amalgamation of two
or more companies, the acquisition of a majority holding in a company and the consolidation
of the assets and liabilities of a holding company and its subsidiary and the valuation of
unquoted shares.
In these situations, goodwill is calculated as the excess of cost of the acquired entity over
the current fair market value of the separable net assets acquired. According to Walker
(1953), goodwill must be more or less persistent and of definite duration to be of any value
and it must exist as a result of a business acquisition and must be measurable in monetary
terms. Internally generated goodwill is not usually recognised in the accounts. According to
the literature, goodwill may be defined or viewed in two different ways: first, the excess profit
approach or excess earnings view and, second, the residuum approach or hidden assets
view (Johnson and Tearny, 1993).
In the excess profit approach, goodwill is "simply conceptualised as the present value of a
number of years of abnormal expected returns for the type of business concerned. Thus, in
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this view the total value of a business is the sum of the present values of the normal returns
from the identifiable net assets, and the present value of the super-normal returns" (Bryer,
1990).
According to Colley and Volkan (1988), a price is paid in excess of the market value of net
assets acquired because profits in excess of a normal return on these net assets are
anticipated. Thus, goodwill can be viewed as the present value of the anticipated excess
earnings discounted over a certain number of years. The discount period will reflect the
estimated life or duration of the reasons underlying the excess returns.
Spacek (1964) defined goodwill as the present value placed on anticipated future earnings
in excess of a reasonable return on producing assets. Thus, it is the cost to the buyer of
earnings over and above the cost of the assets required to produce these earnings. Ma and
Hopkins (1988) defined goodwill as the capitalised value (i.e., the present value) of the
future stream of superior earnings of the business to be acquired. Thus over payment giving
rise to goodwill is due to the expectation of future earnings generated by the acquired
business concerned. Under this approach, the present value of the projected future excess
earnings is determined and recorded as goodwill.
Therefore, the determination of goodwill will depend on the estimates of future earnings or
cash flows, the normal rate of return, the value of identifiable net assets and the discount
period. However goodwill, as conceptualised by this definition, is very difficult to measure
since future earnings cannot be predicted with certainty. Thus, it is not surprising to find that
this approach has been criticised. For example, Gynter (1969) states that,
"This is not what goodwill is. This is merely a rationalisation of the method commonly
used to calculate the value of goodwill, and it is this rationalisation that has come to be
accepted by many as being the nature of goodwill. If we are to get to the nature of
goodwill, we must ask the question, 'Why does excess earning power on tangible
assets exist?'..."
In the residuum approach3, goodwill is defined as the difference between the purchase price
and the fair market value of an acquired company's assets. Goodwill is a leftover amount
that, after a thorough investigation, cannot be identified, as any other tangible or intangible
asset (Johnson and Tearny, 1993). Goodwill also can be defined as "the difference between
the cost of the investment to the parent and the value of the subsidiary's net assets at the
The intangibles are the residuum, the balance of the legitimate values attaching to an enterprises totality over
the sum of the legitimate values of the various tangible properties taken individually...The amount by which the
total of the value of the various physical properties within the enterprise, inventoried unit by unit, fall short of the
legitimate asset total for the entire business, express the intangible value (Paton (1922) quoted by Gynter (1969)).
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time the investment was purchased" (McKinnon, 1983). Both definitions imply that goodwill
is the "left-over amount". As goodwill is measured by calculating the difference between the
value of the identifiable assets and liabilities and the value of the business as a whole, the
concept of identifiability is the key to measuring the value of goodwill. Any asset or liability
that is identifiable can be valued separately from the business and is not part of the
goodwill. Conversely it follows that any asset or liability which cannot be separately
identified, cannot have a value ascribed to it and thus forms part of the goodwill. According
to Lee (1971), it is very important to note that the lack of agreement in the definition of
goodwill has been followed by a corresponding lack of agreement as to how to determine its
treatment in the financial accounts once it has been recorded as a purchase cost.
2.3	 Factors Creating Goodwill
There are numerous advantageous factors and conditions that might contribute to the value
of an enterprise. Factors in the aggregate such as business reputation, location,
monopolistic situation, managerial ability, know-how and experience and future potential will
aD constitute goodwill. It is interesting to note the views taken by various authors regarding
the factors which constitute goodwill. Various views have been proposed in different studies
that employ either the survey or deductive methodologies, with or without empirical analysis.
For an easily accessible reference we summarise these factors in Table 2.1.
Nelson (1953) stated that goodwill comprises customer lists, organisation costs,
development costs, trademarks, trade names and brands, secret processes and formulas,
patents, copyrights, licences, franchises and superior earning power. On the other hand,
Catlett and Olsen (1968) listed these factors: a superior management team; an outstanding
sales manager or organisation; weakness in a competitor's management; effective
advertising; a secret manufacturing process; good labour relations; an outstanding credit
rating because of an established reputation for integrity resulting in increased leverage at
favourable interest rates; top-flight training program for employees; high standing in a
community through contribution to charitable activities and participation in civic activities by
a company's officer; unfavourable developments in a competitor's operations; favourable
association with another company; strategic location; discovery of talents or resources;
favourable tax conditions and favourable government regulation.
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Teamy (1973)
Percentages refer to a sample of
209 NYSE listing applications for
1969 that indicated the specific
reasons for the acquisitions
Falk and Gordon (1977)
Table 2.1: Suggested Factors Constituting Goodwill
Factor
R.H. Nelson (1953) Customer list, Organisation costs, Development costs, Trademarks,
trade names, brands, Secret processes, formulas, Patents,
Copyrights, Licenses, Franchises and Superior earning power.
Catlett and Olsen (1968) Superior management team, outstanding sales manager or
organisation, weakness in a competitor's management, effective
advertising, secret manufacturing process, good labour relations,
outstanding credit rating, top-flight training program for employees,
high standing in a community through contribution to charitable
activities and participation in civic activities by a company's officer,
unfavourable developments in a competitor's operations, favourable
association with another company, strategy location, discovery of
talents or resources, favourable tax conditions and favourable
government regulation.
9.8% wanted to accomplish a particular market objective, 4.3%
wanted to save time in expanding into a new area, 5.6% wanted to
acquired management and technical skills, 40.1% wanted to achieve
product diversification and 33.2% to achieve integration.
increasing short-mn cash flows, stability, human factor and
exclusiveness
Coopers and Lybrand (1993) Expanding a market share, protecting an existing market position,
geographical expansion, acquiring a related business or product,
diversification into a new business, stabilisation, acquiring market
skills or distribution facilities, acquiring expertise, know-how or
technology rights, securing the supply of a key component, material or
service, acquiring production facilities, rationalising of production
facilities and securing other economies of scale, increasing financial
leverage by acquiring a company with cash or low borrowings,
acquiring a place of business in a country in order to gain access to
protected markets and acquiring assets at a discount with a view to
piecemeal disposal after acquisition.
Henning (1994) Superior management, effective advertising, good labour relations,
exclusive patents, or strategic location, reduction in agency costs in
post-take-over periods, the potential for synergy in the post-merger
firm, acquisition method and the number of competing bids.
Tearny (1973) investigated a sample of 209 companies listed on the New York Stock in
1969 to discover the specific reasons why companies made acquisitions. According to him,
9.8% wanted to accomplish a particular market objective, 4.3% wanted to save time in
expanding into a new area, 5.6% wanted to acquire management and technical skills,
40.1% wanted to achieve product diversification and 33.2% wanted to achieve integration.
Tearny argued that a detailed examination of such motives is necessary before the specific
sources of purchased goodwill can be understood. These hidden assets might include
intangible factors such as distribution channels, good customer relations, personnel skills,
product diversification and so on.
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Falk and Gordon (1977) separated out four main factors which constitute goodwill. These
factors are as follows:
1. Increasing short-run cash flow - under this factor the authors include production
economies, raising more funds, cash reserves, low cost of funds, reducing inventory
holding costs, avoiding transaction costs, and tax benefits.
2. Stability - including assured supply, reduced fluctuations and good investment relations.
3. Human Factor - including managerial talent, good labour relations, good training
programs, organisational structure and good public relations.
4. Exclusiveness - including accesses to technology, and brand names.
Among the factors discussed by Falk and Gordon, managerial talent appears to be a prime
contributor to goodwill. Also ranked as highly important were good labour relations, brand
name recognition, production economies and access to technology.
A report by Coopers and Lybrand (1993) listed the reasons why companies seek to expand
by acquisition. These are: to expand their market share or to protect an existing market
position; to promote geographical expansion in a core business to acquire a related
business or product; to diversify into a new business or different product line; to stabilise a
seasonal or cyclical business, to acquire market skills or distribution facilities; to acquire
expertise, know-how or technology rights; and to secure the supply of a key component:
material or service; to acquire production facilities; to rationalise production facilities and to
secure other economies of scale; to increase financial leverage by acquiring a company
with cash or low borrowings; to acquire a place of business in a country in order to gain
access to protected markets and to acquire assets at a discount with a view to piecemeal
disposal after acquisition.
Henning (1994) mentioned two potential sources of goodwill in his study. The first is the pre-
bid which he defines as the difference between the pre-take-over-bid market price and the
fair value of the firm's identifiable net assets. The pre take-over-bid market price provides a
fair appraisal of a firm's value as an independent entity. It excludes the components that
reflect the benefits for which a specific acquiring company is willing to pay above the market
price. Sources of pre-bid goodwill may include superior management, effective advertising,
good labour relations, or strategic location. Premium goodwill is the excess that acquiring
firms pay over the pre-take-over-bid share price. Components of premium goodwill include
the reduction in agency costs in post-take-over periods, the potential for synergy in the post-
merger firm, the method of acquisition and the number of competing bids.
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2.4 Accounting Treatment of Goodwill
Goodwill is acknowledged for accounting purposes only when it is purchased as part of a
take-over. In practice all businesses develop internally generated goodwill as they expand
and develop relations with suppliers, customers and the work force all of which take time
and money to put in place (Cooke, 1985). The worth of all of such valuable intangible assets
that are not separately identified on the balance sheet could collectively be termed
ugoodwilI In 1988 Rank Hovis McDougall (RHM) announced that it had included a value on
its balance sheet for all of its brands, both acquired and internally generated (Moorhouse,
1990). Until then, no attempt had been made to account for anything other than purchased
goodwill. Lee (1971) suggested possible reason for this:
1. The acquired conservatism of accountants, combined with a fear that created goodwill
might well be a fictitious asset introduced to improve the financial position of the
business described in its balance sheet
2. Certain generally accepted concepts of accounting which are extremely difficult to apply
in practice to goodwill - that is, historic cost, objectivity and verifiability.
3. The difficulty of annually revaluing goodwill. Such an exercise has to be based on
several assumptions, including the estimation of future profits and of what is a
reasonable rate of return for the particular business.
4. The difficulty of capitalising the business costs which contribute to the value of goodwill
- for example, the cost of research or advertising expenditure. Which part of the total
advertising expenditure of the business contributed to the sales which generated the
profits related to goodwill? Such an allocation exercise would be, at best, artificial.
Grinyer et a!. (1990) summarises two characteristics of self-generated goodwill, which need
to be identified:
1. Goodwill is not included in the matching-based balance sheet presumably because the
benefit expected to result from it is considered too uncertain to allow it to be recognised
under the prudence concept or because it is not feasible to disentangle the costs of
establishing such goodwill from operating costs; and
2. The costs of establishing goodwill are included as debits in a profit and loss account at
some time (identified as costs of advertising, staff costs, training, personnel costs, etc.).
Thus the costs incurred by management to generate goodwill within the existing business
have been charged at some time to a profit and loss account. Although the lag between
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recognising the cost and recognising the resulting cash inflows obviously prevents an
accurate matching, it may be considered that the orientation towards recognising realised
achievements for the purpose of control justifies such a departure from strict matching. In
the literature, the accounting treatment for purchased goodwill can be grouped into three
different viewpoints: immediate write-off, capitalised and capitalised and amortised.
However, McLeay et a!. (1999) in their study relating to international standardisation and
harmonisation analysed in detail the goodwill accounting method that was used by the
companies in their data sample which was made up of inter-listed companies on all the
stock exchanges in Western Europe. The description of policy, accounting treatment and
the effect on financial statements is given in Table 2.2. As mentioned earlier, the accounting
treatment of purchased goodwill can generally be divided into three categories. In the first
approach, as soon as it is purchased, goodwill is immediately written off against an account
in the shareholder's equity section, generally retained earnings.
Some advocates of the immediate write-off of goodwill reason that this treatment is
consistent with non-purchased goodwill, for example Taylor (1987), and Arnold (1992).
Taylor (1987) suggests that the removal of purchased goodwill by immediate write-off treats
purchased and non-purchased goodwill similarly by removing them both, and that this may
be helpful when comparing two similar firms, one of which has grown by acquisition and
another by internal growth. Gray (1988) favours immediate write-off because the balance
sheet is misleading if it includes only purchased goodwill, which is likely to understate the
total goodwill where also includes self-constructed goodwill.
Ma and Hopkins (1988) argue that where internally generated and purchased goodwill
represent benefits with similar risk characteristics they should be accounted for in the same
way and since it is often difficult to define precisely the economic benefits gained by
goodwill payments; i.e., they cannot be identified with the present value of a defined stream
of benefits, the systematic amortisation of goodwill is difficult to justify.
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Goodwill - Asset
Goodwill - Negative Reserve
Goodwill - Reserve Write Off
Goodwill - Income Write Off
Goodwill - Reserve Amortisation
Goodwill - Income Amortisation
Negative Goodwill - Reserve
Negative Goodwill - Provision
Table 2.2: A Summary of Goodwill Accounting Methods
Description of Policy	 Accounting Treatment	 Effect on Financial Statements
Negative Goodwill - Deferred
Income
The difference between the
consideration and the fair value of
the asset acquired is included
amongst assets in the balance
sheet The asset is either left at its
original historic cost or revalued.
The goodwill (arrived at as above)
is disclosed in reserves as a
'dangling debit' instead of as an
asset
The goodwill (arrived at as above)
Is written off immediately against
reserves.
The goodwill (arrived at as above)
is written off entirely against
income in the year of acquisition.
The goodwill is amortised over
fixed or variable period, the
reserves being reduced
accordingly in each period.
The goodwill is amortised over a
fixed or variable period, a charge
being made each year against the
current income.
Where the consideration is less
then the fair value of the asset
acquired, negative goodwill arises.
This reflects a bargain purchase,
or some particular feature of the
assets concemed. The negative
goodwill is shown as a reserve.
As above but the provision is
shown as a reduction of net assets
The book value of the firm reflects
the view that the value of the asset
is not likely to be impaired for the
foreseeable future (e.g. brands)
The effect is to reduce total assets
and distributable reserves by the
amount of the goodwill, reflecting
current uncertainty as to whether
the asset is realisable
A reduction in distributable
reserves would occur as if a
terminal dividend equivalent to the
goodwill is paid to the shareholders
in the acquired company.
A charge in the income statement
in the year of acquisition reflects
the immediate loss of any value in
excess of the carrying amount.
Goodwill amortisation is not
included in the income statement
as if a distribution on acquisition
were made conditional upon later
realisation of the asset
Goodwill amortisation is included in
the income statement. The
treatment is the same as any other
fixed asset and reflects the use of
the wasting asset over its
economic life.
The effect is similar to a
revaluation reserve. The surplus
can either be left at cost until the
asset to which it relates is disposed
of, or it can be transferred to
distributable reserves as the asset
depreciates.
The provision is taken to income if
the gain is realised and as the
related asset is depreciated.
As above but the negative goodwill The amount deferred is taken to
is shown as a separate asset	 income when the gain is realised.
Source: McLeay ef a!. (1999)
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Other authors argue that capitalisation and amortisation are arbitrary and understate net
income; for example, Spacek (1964). Therefore, a better treatment is to write goodwill oft
immediately against retained earnings. Another rationale which is very conservative
argument for the immediate write-off approach is that it is reasonable to expect that goodwill
relating to a business at the time of purchase will eventually disappear over time. This
argument is based on the fact that the products of the business purchased will decline in
importance. Therefore, the particular goodwill purchased might well be written off.
The second approach to accounting for purchased goodwill states that goodwill should not
be written off at all, unless there is strong evidence to support this procedure. According to
Zeff and Thomas (1973), this school of thought bases their argument on the major points
stated below:
1. It is over-conservative to write goodwill off the books when it has not depreciated in value
below the purchase price. To write oft goodwill in such a case creates a secret reserve
while to recognise this reserve is thought to be unorthodox accounting. Goodwill suffers
no actual decline in value so long as the earning capacity of the enterprise is maintained.
2. When goodwill has actually depreciated, it is not necessary to record that depreciation in
the operating account. The profit and loss record best shows the degree to which
goodwill exists. Its value fluctuates according to the expected future earning possibilities
of the enterprise. It is permissible to write goodwill off the books when it is declining in
value or when it has lost its value but amortisation is not required.
3. It is impossible to determine accurately the extent to which the goodwill has depreciated.
Some accountants have accepted this fact as one of the major reasons why it should not
be brought into published accounts, unless purchased. The owner of a business cannot
make an impartial estimate of the extent to which goodwill has depreciated.
Consequently, since appreciation of goodwill is not recognised in the accounts, neither
should depreciation be charged.
The third approach to accounting for purchased goodwill states that goodwill should be
amortised systematically over a reasonable period of time. In accordance with a primary
function of accounting which is to match costs and income, the cost of purchased goodwill
should be amortised as a means of matching the cost of securing the income actually
received. All expenditure whether on advertising, stationery, buildings, machinery, employee
services, goodwill, or the use of money or machinery, is made for the purpose of generating
an income return which is greater than the output, or as an aid to that goal. The cost of
these purchases is matched with that part of the income stream for which it is applicable.
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The matching does not take place in terms of the changed value of each of the assets
(Walker, 1953).
Under stewardship accounting, management should be required to justify its acquisition of
other companies by demonstrating that cash inflows from the acquisition exceed the cash
outflows incurred when making the investment. It seems reasonable to claim that
appropriate reporting for monitoring and control of the management can only be achieved if
the cash outlay committed to achieve the future net profit inflows are charged as costs in a
profit and loss at some time. To do otherwise is analogous to treating gross profit as the net
gain from trading during a period by charging all overhead costs to reserves. It follows that
payments for goodwill should be debited at some time to the profit and loss account
(Russell eta!. 1989).
According to the momentum theory of goodwill, the buyer of a company normally pays a
large sum of money for the goodwill because he wants a starting push in his new company
rather than to start fresh in a similar business and devote so much effort and money over a
long period of time to developing goodwill. This push is not a continual, everlasting one, but
rather it is like momentum or a running start. The money that is spent on goodwill is just as
beneficial as the money spent on plant and equipment. Thus, the investment ought to be
charged against income over the estimated life of the momentum (Nelson, 1953).
If acquisition is based on momentum theory, Grinyer (1995) argues that the most significant
element of the benefit from acquiring an existing company is the avoidance of the start up
costs of establishing the infrastructure of an alternative business, its production and service
capacity and skills and the market for its product. Those costs are likely to fall particularly
heavily on the early years of a new business.
One could anticipate wide variations between industries. Nevertheless, it is likely that,
because of the heavy commitments of time and resources required to establish and develop
a fledging organisation, the pattern of the start-costs will show a decline over time and those
costs will not be incurred over a very lengthy period. As a result, Grinyer argues this cost
should be amortised but in the shorter period, but not in accordance with the current
practise4.
The maximum period for amortisation is differs from one country to another. For example the United States and
Canada allow 40 years, Australia and Sweden allow 20 years, the Netherlands altows 10 years and Japan allows
5 years. In UK, under the current FRS 10, maximums of 20 years of amortisation period are allowed.
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As mentioned before, in an ideal world a rational analysis of the conceptual issues might
lead to a clearly preferred accounting method but as the above analysis makes clear, there
are competing claims for that preferred method. Basically, opinion is divided on whether
goodwill should be 'capitalised and amortised" or "written oft on acquisition", and both
policies have their supporters. One could ask the question - why does this happen? The
next section will briefly discuss one possible answer to this question.
2.5	 Goodwill - Matching or Valuation?
According to Grinyer eta!. (1990),
"...a root cause of apparent confusion concerning the treatment of goodwill, as in many
other accounting matters, arises because of a failure to identify what the accounts are
trying to measure and the purposes that they serve."
Grinyer et a!. advance their argument by listing two distinct conceptual models (the
matching and the valuation approaches) which are essentially mutually exclusive within a
single profit and loss account. However, in practice, many theorists failed to differentiate
between the two models and as result they believe their model should be superior to the
others. Since the above issue seems to be very important in the discussion of accounting
for goodwill in the UK, both of the conceptual models in financial reporting will be briefly
discussed below.
The valuation concept in accounting can be defined as the difference between values at two
different dates. Hendriksen (1977) defines valuation in accounting as a process of assigning
meaningful quantitative monetary amounts to assets; since the business enterprise is not a
consuming unit, economic values based on subjective utility are not relevant in accounting.
Therefore, the relevant valuation concepts should be based on exchange or conversion
values. There are two types of exchange values: firstly, the output values that reflect the
expected funds to be received by the firm in the future based particularly on the exchange
price for the firm's product or output and, secondly, input values which reflect some
measure of the consideration given up in obtaining the assets used by the firm in its
operations (Hendriksen, 1977). An example of a valuation model that utilises Hendriksens
definition can be found in Bodenhorn (1961) who describes depreciation. According to him,
the depreciation of any asset during a year is the difference between the present value of
the future earnings of the asset at the beginning and the end of the year.
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One important characteristic of valuation-based approaches is that because they consider
that the gains recognised as attributable to a trading period should include all gains (realised
and unrealised) which occurred in the period and only the gains that occurred in the period,
wealth is therefore considered to be the total worth of business at a point in time. Profit is
then the increment in wealth during the accounting period after adjusting for transfers of
wealth to or from the owners.
In 1964, The AM (American Accounting Association) committee defined the matching
concept as the process of reporting expenses on the basis of a cause-and-effect
relationship with reported revenues. The committee advocated that costs (defined as the
products and services factor given up) should be related to revenue realised within a
specific period on the basis of some discernible positive correlation of such costs with the
recognised revenues (Hendriksen, 1977). This approach is the one that is conventionally
practised under accruals-based historical cost accounting.
Thomas (1969) regards matching as an attempt to relate costs directly to revenue. He
argues that most of the matching approaches are arbitrary, incorrigible and indefensible
because they fail to apportion costs by referring to a clearly defined economic model.
However this argument can be challenged because in practice, direct costs are matched, as
far as possible, with revenue whilst period costs are matched with accounting periods
(Skinner, 1979). Such costs may then be perceived as being necessary to establish and
maintain the capacity to operate during the period, and therefore as overheads to be
recovered before identifying any surplus wealth arising from the activities of the period.
Compared to valuation approaches, matching-based approaches are all realised profit
systems. They recognise inflows, and hence gains, only when the outcome of the series of
transactions leading up to the inflow is virtually assured. Thus matching recognises gross
income from completed activities and then deducts the direct expenses that were incurred
to generate that gross income. Period costs are then typically charged as overheads of the
period.
The valuation and matching concepts illustrate two completely different approaches in
financial reporting. The concepts are totally different in the sense of the purpose of financial
reporting. Although both concepts identify the purpose of business as the creation of wealth,
the valuation approach differs from the matching approach because it recognises both
realised and unrealised gains in one trading period, as previously explained. However, it has
been argued that matching concepts are more useful for controlling and motivating
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managers and valuation concepts are more useful for decision making purposes (Grinyer,
1990). It is also important to note that the matching concept occurs more often 5 then the
valuation concepts in UK GAAP. SSAP 2 states that the fundamental concepts of
accounting are going concern, accruals, consistency and prudence. The standard defines
accruals as follows:
"Revenue and costs are accrued (that is, recognised as they are earned or incurred,
not as money is received or paid), matched with one another so far as their
relationship can be established or justifiably assumed, and dealt with in the profit and
loss account of the period to which they relate"
With respect to accounting for goodwill, it is arguable that decisions by managers to acquire
other companies should have to be justified to the shareholders by showing that cash
outflows from acquisition are less than the corresponding cash inflows. It seems that the
only way the above objective can be achieved is by debiting the cost of the acquisition at
some time to the profit and loss account.
The main aim of the first part of this chapter has been to review the theoretical issues of
accounting for goodwill in the UK. We will now consider the history of accounting for
goodwill and its regulation against the backdrop of the theoretical issues.
2.6	 History and Regulation
In the United Kingdom, the statutory requirements relating to accounting for goodwill are set
out in the Companies Act of 1985. As explained in Paragraph 9(4) and (5) of Schedule 4A,
the interest of the parent company and its subsidiaries in the adjusted capital and reserves
of an acquired subsidiary undertaking must be offset against the acquisition cost. The
resulting amount, if positive, must be treated as goodwill, and, if negative, as a negative
consolidation difference. The positive goodwill, if it not has been written off, should be
included under the heading of intangible fixed assets and shown separately from other
assets. If the goodwill is treated as an asset, it must be depreciated systematically over a
period chosen by the directors. The period chosen must not exceed the useful economic life
of the goodwill and must be disclosed in a note. Internally generated goodwill may not be
capitalised and the act also prohibits the revaluation of goodwill.
In practice, some of the accounting standards is based on the valuation concepts or combination of the two
models.
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However, the history of accounting for goodwill history and its regulation in the UK goes
beyond the basic statutory requirements. Lee (1973) carried out an empirical study of the
accounting treatment of goodwill by companies in the UK from 1962 to 1971. His survey
was based on the top 100 companies listed in the industrial section of The Times 1000 and
was concerned essentially with goodwill arising from acquisitions. According to Lee, there
were five main ways in which UK companies accounted for goodwill at that time (Table 2.3).
Table 2.3: Goodwill Practices of UK Companies (1962-1971)
Year/Accounting Treatment 	 1962 (%) 1965 (%) 1971 (%)
Disclosing as a fixed asset 	 31	 24	 14
Neither fixed or current asset	 24	 28	 32
Separate deduction from reserve 	 18	 22	 9
As a reserve	 13	 9	 8
Immediate write-off 	 49	 50	 58
Two accounting treatments	 -35	 -29	 -21
Three accounting treatments	 0	 -2	 0
Total	 100	 100	 100S,jrce deTrom Log1g73).
Goodwill was treated as a fixed asset; or as an asset classified as neither fixed nor current;
as a separate deduction from reserves; as a non-distributable reserve (negative reserve); or
as a write off or write back either to profit retained for the year or to reserves. The varied
practices in that period might have been due to the fact that managers faced different
circumstances which might dictate their choice of accounting treatment, including
differences in the size of available "accounting" reserves, the amounts of goodwill, the level
of earnings and the extent to which companies were vulnerable to take-over (Nobes, 1992).
However, one could conclude that of the five accounting treatments the most popular during
this period was immediate write-off which was used in 49% (1962) and 58% (1971) of all
cases. Of the companies that disclosed a separate asset value for goodwill, only between
10 percent and 17 percent amortised that amount.
In 1974, the Accounting Standard Steering Committee (ASSC) set up two working sub-
committees on accounting for goodwill. These sub-committees proposed two different
accounting treatments for goodwill on acquisition. The first was to amortise goodwill over a
period of 40 years and the second was to write it off immediately against reserves. However
the topic was dropped in the mid-1970s when the ASC began their work on inflation
accounting (Nobes, 1992). On the other hand, there were developments regarding
accounting for goodwill in the European Community. The EC Fourth Directive on company
published account was issued in 1978. This deals only with the accounts of individual
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companies not with group accounts - thus only with goodwill which arises in the accounts of
a particular company and not with goodwill arising from consolidation. Article 37 of the
Directive requires that where goodwill is treated as an asset, it should be written oft over a
period of not more than five years. The words "where goodwill is treated as an asset" are
important in the United Kingdom. They allow, by implication, that goodwill need not be
treated as an asset but can be written off directly to reserves, which is exactly what the UK
officials who negotiated the Directive had sought (Holgate, 1990).
In June 1980, the ASC published a discussion paper on goodwill. The principle
recommendations for the accounting treatment of goodwill were as follows:
1. Goodwill should not be carried as a permanent item in consolidated balance sheets
2. Goodwill should be amortised over its useful economic life
3. The useful economic life should not be larger than the number of years for which the
value of the stream of distributable earnings arising from the acquisition is material in
relation to the price paid. A mathematical formula was presented which gave a figure of
2 1/2 times the Price/Earnings ratio applicable to the acquired company as being
approximate to the amortisation period, up to a limit of forty years.
At that time, the goodwill practices of UK companies could be grouped into three
approaches: (a) to show goodwill at cost, (b) to capitalise goodwill in the balance sheets and
amortise it against profit and (c) to immediately write off acquisition goodwill against
reserves (Tables 2.4 and 2.5).
Table 2.4: GoodwIll Practices of UK Companies (1973 - 1974)
Year/Accounting Treatment	 1973 -4 (%)
Shown at cost	 24
Amortised	 2
Written off immediately	 24
Written down but not amortisatlon 	 19
No reference to goodwill	 30
Total	 100
SOurc deU Rm 1CAEW SUN OtPublISfld AU1731974
Table 2.5: Goodwill Practices of UK Companies (1979- 1980)
Year/Accounting Treatment	 1979 (%) 1980 (%)
Shownatcost	 17	 11
Amortised	 19	 12
Written off immediately	 64	 77
Total	 100	 100
UU from tCAESUNrPUb1AUflmT98OT981.
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The above mentioned discussion paper attracted different opinions from commentators.
One school of thought believed that goodwill should be amortised while a second school
believed that goodwill should be written off immediately on acquisition. The ASC were
clearly influenced by the divergence of opinion because it did not proceed with the
recommendation in the main body of the 1980 discussion paper that acquired goodwill
should be amortised.
This led to a change of direction which can be seen clearly from the Exposure Draft 30 (ED
30) which the ASC published in October 1982. The main proposals in ED 30 were:
1. Non-purchased goodwill should not be recognised in the financial statements.
2. Goodwill should be the difference between the fair value of the consideration given and
the fair value of the separable net assets acquired.
3. Purchased goodwill should not be carried in the balance sheet by either amortisation
through the profit and loss account on a systematic basis over its estimated useful
economic life or by writing it off immediately against reserves representing realised
profits.
4. The estimated useful economic life should not exceed 20 years.
5. Negative goodwill should be directly credited to reserves.
Comments on ED 30 were received from ninety-seven organisations and individuals with a
majority of them favouring "immediate write-off" rather than "amortisation". Following these
comments, the working party recommended to the ASC that the accounting standard should
now adopt a flexible approach and allow an option of capitalisation and amortisation but that
it should express a preference for "immediate write-oft". However, this change did not
include a twenty-year maximum amortisation period, as proposed (Holgate, 1990). In
December 1984, almost two years from the publication of ED 30, the ASC published
Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 22 "Accounting for Goodwill'. The standard's
principal recommendations may be summarised as follows:
1. Internally generated goodwill is not allowed to be shown on a company's balance sheet.
2. Positive goodwill should be written off to reserves in the period in which it is acquired or
by amortisation through the profit and loss account.
3. Negative goodwill should be credited to reserves at the time of acquisition.
4. It also allows acquiring companies to account for some acquisitions using immediate
write off and for others using capitalisation and amortisation.
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This standard received much criticism soon after it was published. According to Holgate
(1990), the major criticisms levelled at SSAP 22 were:
1. A document that allows widely differing approaches to an issue cannot be called a
standard. This criticism relates principally to the alternative accounting policies allowed
by the standard whereby companies can immediately write-off acquired goodwill to
reserves, which has no impact on reported earning per share, or they can capitalise and
amortise it, which does have an impact.
2. Even if the choices in 1 above were deemed to be generally acceptable, it is not
acceptable for the standard to allow a company to use both policies at the same time
because this conflicts with the fundamental accounting concept of consistency.
3. Immediate write-off was attacked because it was said that goodwill often increased in
value and that amortisation was contrary to that fact. Moreover, it was argued that
expenses such as advertising and staff training have the effect of sustaining the value
of goodwill and amortisation has the effect of duplicating that charge.
A study by Russell et aL (1989) showed that, in 1986, almost all UK companies chose the
"immediate write-off" accounting treatment for goodwill (Table 2.6). Arguably, the method
chosen by the companies can be justified if it is assumed that managers will act to achieve
their personal interest. By choosing immediate write-off against reserve, part of the cost of
the acquisition which, logically, should be charged to the profit and loss account will not
impact on profits.
Table 2.6: Goodwill Practices of UK Companies (1982-1986)
Year/Accounting Treatment 	 1982	 1983	 1984 1985	 1986
c/f as Intangible asset	 10	 8	 7	 3	 0
c/f as negative reserve 	 4	 3	 1	 1	 0
Written off immediately	 78	 80	 87	 94	 98
Amortised	 4	 6	 2	 1	 1
Other	 4	 3	 3	 2	 1
Total	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100
SOUrte AdproaTrom
The effect of the choice between immediate write-off and a five year amortisation (as
recommended by IASC E32) was so material (Grinyer et aL, 1992) that the decision by
managers to choose immediate write-off can be understood in terms of the positive effect
on reported earnings. In practical terms, SSAP 22 "encouraged" companies to select the
treatment that gave the most favourable results. Consequently this led to abuse by
managers. Such abuse has been well documented and, according to Woolf (1990),
included the following:
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1. Allocating low value to acquired assets and a correspondingly high value to goodwill;
writing off goodwill against reserves and enjoying low future depreciation charges on
acquired assets, Inflating goodwill still further with a provision for future rationalisation
costs (e.g. British Airways acquired British Caledonian in 1990)6;
2. writing off future revenue costs against the provision (rather than profit); and writing back
to the profit and loss account any part of the original provision now regarded as
excessive;
3. obtaining the court's permission to write off goodwill against share premiums 7; writing off
goodwill against nothing at all;
4. creating a negative "goodwill write-off reserve" which could linger indefinitely as a
dangling debit leaving other reserves and earnings intact8;
5. writing off goodwill against revaluation reserve (which is now prohibited under the
Companies Act of 1989) and finding an alternative treatment to different acquired
intangible assets such as brands, titles, concessions and patents.
Because the ASC received a great deal of criticism for allowing the above-mentioned
"abuses", it is not surprising that the ASC revised SSAP 22. The revised standard was
published in September 1989 and required companies to disclose more information about
the treatment of goodwill. The extra disclosure requirements obliged companies to publish:
1. The fair value of the purchase consideration, the amount of purchased goodwill arising
on each acquisition and the method of dealing with goodwill;
2. A table of the previous book values of the acquired assets, the adjustments made and
the fair values ascribed;
3. Movements in the provision relating to acquisitions;
4. Certain details when fair values can be ascribed only on a provisional basis; and
5. Certain details regarding the treatment of goodwill on the disposal of a previously
acquired subsidiary.
6 The calculation of goodwill of £353m given by the sum of Net Liabilities acquired £lOm, purchase price £246m,
acquisition expenses £7m, and estimated reorganisation expenses £90m.
Saatchi & Saatchi sought court approval for the cancellation of their share premium account in order to write off
goodwill in 1985.
" Erskine House Group accounts for the year ended 31 March 1986 shows a goodwill reserve.
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In August 1989 the ASC issued a report (ASC Report No. 7) which indicated that
"acquired goodwill should be recognised as an asset in the balance sheet, it
should be amortised through the profit and loss account on a systematic basis
and amortistion should be over the useful economic life subject to a maximum
of forty years, but if the directors consider that the life exceeds twenty years
they must give sufficient information to explain why the believe the life to be of
such length, giving details of the main factors that give rise to goodwill".
On the other hand, in January 1989, the IASC issued Exposure Draft 32 (The Comparability
of Financial Statements), which proposed amendments to numerous International
Accounting Standards, including lAS 22, which also governs the accounting for goodwill.
The IASC sees the purpose of the proposed amendments as the first step in the process of
improving lASs through the removal of the free choice of accounting treatments presently
permitted. For the treatment of goodwill; that is, the difference between the cost of
acquisition and fair values of net identifiable assets acquired, the IASC proposes:
1. that for positive goodwill any excess of cost over the fair value of net assets acquired be
given asset recognition as goodwill on the consolidation balance sheet;
2. that goodwill be amortised to income on a systematic basis over its useful life; the
amortisation period should not exceed five years unless the company justifies and
explains in the financial statements a longer useful life. The maximum useful life should
not exceed twenty years.
In February 1990 the ASC issued ED 47 (Accounting for Goodwill) that contained the same
proposals as the 1989 report. In this exposure draft, it was argued that the disclosure of
goodwill as an asset would lead to improved accountability and this would bring the UK into
line with most of the world (For example, goodwill must be amortised in the United States
and Canada. The amortisation period is not more than 40 years. By comparison, Japan
allows an option between capitalisation and immediate write-off of goodwill against income.
In Australia, capitalisation and amortisation over the goodwill's determinable life is
recommended. However in practice, most companies immediately write-off goodwill to
stockholders' equity).
Leading practitioners and businessman attacked this proposal even before it was officially
published (Grinyer etal., 1992). A study by Grinyer etaL shows that most of the companies
and auditors that responded to ED 47 rejected the proposal to capitalise goodwill and to
systematically amortise it against profits (Table 2.7).
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opposition to systematic amortisation (Nobes, 1992). The ASB started their work on this
issue with a new version of the discussion paper "Goodwill and Intangible Asset?. In this
discussion paper the ASB outlined six possible alternative treatments. These alternatives
were as follows:
1. Capitalisation and predetermined gradual amortisation.
2. Capitalisation and annual impairment.
3. Combination of two capitalisation approaches with method 2 being used only in the
special circumstances where goodwill had an indefinite life believed to exceed 20 years
4. Immediate write-off to reserves.
5. Immediate write-off to separate reserves.
6. Immediate write-off to separate reserve with impairment tests.
According to the ASB, no overall consensus emerged from the responses to the Discussion
Paper. The method that individually achieved greatest support was method 5. However,
more respondents favoured the capitalisation method than favoured the elimination
methods. The board decided to develop proposals based on method 3 after taking into
account both the arguments made by respondents and the direction being taken
internationally as well as the previous opposition to ED 47's proposals for compulsory
amortisation. As mentioned in the FRS 10, the board favoured capitalisation rather than
elimination against reserves and was influenced by the arguments below:
1. A method requiring elimination against reserves would treat goodwill very differently from
brands and similar intangible assets. Given that such assets are very similar in nature to
goodwill and that the allocation of a purchase cost between the two can be subjective, it
would be possible for a reporting entity's results to be shown in a more favourable light
merely by classifying expenditure as an intangible asset rather than goodwill, or vice
versa.
2. The immediate elimination of goodwill against reserves fails to demonstrate
management's accountability for goodwill as part of the investment in an acquired
business. The goodwill is not included in the assets on which a return must be earned,
and under methods 4 and 5 no charge would be made in the profit and loss account if
the value of the goodwill were not maintained.
In January 1995, Gore et a!. (1996) conducted a survey that was based on the Finance
Directors and senior management of The Times 1,000 companies. According to Gore et a!.,
92% of UK companies preferred to use immediate write-off and 6% used capitalisation and
gradual amortisation, consistent with other UK surveys. The ASB then published the
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Financial Reporting Exposure Draft (FRED 12) in June 1996, which is based on method 3
set out above. In these proposals, the ASB proposes that goodwill should be written off over
a maximum of 20 years except where it can be demonstrated that the goodwill might have
an indefinitely long life and, for time being, require no depreciation at all. Where goodwill is
depreciated over more than 20 years or not at all, its value would be subject to an
'impairment test'.
Basically the proposals can be summarised briefly as:
1. purchased goodwill to be capitalised;
2. purchased intangible assets to be recognised separately from goodwill when their value
can be measured reliably;
3. goodwill and intangible assets generally to be amortised over not more than 20 years,
but, exceptionally, amortisation to be avoided altogether and impairment review applied
instead.
There are two aspects which should be considered when discussing impairment tests.
According to Brown (1996), impairment reviews would involve a comparison of the carrying
value of the purchased goodwill with the value of goodwill in the acquired business at the
review date. If the carrying value were higher, it would be written down. The value of
goodwill in the acquired business would be determined by calculating the present value of
the forecast future cash flows. However, goodwill that was being amortised over 20 years or
less would not totally escape the requirements for impairment reviews. An impairment
review would be required one year after acquisition. If the business was not performing in
line with pre-acquisition expectations, any resulting over- valuation of the goodwill would be
written off. Thereafter, only if a change in circumstances, such as the emergence of a major
competitor, indicated that the goodwill had become impaired, would any further impairment
reviews be required.
One could argue that FRED 12 has a diplomatic ambivalence. Those who are opposed to
write off goodwill through Profit and Loss Account will seize on the opportunity offered to
avoid doing so. Those who support a Profit and Loss write-off will be pleased that there is a
rebuttable presumption that the life of goodwill does not exceed 20 years.
As mentioned by the ASB, the majority of respondents to FRED 12 were broadly supportive
of its overall approach. The minority who were opposed to the approach divided into those
who would prefer immediate elimination of goodwill against reserves and those who would
prefer compulsory amortisation. In December 1997, ASB issued Financial Reporting
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Standard (FRS) 10 (Goodwill and Intangible Assets) which is based on FRED 12 with some
minor modification.
The most significant changes that have been made by FRS 10 are as follows:
1. The removal of the procedures to be used in performing impairment reviews which has
been published as a separate FRS encompassing the impairment of all fixed assets and
goodwill9.
2. Simplification of the procedures for performing 'first year' impairment reviews. According
to the ASB, they accept the argument that a requirement to perform a full first year
impairment review for every acquisition would be unduly onerous, particularly for smaller
companies. The FRS permits the first year impairment review to be performed on a
simpler review with full review being required only if the simpler review indicates a
potential impairment.
Nine out of ten members of the ASB approved the adoption of FRS 10. One member who
dissented is Mr Hinton and his dissenting view was set out in Appendix IV of FRS 10. The
statement published by the ASB is as follows:
"Mr Hinton dissents from the FRS because he does not agree that goodwill should be
capitalised as an asset and amortised, or that revaluation of identifiable intangible
assets should be prohibited. He advocates an alternative approach, which, he
believes, places greater emphasis on the needs of users and the nature of goodwill,
recognising that it is neither an asset nor an immediate loss in value. He concludes
that goodwill should not be presented as an asset or in any way amortised but should
be deducted from shareholders' equity. He notes that over 95 per cent of UK
companies with goodwill at present deduct such goodwill from shareholders equity by
write-off to reserves or to goodwill reserves"
Basically, FRS 10 restricts accounting for goodwill to one method; that is, to capitalise
purchased goodwill and to amortise it in the profit and loss account with a few exceptions
(As required by FRS 10, goodwill and intangible assets generally to be amortised over not
more than 20 years, but, exceptionally, amortisation to be avoided altogether and
impairment review applied instead). Companies no longer have a choice as there is no
longer an option to write off goodwill to reserves. However, a number of factors will
influence FRS 10's success. One will be the effectiveness of the impairment review
procedures that have been field tested but not yet applied more widely. Logically, if
managers follow their personal interests, instead of amortisation, it is reasonable to believe
that there will be a large amount of goodwill in the balance sheet. At least that amount will
This Financial Reporting Standard, FRS 11 (Impairment of Fixed Assets and Goodwill) was issued by
Accounting Standard Board in July 1998.
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not disappear immediately through a hole in reserves and, thus, it will would bring the UK
closer to international practice.
2.7	 Conclusion and Discussion
This chapter has discussed two issues: first, the theoretical issues and then the history and
regulation of accounting for goodwill in the UK. Most of the arguments in the literature
relating to accounting for goodwill are based on one or other of the valuation and matching
concepts. Authors who define goodwill under the excess profit approach are advocates of
the valuation concepts which often leads to them supporting the immediate write-off against
reserve alternative.
On the other hand, authors who define goodwill under the residuum approach favour the
matching concept that leads to capitalisation and amortisation of goodwill. As stated before,
these two concepts are essentially mutually exclusive within a single profit and loss account.
Therefore, it can be understood why advocates of the different approaches reach different
conclusions as to the appropriate treatment of goodwill. From the second part of discussion,
it is obvious that accounting for goodwill is a controversial subject in the UK, at least in
terms of history and regulatory perspectives. This might be related to the controversy
surrounding the theoretical aspect of accounting for goodwill.
However, many researchers in this area believe that the behavioural aspects of managers
play a very important role in contributing to the accounting for goodwill saga in the UK. Most
of the "managers factors" analysis is based on the perception that financial statements are
supposed to be one of the basic elements in accounting system. Therefore, any different
treatments of accounting for goodwill will affect the final result of the financial statement,
which then will affect managers.
Most of these arguments are based on Agency Theory that was developed by Jensen and
Meckling in 1976. Agency Theory as defined by Jensen and Meckling is:
"a contract, under which one or more persons [the principal(s)] engage another person
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some
decision making authority to the agent"
This theory can be applied in financial reporting, because a manager who is supposed to
perform his service on behalf of a principal will always be obliged to give some information
about the results of his efforts in order to allow for the principal to monitor his performance
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(Ballwieser, 1987). It is reasonable to acknowledge that the large public companies are
complex organisations far different from the traditional economic notion of a single
entrepreneur running his own small firm. Thus, the owners of a firm (shareholders)
generally have little interest in and even less direct knowledge of the day to day operations
of their firms. This phenomenon can be attributed to the separation of the ownership and
the management functions that have become increasingly prevalent (Cohen and Cyert,
1965).
This situation (agent-principal relationship and separation of ownership and management
function) requires a monitoring system to make managers accountable to owners. Russell
et a!. (1989) suggested that financial statements "within agency contexts" act as primary
tools to motivate and monitor managers. On the other hand, Williamson (1963) has
developed a model of business behaviour that focuses on the self-interest-seeking
behaviour of corporate managers. According to him,
"this separation of ownership and management functions permits the managers of a
firm to pursue their own self-interest, subject only to their being able to maintain
effective control over the firm. In particular, if profits at any time are at an acceptable
level, if the firm shows a reasonable rate of growth over time, and sufficient dividends
are paid to keep the shareholders happy, then the managers are fairly certain of
retaining their power"
It is widely accepted that reported profit is one of the key elements by which managers and
others assess managerial performance. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) suggest a model for
predicting and explaining the behaviour of managers. One of their most important factors is
the effect on managers of reductions in corporate earnings. It also appears reasonable to
claim that managers will show their interest in other areas in financial reports if these areas
are used as tools to monitor their performance. Obviously, if the above arguments are valid,
managers of firms will give serious consideration to accounting for goodwill issues because
any treatment which is proposed and selected will affect the numbers in financial
statements. Thus, the aim of FRS 10 to make management accountable for amounts spent
on purchased goodwill and to alert the readers of financial statements to any decline in the
health of acquired businesses (Brown, 1996) is not surprising.
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CHAPTER 3
ACCOUNTING FOR GOODWILL
3.1	 Introduction
The conceptual and theoretical issues related to accounting for goodwill in the UK have
been presented in the previous chapter, including historical and regulative perspectives.
Goodwill has been the subject of many works produced by academics and practitioners and
related issues have been the subject of many debates. As mentioned by Lee (1971), the
debate was initiated by Francis More in 1891 and it has been continued over the years by
eminent accountants and academicians such as Paton (1944), Nelson (1953), Spacek
(1964), Lee (1971), Ma and Hopkins (1988), Grinyer et a!. (1990), Bryer (1990), Nobes
(1992), Tearny and Johnson (1993) and more recently by McCarthy and Schneider (1995),
Jennings et a!. (1996), Higson (1998) and Deng and Lev (1998). Many of the earlier papers
in which goodwill issues were discussed were analytical and descriptive in nature. In recent
years, however, a number of empirical studies have been published. This chapter will
review some of the previous work on accounting for goodwill, concentrating on the empirical
work that has appeared over the past 10 years. Some of the earlier papers relating to the
theoretical and regulatory issues have already been discussed in Chapter 2; thus, some of
the discussion in this chapter is complimentary to that of the previous chapter. This chapter
is divided into six main sections: valuation and treatment (3.2), amortisation of goodwill
(3.3), capitalisation of goodwill (3.4), standardisation and harmonisation (3.5), management
and SSAP 22 (3.6) and the value-relevance of goodwill (3.7). Section 3.8 provides a brief
summary of this chapter.
3.2	 Valuation and Treatment
ED 47 (Accounting for Goodwill) was published by the Accounting Standards Committee in
1990. The proposed UK Standard would require goodwill to be capitalised and amortised
over an arbitrary period. This proposal aroused substantial controversy, and was countered
by suggestions that goodwill should remain as an asset unless its value diminished.
Egginton (1990) addresses the issue of whether practical methods can be devised to test
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the value of goodwill. Basically, his models are based on how to calculate the market
capitalisation and have that computed, we then compare this with the carrying value of
asset included goodwill. He proposes four basic models which might be used as a broad
framework for testing goodwill namely: Stock Market Capitalisation, Net Present Value,
Value as a Function of Current Earnings and Value as a Function of Causal Variables. All
the four models will be explained briefly below.
3.2.1 Stock Market Capitalisation
According to Egginton, stock market capitalisation is the most obvious test of goodwill to the
market. This model is based on the assumption that the value of the firm equals the number
of shares issued times their current Stock Market price. Symbolically,
V = NP
where,
V	 is the value of the equity of the company
N	 is the number of shares in issue
P	 is the current price per share
If the accounting value placed on net assets (including goodwill) (VNA) were less than V
(VNA < V), the accounting value would be acceptable. If VNA were greater than V (VNA>
V), it would require a reduction in goodwill to bring net assets down to the stock market
value.
3.2.2 Net Present Value
The net present value model is based on the following equation:
C:v=t
:=O (I+k )'
where,
V	 is value of the equity of the company
C	 is the net cash flow of the business segment at time t
k	 is the firm's weighted average cost of capital
As explained by Egginton, there is some difficulty with this model because companies do
not project their cash flows to infinity. Nevertheless, companies commonly prepare planning
budgets with horizons of three or five years. In order to assess the stability of the companys
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earning power and to judge whether NPV appears to have been maintained, the auditor
could use such budgets in cash flow or profit terms. Egginton mentions two set drawbacks
of this approach; i.e., that the budgets are prepared by management and that the short time
horizon does not allow sufficient discounting in order to obtain an explicit NPV.
3.2.3 Value as a Function of Current Earnings
This model is based on the price-earning ratio which can be viewed as the reciprocal of a
discount rate; in effect, earnings are assumed constant and discounted as perpetuity to a
present value. Symbolically:
V = Y6IKe
Where,
V	 is value of the equity of the company
Y	 is the most recent net profit attributable to shareholders of the company
K	 is the company's equity cost of capital
According to Egginton, this model is analogous to the value function developed in a paper
on the theory and value of earnings by Ohlson (1989). In the present context, the last
period's earnings are used as a proxy for the next period's earnings in the face of
uncertainty. In using V in a goodwill test against net book value it would be necessary to
adapt the definitions appropriately. One example given by Egginton is that in considering the
profits of a segment, the earnings considered would need to be before both interest and tax,
and the cost of capital would be in a corresponding gross form. The cost of capital should
also be related to the risk of the segment's activities.
3.2.4 Value as a Function of Causal Variables
The fourth model mentioned by Egginton is based on the belief that the value of a company
might be loosely characterised as being derived from a number of causal variable factors.
Among these would be the markets for goods and services that the company produces. The
nature of the competition faced in those markets is determined by the company's command
over tangible assets and its strategic assets, which are effectively separable intangibles.
These elements are brought together by the entrepreneurial and operating skills of
management and work force, (labelled as X-efficiency).
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The implied value relationships could be stated thus:
V= f(M,C,T,S,X)
Where,
V
	 is the value of the equity of the company
M
	 is the potential value of the markets in which the company operates
C
	 is a measure of the strength of competition
T
	
is the value of the companys tangible assets
S
	
is the value of its strategic or separable intangible assets
x
	
is the X-efliciency within the company
Egginton realised, however, that it is impossible to measure all these elements objectively.
He argued that in practice none are measured objectively since accountants normally use
the proxy of historical cost for the value of net tangible assets and separable intangibles.
The broad principles of the model could be used as a basis for selecting proxies for
elements in the formulation of valuation tests which could then be used in making
judgements about the maintenance of goodwill.
According to the author, the models are not mutually exclusive. Given the limitations of the
models and the subjectivity of the tests, the suspicion with which intangibles are traditionally
regarded, and the caution of accountants, these models might be used in combination.
Another report produced by Arnold et a!. (1992) which was initiated by the ASB also focuses
on accounting for goodwill in the UK. The study is based on a theoretical framework which
adopts the premises that accounting reports are needed: (a) for decision-useful information
to satisfy diverse needs but with common interests as typified by those of investors and (b)
for the control of accounting choice by means of standards in an agency situation involving
moral hazard. Arnold et a!. divided goodwill into three elements; namely, separately
identifiable intangibles, benefits arising from monopoly profits and accounting measurement
errors.
Arnold et a!. argued that the practice of immediate write-oft following corporate acquisitions
is subject to creative accounting which attempts to avoid the issue of goodwill by
constructing transactions in such a way that accounting for goodwill is not required. The
authors see the existing situation as full of inconsistency and needing specified criteria to
deal with alternative situations. They recommend that these criteria should include
relevance and reliability, prudence, consistency and comparability. The proposed system of
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accounting for goodwill is based on the full disclosure of all intangibles that can be verified
as existing. All goodwill is to be decomposed into:
1. the fair value of separable intangibles
2. the present value of profits arising from market imperfections, and
3. over or under payment
Accounting treatment for (3) is to write it off immediately against income and to write (1) and
(2) off to income over their useful economic lives, ensuring that their net book value is below
their recoverable amount. Companies are to be given the option of occasionally revaluing
that intangible but they have to disclose the basis of valuation as well as details of the value.
In a different context, Wines and Ferguson (1993) examine the accounting policies adopted
for goodwill and for identifiable intangible assets by a sample of 150 Australian Stock
Exchange listed companies over the five-year period from 1985 to 1989 inclusive. The
general research objective in this study was to examine the financial statements from the
above sample in order to ascertain any trends in accounting policies adopted for goodwill
and identifiable intangible assets. The first Australian Accounting Standard relating to
intangible assets was AAS 18 (Accounting for Goodwill) which was issued in March 1984.
According to the authors, Australian companies had previously adopted a wide variety of
accounting treatments for goodwill. With the introduction of AAS 18, however, which
required companies to capitalise and amortise goodwill over the time during which benefits
were expected to arise, many companies failed to comply with the requirement for various
reasons preferring immediate write off. It required the introduction of ARSB 1013 which has
statutory backing for compliance to be more effectively enforced. This approved accounting
standard applies to companies reporting in financial periods ending after 18 June 1988.
Against this background, they developed their first hypothesis. It stated that, over the period
1985 to 1989, an increasing percentage of companies reporting goodwill adopted the
accounting policy of capitalisation and systematic amortisation. The second hypothesis
addresses the question of whether there has been a change in the accounting policies
adopted for identifiable intangible assets. With companies recognising identifiable
intangibles in an effort to reduce the impact on reported operating profits of the
requirements of AAS 18 and ASRB 1013 for the amortisation of goodwill, it would be
expected that a decreasing percentage of companies reporting identifiable intangibles would
have adopted the accounting policy of capitalisation and systematic amortisation.
39
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 summarise the goodwill accounting policies and the categories of
identifiable assets in this study. Wines and Ferguson reveal a general decrease in the
diversity of goodwill accounting policies over the study period but the converse is the case
for identifiable intangible policies. In particular, they find an increase in the percentage of
companies electing not to amortise identifiable intangibles. The study therefore provides
evidence to support claims that companies have been recognising identifiable intangibles in
order to reduce the impact on the reported operating profits of amortising goodwill because
of the change in the accounting standard.
Table 3.1: Goodwill Practices of Australian Companies (1985-1989)
Accounting Policy	 1985 (%) 1986 (%) 1987 (%) 1988(%) 	 1989(%)
1 Systematic Amortisation 	 43.7
	
52.2
	 55.0
	
63.1
	
86.8
2.Non-systematic	 0.0
	
0.0
	 1.3
	
1.2
	
0.0
Amortisation	 4.2
	
4.3
	 1.3
	
1.2
	
0.0
3.Extraordinary Amortisation	 4.2
	
2.9
	 1.3
	
1.2
	 0.0
4.No Amortisation	 4.2
	
4.3
	 1.3
	
0.0
	
0.0
5.Dangling Debit 	 26.8
	
26.1
	
27.5
	
19.0
	
2.4
6.Wntten-off Extraordinary 	 9.9
	
4.4
	 2.4
	
0.0
	
0.0
7.Wntten-off Reserves	 0.0
	 0.0
	 1.2
	
2.4
	 0.0
8.Written-off Abnormal
	
7.0
	
5.8
	
8.7
	
10.7
	
10.8
9.Both 1 and 6	 0.0	 0.0
	 0.0
	
1.2
	
0.0
10.Both 1 and 8	 100.0
	
100.0
	
100.0
	
100.0	 100.0
Total
(Source: Wines and Ferguson, 1
Table 3.2: CategorIes of Identifiable Intangible Assets Recognised
Accounting Policy	 1985 1986
	 1987	 1988	 1989
Trademarks/Names	 5	 9	 18	 24	 24
Patents	 8	 11	 16
	
21
	
16
Licences	 7	 8	 10
	
13
	
14
Rights	 8	 8	 12	 13	 11
Brand	 3
	
6
	
10	 9
Other	 1	 2	 1
Mastheads	 1
	
1
Titles	 1
	
1
Intellectual Property	 0	 0	 1	 1
Technological
	
0
	
0
	
1
	
1
Assets	 0
	
0
	
1
	 0
Franchises	 0
	
0
	
0
	
0
Television Licences
32	 42	 68
	
88
	 80
Total
[Source: Wines and Ferguson (1993)]
3.3	 The Amortisation of Goodwill
In his 1995 paper, Grinyer discussed the basic concepts of accounting theory related to
accounting for goodwill. The most important issue presented in his paper is a new idea for
amortising goodwill, which is based on the momentum theory of goodwill established by
Nelson in 1953. According to Grinyer, acquisition is frequently an alternative to self-start
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investment, the creation of businesses with the characteristics desired by the managers of
the acquisitive firm. It follows that the acquisition of an established business saves the
bidder the very substantial costs of getting to the same position by the alternative self-start
option. Assuming that the bidder would have proceeded with the alternative investment if
acquisition was not a possible option, then the savings of the outlays associated with the
self-start option represent the equivalent to cash benefits deriving from the acquisition. Such
benefits might be as follows:
1. the acquisition of profits during the build up period of the alternative business
investment, since new businesses in a competitive environment are rarely profitable in
the phase of their early development; and
2. the avoidance of the uncertainty associated with a new business, given that new
concerns typically face a greater number of unknown factors in both the production and
marketing areas than established businesses.
Figure 3.1: Profitability of Acquisition
Profits
[Source: Gnnyer (1995)}
Figure 3.2 depicts the self-start alternative where it is assumed that heavy investment in
revenue expenses would have been incurred in order to achieve profit 'b' by time 't' (the
characteristics and profits of the alternative businesses are identical). The curve 'cd' is
based on the assumption that the rate of such expenditure declines and the level of revenue
achieved rises over time.
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TIME
Figure 3.2: Profitability of Acquisition (Self-Start Business)
Profits
[Source: Grinyer (1995))
Figure 3.3 combines both Figures 3.1 and 3.2 to allow one model to be developed where
the pattern of additional costs associated with the self-start option are shown. These costs
are the differences between the curves 'ad' and 'cd' in Figure 3.3. Grinyer argues that the
curve 'ad' plots the profit stream of the acquisition and 'cd' plots that of the alternative self
start business up to the time at which it is established as being equivalent to the acquisition.
The difference between the curves is hypothesised as being attributable to a combination of
the high costs of creating an internally generated business and the lead-time required to
build up revenue in the start-up business. The difference in the curves are the savings
achieved by reason of the acquisition and therefore the benefits obtained by purchasing
goodwill.
Furthermore, Grinyer believes that Figure 3.3 reflects the perceptions that:
1. A significant element of the benefit from acquiring an existing company is the avoidance
of the start up costs of establishing the infrastructure of the alternative business, its
production and service capacity and skills and the market for its product.
2. Those costs are likely to fall particularly heavily on the early years of a new business. It is
likely that the pattern of the start up costs will show a decline over time and the costs will
not be incurred over a very lengthy period.
3. One element of the benefit derived from acquisitions is the additional profit made on the
higher sales volume that is likely to underlie curve 'ad' during period 1 to t - 1.
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Figure 3.3: Profitability of Acquisition (Combination of FIgure 3.1 and 3.)
Profits
[Source: Gnnyer (1995))
Based on the above arguments, Grinyer proceeds to the following hypotheses that:
1. All of the benefits gained by acquisition decline in value over time,
2. The period over which they extend could be expected to be no longer than the time
usually required to form and establish a company with similar characteristics to the one
acquired, and
3. Given (1) and (2), if it is to comply with the conventional concepts of matching based
depreciation, the pattern of amortisation of goodwill should reflect the declining pattern of
benefit.
Basically, the discussion offered by Grinyer is based on a deductive argument which
proceeds from the stated assumptions and is consistent with the concept of matching based
accrual accounting which underlies most practice and is open to empirical observations.
In contrast to Grinyers study, Hall (1991) seeks to establish that in the United States, Under
accounting Principles Board Opinion 70 (1970), managerial choice would be restricted to a
single method of amortising over a fixed period of 40 years or less, if the guideline could be
interpreted in a uniform way. This reflects the desire of the APB to restrict alternative
choices. However because there is substantial discretion in the choice of period for
amortisation an opportunity for management opportunism exists. Hall seeks to identify how
management behaviour of the type identified by Watts and Zimmerman (1978) would
influence the choice of accounting policy. To do this he establishes three hypotheses:
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1. Firms operating near their debt covenant constraints choose longer amortisation periods
for goodwill (leverage ratio is used to proxy for the nearness to debt constraints).
2. Large firms choose shorter amortisation periods for goodwill (net sales are used as the
measure of firm size).
3. Firms with high ownership concentration choose shorter amortisation periods for
goodwill (ownership concentration is measured as the percentage of the firm owned by
insiders).
Hall estimated the following regression model:
YEARS = a0 + a 1 LEV + a2SIZE + a3OWNER
where,
YEARS	 = Maximum number of years over which goodwill is amortised
LEV	 = Total Debt/Total Assets if Moody's reports a debt covenant sensitive to
goodwill accounting choices; zero otherwise
SIZE	 = Net Sales
OWNER	 = Percentage of the firm owned by insiders
The results of the regression analysis perlormed by Hall are presented in Table 3.3 which
shows that the length of the goodwill amortisation period is related to the size of the firm
and, for those firms with debt contract provision sensitive to goodwill accounting, to the
firm's leverage. Thus, it appears that managers take economic consequences into
consideration when deciding the number of years over which goodwill is amortised. In
particular, political costs and debt contracting costs are considered. This is in contrast to a
strict interpretation of APB17, which requires that goodwill be amortised over the periods
when a company is estimated to have benefited.
Table 3.3: Goodwill amortisation as a Function of Debt, Sales and Ownership
a2	 a3	 R2	 N
Predicted Sign	 +	 -	 -
Estimate	 16.887	 -0.240	 0.058	 0.273 48
t-statistics	 1.804	 -2.932	 0.941
Probability	 0.078	 0.005	 0.352
Model: YEARS = ao+ a 1 LEV + a2SIZE + a3OWNER
(Source: HaIl, 1993)
44
3.4	 The Capitalisation of Goodwill
In the UK, Russell et a!. (1989) produced The Chartered Association of Certified
Accountants (CACA) Research Report 13 that concentrated on Accounting for Goodwill in
the UK. Russell et aL examined the accounts of 229 UK companies for the five-year period
from 1982 to 1986. One of the aspects of this report concerns the effects of accounting for
acquired goodwill on the average levels of reported company profitability. Russell et a!.
recalculated the accounting rates of return for those companies by using two different
treatments of acquired goodwill: immediate write-off and a five-year amortisation period.
The results of this study are presented in Table 3.4. The table reveals that one of the main
effects of shifting from immediate write off to the five year amortisation of goodwill would be
to reduce the average level of reported profitability by about three percentage points.
Table 3.4: Effect of the Accounting Treatment of Goodwill on Reported Accounting Rates of Return
Immediate Write off
	 Five year Amortisation
%	 %
Mean	 14	 11
25th Percentile	 10	 7
Median	 15	 11
75th Percentile	 18	 16
[Source: Russell et al. (1989)]
As can be seen in Table 3.4, the 1986 arithmetic mean level of the accounting rates of
return of the companies in the sample was 14 percent under immediate write-off compared
with 11 percent under five year amortisation. At the same time the 25th percentile, the
median and the 75th percentile shifted down by three, four and two percentage points
respectively.
Colley and Volkan (1988) suggest that the issue of the capitalisation of goodwill will continue
to be a source of controversy because changes in accounting standards for business
combinations must inevitably involve goodwill. They suggest that what is currently
recognised as goodwill should be separately identified and capitalised as specific intangible
assets. Any unidentifiable portion of goodwill would then be immediately written off to
stockholders' equity on the acquisition date, due to fundamental uncertainty as to its make
up.
Part of Colley and Volkan's focus is on the financial consequences of the non-capitalisation
of purchased goodwill for US companies for the years 1980 to 1984. Specifically, they
examine the magnitude of the impact on the risk (debt-to-equity) and performance (return
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on investment) ratios of the change from capitalised to non-capitalised purchased goodwill
in accounting policy. In order to determine the credit ratings and stock prices of companies,
financial analysts extensively use both ratios. In order to analyse these changes, the
authors compute the debt to equity (DIE) and net income to total asset (ROA) ratios of the
firms in their sample for each of the five years. Finally they repeat this step, assuming that
the goodwill amount has been deducted from total assets and total equity and that its
amortisation has been added back to net income (NEWROA and NEWDTE, respectively).
Table 3.5: FinancIal Consequences of Non-Capitalisation
Year	 Number	 ROA	 NEW	 Diff	 Duff (%)	 Goodwill to
of Firms	 ROA	 Amount	 Asset Ratio
1980
	 59	 0.0840	 0.0878	 0.0038	 4.5	 0.0318
1981
	 60	 0.0838	 0.0875	 0.0038	 4.5	 0.0320
1982
	 62	 0.0749	 0.0790	 0.0041	 5.5	 0.0373
1983
	 64	 0.0762	 0.0800	 0.0038	 5.0	 0.0350
1984
	 65	 0.0833	 0.0875	 0.0042	 5.0	 0.0359
Year	 Number	 DTE	 NEW	 Duff	 Diff	 Goodwill to
of Firms	 DTE	 Amount	 (%)	 WE Ratio
1980	 59	 0.9090	 0.9811	 0.0721	 7.9	 0.0807
1981
	 60	 0.9277	 0.9943	 0.0666	 7.2	 0.0785
1982
	 62	 0.9817	 1.0837	 0.1020	 10.4	 0.0913
1983
	 64	 0.9298	 1.0117	 0.0819	 8.8	 0.0960
1984
	 65	 0.9924	 1.0843	 0.0919	 9.3	 0.0988
[Source: Colley and Volkan (1988)]
Table 3.5 shows the results of their observations which can be summarised as follows:
1. The average ROA is 0.0804 while the average NEWROA is 0.0844 indicating an
increase of 0.4 percentage points with a range of 0 to 1.7 percentage points.
2. The average DTE is 0.9481 while the average NEWDTE is 1.0310 indicating an increase
of 8 percentage points with a range of 0.2 to 110.0 percentage points.
3. The average ratio of goodwill to total assets is 0.034
4. The average ratio of goodwill to retained earnings is only 0.089.
According to the authors, the average impact of the suggested change in accounting policy
on the ROA may be viewed as immaterial (according to the five percent criterion) while the
impact on DTE is modest, indicating an increase in these ratios of 4.9 percent and 8.7
percent respectively.
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3.5	 Standardisation and Harmon isation
The main theme of Nobes' (1992) paper is the cyclical pattern of standard setting. The
paper contains a cas.e study of UK standard setting on the subject of goodwill. The two most
important aspects of Nobes' study are his explanation of political influences and a
discussion of the cyclical pattern of the standard setting for accounting for goodwill. Nobes
identifies several interested parties which are involved in the political process of standard
setting and outlines their motives and their influence on the Accounting Standard
Committee (ASC).
According to Nobes, corporate managers lobbied vigorously against the 1980 Discussion
Paper and again against ED 47. The most plausible explanation of their behaviour was the
effect that a reduction in earnings might have on share prices, company reputation and
compensation. However, there were directors who felt that in order to avoid political
inference, they should keep profits low and thus would have no incentive to lobby for or
against ED3O, SSAP22 or ED47 since all these propose making amortisation charges
voluntary or compulsory. However, Nobes believes that these managers would still oppose
the idea of compulsory write-off to reserves, an idea which did not gain agenda entrance.
On the other hand, Nobes noted that the auditors were comfortable with ED 30 and SSAP
22 because a standard practice of immediate deduction from reserves reduces uncertainty
more than does the need for estimates of the life of goodwill or appraisals of its impairment.
Some large firms responded to ED 47 by favouring capitalisation followed by the appraisal
technique, which is more uncertain and difficult to audit, compared to immediate write-off or
capitalisation and amortisation over a given period. All the largest firms opposed systematic
amortisation. According to Nobes, this public stance was consistent with the clearly
revealed strong preference of their clients and potential clients rather than their personal
preference. According to Nobes, the views of the users of accounts were hard to ascertain.
However several editorials in professional journals and newspapers were in favour of ED
47, suggesting that it provided better accountability and more complete information.
Government also expressed its view through the DTI which stated clearly to the ASC that
goodwill, where capitalised, must be systematically amortised. Legal council confirmed this
view. As for international opinion, Nobes mentioned that there was no direct pressure from
the FASB, SEC or COB for the removal of the deduction from reserve treatment, although
their views were well known. The most obvious pressure came from the desire of the ASC
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to contribute to the world wide harmonisation attempts of the IASC through the removal of
options as recommended in E32.
Nobes' study illustrates the cyclical pattern of standard setting in a case study of accounting
for goodwill in the UK. According to Nobes, accounting for goodwill in the UK exhibits four
features which can be considered as a cyclical model of standard setting namely; the start
point, stimulus for action, the downward force and the upward force. Figure 3.4 presents an
representation of Nobess goodwill cycle showing the degree of standardisation proposed by
the ASC document.
The cycle starts from a point of varied practice. In the goodwill case, Nobes has noted that
there were a great variety of practices in the 1970s. Goodwill was treated as a fixed asset,
or as an asset classified as neither fixed nor current, nor as a separate deduction from
reserves, or else as a non-distributable reserve (negative reserve) or as a write off or write
back either to profit retained for the year or to reserves. The varied practices during that
period might be due to the fact that managers face different circumstances which might
dictate their choice of accounting treatment. These include differences in the size of
available uaccountingn reserves, the amounts of goodwill, the level of earnings and the
extent to which companies are vulnerable to take-over (Nobes, 1992).
According to the survey done by Lee in 1971, one could conclude that the most favourable
accounting treatment during this period was immediate write-off, out of the five accounting
treatments, immediate write-off was used in 49% of cases in 1962 and 58% in 1971. Of the
companies that disclosed a separate asset value for goodwill, only between 10 percent and
17 percent amortised that amount. The various stimuli for ASC action noted in his paper
come in two chronological groups. First, in the 1970s, there was the prior existence of US
rules, the awareness of diversity of practice and the publication of the drafts of the EC
Fourth and Seventh Directives. A second wave of stimuli in the late 1980s led to the need to
revise SSAP 22. These included an increase in take-over activity in a bull market, and the
related increase in the amounts of goodwill with resultant difficulties in write off.
The first point on the graph in Figure 3.4 is the 1980 Discussion Paper, which shows the
influence of the upward force: the proposal was for the standard practice of capitalisation
and amortisation. The resultant the downward force produced a two-stage retreat to the
permissive SSAP 22. This was followed by amendments but to disclosure rules only, in ED
44 and SSAP 22 (revised). However, according to Nobes, criticism of the result of SSAP 22
from members of the profession, the press and the DTI, as well as the opinion of
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international bodies, led to a review of SSAP 22 and to another opportunity for the upward
force to assert itself in the form of ED 47.
The model predicts that the next stage in the cycle will be a retreat from income reducing
proposals and the publication of a standard that allows more room for judgement and thus
for choice. Nobes mentions that the standard setting arrangements changed in 1990 and
this itself has been blamed on the ASC's performance on goodwill. Judging from the latest
standard published by the ASB which is based on the six alternative treatments; i.e., that
goodwill should be written off over a maximum of 20 years except where it can be
demonstrated that the goodwill might have an indefinitely long life and, requires no
depreciation; and that where goodwill is depreciated over more than 20 years or not at all,
its value should be subject to an 'impairment test', Nobes prediction is almost perfect!
Figure 3.4: An Impression of the Goodwill Cycle
High	 An Impression of the Goodwill Cycle
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(Source: Nobes, 1992)
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The European Union also considers Accounting for Goodwill to be one of the important
items in a program of accounting harmonisation which (as normally understood in the
literature) will lead to a situation of maximum harmony in which particular financial
statement items will be dealt with using the same accounting methods by all member states.
However, Archer et a!. (1996) argue in their paper that this notion ignores the possibility that
companies may be subject to different circumstances which arguably justify the use of
correspondingly different accounting methods in respect to a particular item. As a result,
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they develop a statistical model of international accounting harmonisation, which is based
on an alternative notion of international harmony. According to this notion, a state of
international harmony exists when, all things being equal, the odds of selecting a given
accounting method are identical in each country.
Although the main purpose of their paper is to show how the measurement of harmonisation
over time can be analysed by means of a nested hierarchy of log-linear models, the use of
purchased goodwill as one of the variables in this study reveals how the accounting
practices for purchased goodwill have changed over time and also the degree of
harmonisation in the European Union in respect to goodwill.
Archer et a!. focus on accounting for goodwill and deferred tax for two periods, 1986/87 and
1990/91. Their cross-classification of goodwill accounting methods is given in Table 3.6.
There is little change overall if we compare 1986/87 and 1990/91. From Table 3.6, it is
obvious that the majority of companies use method B. Of the UK companies (if we ignore
method E), 94 percent use method B, in which are eliminated against reserves in the year of
acquisition. This is consistent with other studies.
Table 3.6: GoodwIll Practices of European Companies (1986-1992)
1986/87	 1990/91
Accou	 Method	 Accoung Method
A	 B	 C	 D	 E Total	 A	 B	 C	 0	 E	 Total
4
12
22
4
12
13
4
18
Belgium	 0
France	 0
Germany	 3
Ireland	 1
Netherlands	 0
Sweden	 1
Switzerland	 0
U.K	 0
0	 0
1	 0
10	 2
2	 0
12	 0
2	 0
0	 0
15	 0
4	 0
11	 0
6	 1
0	 1
0	 0
10	 0
2	 2
1	 2
o	 0	 0	 4
0	 1	 0	 11
0	 11	 0	 8
1	 2	 0	 0
0	 9	 0	 1
0	 4	 0	 9
0	 2	 0	 2
0	 15	 0	 1
0	 4
0	 12
3	 22
1	 4
2	 12
0	 13
0	 4
2	 18
Total	 5	 42	 2	 34	 6	 89	 1	 44	 0	 36	 8	 89
yj A = Written off against profit and loss account in the year of acquisition; B = Eliminated against reserves in
the year of acquisition; C = Shown as an asset and not amortised; D = Shown as an asset and amortised through
the profit and loss account over more than one year; E = Other or unspecified.
[Source: Archer eta!. (1996)]
Table 3.7 presents goodwill comparability indices from the study which indicate that
constant comparability in a state of static harmony which stands at 39.22 per cent overall.
The near absence of harmonisation effects is reflected in the index values given under the
dynamic model of harmonisation which changed little from 1986/87 (38.33 per cent) to
1990/91 (40.25 per cent). The study shows that in the area of purchased goodwill, little
progress in harmonisation took place between 1986/87 and 1990/91.
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Table 3.7: Goodwill Comparability Indices
Within-Country	 Between-Country	 Total
Comparability	 ComparabiIiy	 Comparability
1986/87 1990/91	 1986/87	 1990/91	 1986/87	 1990/91
Conditional independence 	 14.66	 14.66	 18.75	 18.75	 18.11	 18.11
Static Harmony	 36.01	 36.01	 39.82	 39.82	 39.22	 39.22
Dynamic Harmonisation	 35.00	 37.17	 38.95	 40.82	 38.33	 40.25
Full Model	 54.87	 56.35	 35.27	 37.26	 38.33	 40.25
Observed Values	 58.17	 53.92	 34.66	 37.71	 38.33	 40.25
[Source: Archer eta!. (1996)]
In another study, Brunovs and Kirsch (1991) study goodwill accounting in six selected
countries in relation to the harmonisation of international accounting standards prior to
1990. One purpose of their study is to make a comparative analysis of national accounting
standards covering five areas of goodwill in the sample countries. These areas are internal
goodwill, the measurement of goodwill, amortisation, reassessment and disclosure policy.
According to Brunovs and Kirsch, the most significant finding of their analysis is the
conceptual difference which exists between the goodwill accounting standards issued in the
United Kingdom and Ireland and the rest of the countries under study.
The UK standard advocated that goodwill be eliminated immediately on acquisition by write-
oft directly against reserves, whereas the other countries require goodwill to be carried
forward in the balance sheet and systematically amortised against income over the
estimated useful life of that goodwill. There are significant discrepancies between the
various accounting standards as to the acceptable method for the calculation of the amount
of goodwill at the acquisition date. The UK standard allowed the reorganisation costs
associated with an acquisition to be included in the determination of the fair value of the net
assets at acquisition. These costs will, consequently, form part of the cost of goodwill. As a
result, the UK standard provided the opportunity for inherently conservative calculations in
the highly subjective area of estimating future reorganisation costs to be incorporated in the
calculation of goodwill on acquisition. The overall comparison of the standards in this study
can be seen in Table 3.8.
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3.6 Management Choices and SSAP 22
Grinyer et a!. (1991) carry out an empirical examination of management choices of
accounting for goodwill subsequent to acquisition. Their paper explores the behaviour of
managers when assigning values to net tangible assets following the acquisition of other
companies. The authors make the assumption that people select accounting practices so
as to maximise their own welfare. In the period under study (1987), the UK managers were
able to choose between alternative treatments of accounting for goodwill: either immediate
write off or of the capitalisation and amortisation. Moreover, in practise the UK managers
also had considerable discretion when assigning figures to book values of tangible assets
and consequently to the recorded value of goodwill.
There is evidence that the managers of UK companies have usually regarded the stream of
earnings as important and that they wish to maximise the level of profits over time. Such an
objective may motivate them to be biased by reducing the value assigned to the acquired
tangible assets. However, lowering the book value of tangible assets would lead to a higher
post acquisition figure of balance sheet gearing for firms with borrowing. As a result Grinyer
et a!. suggest that there would have been a trade-off between increasing the reported book
value of net tangible assets and thus strengthening the balance sheet and inflating post
acquisition earnings. Even though goodwill written off against reserves would have no
impact on current and future reported earnings, it might cause a reduction in the value of
net assets that could be used as collateral for borrowing. This would in turn provide
incentives to the managers of firms which were going to have high gearing ratios in their
balance sheet to reduce the ratios by placing a relatively higher value on tangible assets to
allow more flexible borrowing capacity to firms.
The study by Grinyer et a!. is based on their 'trade-off' hypothesis which states that the
proportion of the acquisition price assigned to goodwill was negatively related to both post-
acquisition gearing and to the size of the price paid for the acquired firm relative to the post-
acquisition market value of the acquirer, and positively associated with the availability of
merger relief reserves. The 'trade-off ' hypothesis was tested using the Russell et aL (1989)
database relating to a random sample of 264 companies selected from the 400 UK listed
companies with the largest sales values in 1987. Purchased goodwill was regressed on
price, leverage and on a dummy variable signifying whether or not management took
advantage of the merger relief. The authors used the following linear model using ordinary
least square (OLS) regression:
53
Gft = a0 ^ alMft ^ a2 Vft + a3Dft -i- c
where a, a 1 , a2 and a3
 are the regression parameters to be estimated and
=	 purchased goodwill written off by firm i in year t divided by the total value of
the recorded prices of all acquisitions by firm i in company year t;
M 1 	 =	 a dummy variable for firm i taking the value 1 for years tin which advantage
was taken of the merger relief provisions and zero otherwise.
Vu	 =	 total acquisition price for all acquisitions by firm i in year t divided by the
post acquisition market value of the acquirer's equity in that year;
D 1 	 =	 the post acquisition gearing level of firm i in company year t (calculated as
one minus shareholders' funds as a proportion of total assets net of current
liabilities, which are equivalent to long term loans as a proportion of total
assets net of current liabilities).
Table 3.9 presents the results arising from the OLS estimation based on the Grinyer et a!.
model. Their findings are consistent with the trade-off hypothesis where the proportion of
acquisition price assigned to goodwill is negatively related to post-acquisition leverage and
the cost of the acquired firm, and positively related to the availability of merger relief
reserves.
Table 3.9: Goodwill amortisation as a Function of Merger Relief, Acquisition Price
and Post-acquisition Gearing
a0	 Ui	 C(2	 R2	 N
Estimate	 0.540	 0.195	 -0.204	 -0.265
White Standard Error
	 0.034	 0.035	 0.057	 0.117	 0.093	 362
t-value	 16.050	 5.640	 -3.560	 -2.270
Model: Gft=ae+a1Mft+a2Vft+a0Dft+
[Source: Grinyer eta!. (1992)]
A further study by Bryer (1995) treats the controversy of SSAP 22, and in particular the
reduction of capital due to immediate write off as an anomaly requiring explanation. In the
first part of his paper, Bryer discusses the concepts of Marx's political economy in order to
elaborate on the conventional method 1 ° of accounting treatment of goodwill which is argued
to be necessary to allow the capital markets to observe the generation and realisation of
profit and the rate of return on capital. Information on the realised rate of return on capital is
° According to Bryer (1995), "in late 19th century Britain it was widely accepted by leading authorities that
goodwill was simply the purchase of sufficient expected 'surplus profits' to persuade the owners of a business to
part with its net assets and control, and that this expenditure should be capitalised and amortised against those
surplus profits as they realised".
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useful to investors because it provides them with a collective basis for controlling
management, and also because it ensures equity between individual investors who
represent fractions of total social capital. Bryer questions the ASC's preference for
immediately writing-off goodwill against reserves instead of using capitalisation and
amortisation which are more transparent to the capital markets. He outlines that a popular
explanation for the implementation of the write-off option has been the dominant interests of
management. For example, he refers to the study by Grinyer et aL (1991) which is based on
the assumption that people select accounting practices so as to maximise their own welfare
and concludes that it is reasonable to assume that managers of UK public companies would
usually have wished to maximise the level of reported profit over time. Moreover, Grinyer et
a!. link the maximising of reported profits to the financial interests of management because
(a) bonuses are frequently linked to accounting profit and (b) current and future salaries are
also linked to accounting profit.
Bryer dismisses this argument by quoting a study by Gregg eta!. (1992) of 288 of the UK's
top 500 companies between 1983 and 1991 which shows that the relationship between the
salary and bonus of the highest paid directors and both the capital market and accounting
measures of performance (other than sales growth) was very weak. In fact, no serious
correlation has been found between management pay and profits in any country (Rosen,
1990). Bryer offers another alternative hypotheses to explain why companies choose to
write off immediately purchased goodwill even though the capital markets usually want
purchased goodwill to be capitalised and amortised.
According to Bryer, during the recession of the early 1980's many British companies closed
substantial parts of their operations in the acquisitions and merger boom. At the same time,
dividends were substantially increased. On a historical cost basis, by the early 1980's the
typical pay out ratio of UK companies increased from 16% in the mid-i 970's to around 25%.
During the later part of the 1980's this rose to around 35% and by the early 1990's it was
running at as high as 55%. If goodwill had been amortised and had reduced profit by a
modest 10%, in 1991 the pay out ratio would have been an unprecedented 62%. Thus,
Bryer believes that there is evidence of a potential need for creative accounting for goodwill.
The motive offered by Bryer is that the writing-off of purchased goodwill against capital was
in the collective interest of the investor because it helped to hide from public view the fact
that dividends were being paid from capital.
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3.7	 Value-Relevance of Goodwill
Amir et a!. (1993) employ several methods to test the value relevance of the information
provided on Form 20-F to reconcile non-US GAAP earnings and stockholders' equity to US
GAAP earnings and stockholders' equity. One of the components that causes the
differences between non-US GAAP and GAAP is capitalised goodwill and amortisation. The
authors conduct an event study, which includes both long and short windows and its
association with returns, and a market to book ratio analysis. The approach which is the
most relevant to this thesis is the market to book ratio analysis. According to Amir eta!., this
approach evaluates the value-relevance of reconciliation items in order to ascertain whether
they can explain the difference between the market value (P) and the book value of
shareholders' equity (By).
The difference between P and BV is unrecorded goodwill, which is related to the market's
perception of expected earnings and especially any excess or abnormal earnings. The
authors explain that P and BV might also differ because of accounting differences; for
example, the ratio of P to BV will be higher when conservative practices are used. Hence, if
reconciliation to US-GAAP reflects value relevant measurement practices these should be
expected to help the market-to-book ratio when BV is measured in non US-GAAP. Based
on the overall findings for the market to book value ratio analysis, the authors conclude that
investors view capitalised goodwill as value relevant; i.e., the reconciliation of accounting
data to US GAAP increases the association between accounting measures and price.
In another paper, Deng and Lev (1998) analyse a sample of 375 cases where USA public
companies disclosed the fair market values of acquired R&D-in-process, and then
proceeded to fully expense them. One aspect of this study that relates to accounting for
goodwill is the question of whether the investors consider R&D-in-process-valuation as
credible and value-relevant. In order to answer the above question, the authors assess the
reliability of the R&D valuations by observing investors' actions around the times of public
announcements of the valuation, as reflected in stock prices and returns. In other words, if
the stock prices and returns of the acquiring companies during the period of acquisition are
found to be correlated with the fair market values of R&D-in-process, it can be concluded
that the investors regarded the R&D information as credible and value-relevant. Deng and
Lev use three cross-sectional models to estimate the association which can observed
between the fair values of acquired R&D and capital markets as follows:
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= cz0 + a1E + aE1 + a3RD + a4DUM +
P,1 = a0 + cx1 BV1t + a2 E 1 + a3RD 1 + a4DUM + e1
M 11/	 = cy,+ cxi (BV 1/ By1 ,. 1 ) + a(E,/ Bv1,, 1 ) + a3(RD11/ BV1,t4 ^ z4DUM + e11
where,
R 1	 =	 quarterly stock return (raw and market-adjusted) of firm i in quarter
t. Return cumulating starts with the beginning of the second month
of the quarter and ends two days after quarter t's earnings
announcement.
E and i\E1,	 =	 reported quarterly earnings before extraordinary items) and the
change in earnings relative to same quarter a year earlier,
respectively.
RD1,	 =	 fair market value assigned to acquired R&D-in-process.
Pit	 =	 share price two days after earnings announcement.
By,	 =	 book value at end of quarter t.
Table 3.10: Capital Market Values and R&D-In-Process
Dependent	 Book
Variable	 lnterceDt	 Earninas	 AEarninas	 Value
Quarterly Raw	 0.041	 0.810	 0.027	 -
Returns	 (1.56)	 (1.60)	 (0.06)
Quarterly Market 	 0.005	 0.790	 -0.017	 -
Adjusted Returns	 (0.21)	 (1.69)	 (-0.04)
Five Day Raw	 0.001	 0.354	 -0.202	 -
Returns	 (0.07)	 (2.27)	 (-1.36)
Stock Price	 5.957	 3.394	 2.169
(3.91)	 (2.81)	 (13.14)
Market to Book	 1.486	 0.152
	
2.784
(2.00)	 (0.130)	 (4.56)
R&D-in-
process	 Dummy	 R2
1.175	 0.003	 0.02
(3.21)	 (0.07)
1.033	 0.012	 0.02
(3.06)	 (0.31)
0.172	 0.046	 0.06
(1.52)	 (3.59)
6.252	 6.132	 0.47
(4.01)	 (3.34)
3.977	 0.367	 0.35
(2.69)	 (0.52)
[Source: Deng	 (1
Table 3.10 provides Deng and Lev's results for all three models. The main empirical
findings in these tables indicate that investors consider, on average, the acquired R&D-in-
process a valuable asset (considerably more than the firms' tangible assets). The authors
conclude that, the fair market valuation of R&D by management appears, on average, to be
credible, and its expensing in financial reports is appropriate.
On the other hand, a thesis by Henning (1994) identifies two potential sources of goodwill:
i.e., pre-bid and premium, which together comprise total purchased goodwill. He defines
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pre-bid goodwill as the difference between the pre-take-over bid market price and the fair
value of the firm's identifiable net assets. Premium goodwill is the excess that acquiring
firms pay over the pre-take-over bid share price. Consequently, premium goodwill reflects
the increased price which occurs immediately prior to the take over and which relates
exclusively to the occurrence of a particular business combination.
One of the chapters in Henning's study presents evidence on the components of premium
goodwill in US companies. According to him, since premium goodwill is the largest source
of purchased goodwill, evidence of its components plays an important role when assessing
the economic substance of the asset goodwill. The distinction between pre-bid and premium
goodwill is important for at least two reasons. First, the managers of acquiring firms pay
large premiums over market value to gain control over target firms. Second, there is less
consensus on the economic benefits derived from premium goodwill. For example, if pre-bid
goodwill has underlying substance related to operating assets or other intangible assets,
there is less uncertainty surrounding future economic benefits.
Conversely, the benefits associated with transaction-specific premium goodwill are less
obvious. According to Henning, if premium goodwill exhibits more uncertainty as to its
economic substance, then the informativeness of reported premium goodwill accounting
numbers, based on their ability to explain market value, is diminished. This result is
consistent with investors' uncertainty about the economic benefits associated with premium
goodwill. On the other hand, part of Henning's thesis examines various factors which
increased premium goodwill in take-over activities. Based on agency theory and the factor
of synergy for take-over, he formulates two hypotheses to test the relationship between
these factors with premium goodwill. The hypotheses are as follows:
1. Premium goodwill is positively associated with a target firm's agency cost of outside
equity, and with combination of high free cash flow and slack-poor firms.
2. A difference in capital assets and R&D resource allocation patterns between acquiring
and target firms is positively related to premium goodwill.
There are other factors which affect the amount of premium goodwill in specific acquisitions.
In order to increase the reliability of his empirical analysis, Henning includes three additional
transactions-specific factors in his model; i.e., leverage, the presence of rival bidders and
the method of acquisition. The following model is used to evaluate the ability of agency cost
and synergy variables to explain premium goodwill:
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PREMJ a0 ^ aiOWNT, + x2OWNA1 + CC3OWNALO x OWNTL0 + aOWNALO x OWNTHI +
cxSPIO) x HFCF(i) + cDEBT1 + cz7CAP + cx8R&D 11 + a9METHOD + cx1 oRlVAL +
where the subscript i (J) denotes the target and acquiring firms, respectively.
The variables are defined as follows:
• PREM is measured as the difference between the final purchase price and the market
value of the target firm ten trading days prior to the first take-over announcement,
deflated by the total purchase price.
• OWNT (OWNA) is measured as the percentage of shares held by officers, directors,
and principal owners of the target (acquiring firm). The LO (HI) subscript on the
ownership variables means that the variable takes on the value of one if the percentage
of shares held by officers, directors, and principal owners of the target or acquiring firm
is below (above) the median value for all target or acquiring firms.
•	 SP takes on the value of one if the firm is slack poor (i.e., if the firm has low liquidity and
high growth prospects). HFCF takes on the value of one if the firm is a high free cash
flow firm (i.e., if the firm has high liquidity and low growth prospects).
• DEBT is measured as the absolute value of the difference in the ratio of total debt to
total assets of the target and acquiring firms.
• CAP is measured as the absolute value of the difference between the 3-year average
capital expenditure of the target and acquiring firms.
• R&D is measured as the absolute value of the difference between the three year
average R&D expense of the target and acquiring firms.
• METHOD takes on the value of one if the take-over results from a tender (cash) offer
• RIVAL takes on the value of one if there is one or more rival bidders during the
negotiation process.
Table 3.11 shows the empirical results based on the above model. Henning divided his
analysis into three models: agency, synergy and the full model. The full model brings
together in a single model various factors that have been hypothesised to affect the
premium paid in business combinations.
According to Henning, there are several important conclusions to be drawn from this study.
His evidence suggests that the target firm's agency cost of outside equity is a significant
determinant of premium goodwill. In other words, managers of acquiring firms value these
anticipated savings. Furthermore, while the findings indicate that operating synergy, method
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of payment, and the presence of competing bidders are positive determinants of acquisition
premium, it is not clear what economic benefit market participants attach to these
components of premium goodwill.
Table 3.11: Goodwill, Agency Costs and Synergy
Variables	 Agency Model	 Synergy Model
	
Full Model
Intercept	 95.37	 92.10	 63.27
(0.12)	 (0.09)	 (0.06)
OWNT	 -1.19	 -0.61
(0.02)	 (0.03)
OWNA	 -0.42	 -0.25
(0.15	 (0.21)
OWNALO X OWNTLO	 1.07
	
0.98
(0.08)	 (0.11)
OWNAL0 X OWNTi p	0.83
	
0.78
(0.13)	 (0.16)
SPj0) x HFCF1(j)	6.48	 5.98
(0.00)	 (0.02)
DEBT	 0.72
	
0.60
(0.02)	 (0.00)
CAP
	 0.53
	
0.14
(0.05)	 (0.07)
R&D
	
1.09
	
1.34
(0.03)	 (0.01)
METHOD
	
21.38	 22.67
	
20.89
(0.03)	 (0.02)	 (0.05)
RIVAL
	
26.52	 27.69
	
23.72
(0.01)	 (0.01)	 (0.02)
Observation	 738	 738	 738
Adjusted R2	0.19	 0.22	 0.57
Model: PREM1 = ao + a1 OWNT1 + (X2OWNAJ + a3OWNALO X OWNTLO
+ a4OWNALO x OWNTHI + a5SP iU)
 x HFCFJ(j) + aoDEBTj1 + a7CAP1
+ a8R&Dj + agMETHODj
 + aioRIVAL +
[Source: Henning (1994)]
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3.8 Summary
Almost all the studies related to the UK environment which are reviewed in this chapter
were carried out after the publication of SSAP 22 and opposed the "immediate write-off"
treatment of accounting for goodwill. Nobes (1992), Arnold eta!. (1992), Egginton (1993),
Bryer (1995) and Grinyer (1995) have written analytical and descriptive studies of goodwill
issues and all of them suggest that the accounting treatment for purchased goodwill as
proposed by SSAP 22 is controversial and needs to be reconsidered. Empirical studies by
Russell et a!. (1989) and Grinyer et a!. (1991) suggested that the choices of preferred
method of accounting for purchased goodwill have been influenced by management
interests in maximising their own welfare by publishing favourable financial indicators. Amir
et a!. (1993) support critics of SSAP 22 by showing that investors view capitalised goodwill
as value relevant: thus the reconciliation of accounting data to US GAAP increases the
association between accounting measures and price. Archer et a!. (1996) mention that little
progress in harmonisation took place between the two periods of their study, and that the
UK is an outlier.
The above studies combined with other studies - Colley and Volkan (1998), Brunovs and
Kirsch (1991), Hall (1993), Wines and Ferguson (1993), Henning (1994), and Deng and Lev
(1998) - lead us to conclude that the debate on goodwill is controversial but relevant. In the
next chapter we will discuss the previous research in accounting literature that has
employed market and book value relationship in order to provide a background for our
discussion, in Chapter 6, of the research design and method of the present study.
CHAPTER 4
MARKET VALUE AND BOOK VALUE
4.1	 Introduction
The main objective of this thesis is to provide evidence of whether the market takes into
consideration the amount of goodwill write-off in the determination of a company's valuation.
We propose to apply a cross-sectional market value regression model that is based on the
modified balance sheet identity. Models based on a relation between market value and book
values employing balance sheet variables are used only occasionally, but continuously, in
the accounting research literature. Landsman (1986), Harris and Ohlson (1987), Barth
(1991), Shevlin (1991), Gopalkrishnan and Sugrue (1993), McCarthy and Schneider (1995),
Jennings et a!. (1996), Pfeiffer (1998) are among the researchers who have based their
work on this model.
This chapter will review some of the previous empirical work in accounting literature that
has employed the relationship between market value and book value. In this review, we will
concentrate on the previous studies that employed the balance sheet identity model with
some modification. These include research in areas such as pension fund property rights,
market valuations of banking firms, research and development (R&D), and Intangible assets
and goodwill. This chapter will also highlight some econometric issues raised by various
authors.
4.2 Pension Fund Property Rights
Landsman (1986) empirically examined whether pension fund assets and liabilities
associated with corporate-sponsored defined benefit pension plans are valued by the
securities markets as corporate assets and liabilities based on balance sheet identity. The
data used in his study was taken from US companies over three annual accounting periods,
from 1979 to 1981.
Landsman employed an equity valuation model based on the balance sheet identity, which
permitted pension and non-pension assets and liabilities to have separate empirical
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coefficient values. His model was based on the fundamental accounting identity which holds
that shareholders' equity is the residual of corporate assets less corporate liabilities. By
using this equation, Landsman was able to compare the coefficient values of non-pension
assets and liabilities to their pension counterparts. The basic model can be written as
follows:
MVE = a1 MVA + a2MVL + cx3PA+ a4PL
where
MVE =	 the market value of the shareholders' equity
MVA =	 market value of the firm's non-pension assets
MVL =	 the market value of the firm's non-pension debt
PA	 =	 pension assets
PL	 =	 pension debt
According to Landsman, because the above model is stated in terms of market value rather
than accounting book value, the tautology of the accounting identity is not necessarily
preserved. For example, the market value of the residual claim may in fact exceed the
market value of corporate assets less the market value of corporate liabilities as the Miller
and Modigliani (1966) models of capital market equilibrium suggest.
In order to estimate the above equation, Landsman introduced the intercept value (a 0) and
the error term (Ct), which is simply the disturbance term from a regression model, into the
equation. If the theoretical model is correct, then the empirical value of a0 should be zero.
The market value of shareholders' equity (MVE) is defined to be price times the number of
shares outstanding as of December 31 for each year. The book value of total non-pension
assets (ASBV) and book value of total non-pension liabilities (LIBV) are used as proxies for
its respective market value quantities (MVA and MVL) because the latter two are not
observable. As for the other variables, pension assets (PA) are recorded at market value for
those assets within the pension fund that are held in marketable securities. Non-marketable
securities are valued by the reporting firm if their market value is not available. Pension
Liabilities (PL) are represented by the actually determined present value of the accrued
benefit pension obligation as reported by each firm. Two sets of regressions are estimated
for the basic model for each year using the reported pension liability (PLU) and the adjusted
pension liability (PL1 0) to reflect a 25-year, ten per cent annuity assumption.
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Landsman list four econometric problems associated with estimation of the model. One of
the major econometric problems when estimating the cross-sectional valuation model is the
problem of heteroscedastic disturbance. This problem arises from the fact that large or
small firms tend to produce large or small disturbance. Quoting Johnson (1972) and
Kmenta (1971), Landsman mentions that the researcher could use generalised least
squares (GLS) to produce more efficient estimates than those obtained using ordinary least
squares (OLS).
Landsman used another technique to reduce the heteroscedastic problems; he transformed
the variables by deflating them with the independent variable. This procedure implies that
the true error variance is proportional to the square of the independent variable. The
procedure adopted in his study is based on Park (1966) who suggested that one should
estimate the power of the independent variable involved in the proportion (instead of
assuming it to be two) by regressing the natural log of the residual variance, on the natural
log of the independent variable. The independent variable used in Landsman's study is the
total sales value of the firm.
Another common econometric problem discussed by Landsman is measurement error in
the regressors. In his model, the market values for each of the explanatory variables are not
directly observable. This circumstance may result in biased coefficients resulting from
measurement error in those variables. According to the author, without knowledge of (a) the
specific form of measurement error and (b) the covariance structure of the measurement
error of the explanatory variables, it is difficult to predict what bias to expect in the estimates
of the regression coefficients. Landsman offered three specific models of the measurement
error of the regressors in his study. Two sets of regressions were estimated for the basic
model for each year using reported pension liability (PLU) and adjusted pension liability
(PL1O) to reflect a 25-year, ten per cent annuity assumption. The motivation for adjusting
PLU in this model was to reflect a common interest rate was to improve estimation by
reducing the potential measurement error. The purpose of second model was to examine
whether historical cost assets and liabilities systematically understated the market value of
the assets and liabilities. Landsman compared the coefficient values of the non-pension
assets and liabilities when PA and PL are both excluded and included as regressors. If the
hypothesis was correct, then the coefficient values of the non-pension variables should
move closer to one (in absolute) when PA and PL are included as regressors than when
they are not.
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Landsman also discussed the problem of multicollinearitv due to the existence of a linear
relationship among the explanatory variables of a regression model. The presence of a
severe multicollinearity problem could result in misleading inferences being drawn from
sample t-statistics. In particular, in a case where the sample t-statistics are unbiased, if
there are no other econometric problems, it is difficult to determine whether the sampling
variances are large because of multicollinearity, or whether the variance of the true
population is large. In order to reduce this problem, Landsman estimated his model using
the net asset form; i.e., using net non-pension assets (MVA-MVL) and net pension assets
(PA - PL). However, estimation using net asset form can be employed only if (a) the
theoretical coefficient values for MVA and MVL and for PA and PL were the same in
absolute value, and (b) the estimated coefficients provided statistical evidence to support
the economic model; i.e., the coefficient of MVA was equal to the minus coefficient of MVL.
Table 4.1: Market Value as a Function of Book Assets, Liabilities and Pension Plan Assets and
Obligation (Landsman, 1986)
a2	 a3
1979 PLU Model
Estimate	 12.66	 1.08	 -1.31	 0.95
t-ratio	 3.24	 9.27	 -7.70	 1.61
Prob> :t:
	
0.0014	 0.0001	 0.0001	 0.1068
a4	 R2	 DFE
-0.89	 0.44	 230
-1.85
0.0644
1979 PL1O Model
Estimate	 27.57	 1.07	 -1.30	 1.60	 -1.82	 0.47	 230
t-ratio	 3.22	 9.11	 -7.59	 2.63	 -2.94
Prob> :t:
	
0.0015	 0.0001	 o.000i	 0.0089	 0.0035
1980 PLU Model
Estimate	 41.61	 0.96	 -1.09	 0.44	 -0.83	 0.25	 616
t-ratio	 6.57	 13.12	 -11.65	 1.03	 -2.38
Prob> t
	
0.0001	 0.0001	 0.0001	 0.2784	 0.0174
1980 PL1O Model
Estimate	 61.57	 1.10	 -1.33	 0.74	 -1.21	 0.31	 616
t-ratio	 6.34	 14.64	 -12.92	 2.08	 -3.30
Prob> t
	
0.0001	 0.0001	 0.0001	 0.0373	 0.0010
1981 PLU Model
Estimate	 29.45	 1.07	 -1.32	 0.89	 -1.09	 0.47	 619
t-ratio	 6.56	 19.26	 -16.25	 3.29	 -4.21
Prob> t	 0.0001	 0.0001	 0.0001	 0.0010	 0.0001
1981 PL1O Model
Estimate	 28.68	 1.08	 -1.32	 1.02	 -1.34	 0.50	 619
t-ratio	 6.21	 19.31	 -16.29	 3.97	 -4.91
Prob> :t:	 0.0001	 0.0001	 0.0001	 0.0001	 0.0001
erro&
Model: MVEt
 = ao + a1ASB V + a2LIB Vt + a3PAt + a4PL,-,- Et
[Source: Landsman, 1986]
65
MVE1
Where
MVE
ASSET
LIABY
PASSET
PBO
Table 4.2: The Effect on Market Value of Netting Book Assets and Liabilities
ao	 al	 tX2	 R2 DFE
1979	 0.44	 232
Estimate	 1102.73	 0.82	 0.88
t-ratio	 2.524	 13.63	 1.80
Prob> :t:	 0.0114	 0.0001	 0.0721
1980	 0.33	 618
Estimate	 379.62	 0.85	 0.88
t-ratio	 4.87	 17.05	 2.66
Prob> t:	 0.0001	 0.0001	 0.0079
1981	 0.36	 621
Estimate	 121.03	 0.69	 1.09
t-ratio	 6.05	 17.72	 3.69
Prob> t	 0.0001	 0.0001	 0.0002
DF=rees oTfreediWriression ermr. NETNFA .ASV - UBV; NETPA • PA
Model: MVE = ao + a,NETNPA + a2NETPA + e
[Source: Landsman (1986)]
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show Landsman's results from the basic model and net asset form. The
empirical findings of this study show the market prices the assets and liabilities of pension
funds as part of the corporate assets and liabilities. However, the most important aspect of
this study from our perspective is related to the balance sheet equation model employed by
Landsman which, compared to the equity valuation model, is new and can be explored
further.
Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue (1993) extend the work of Landsman (1986) in pension fund
property rights. The main area of their study focuses on the pension fund property rights of
projected benefit obligations and pension plan assets. Based on Landsman (1986), they
develop the following model to examine the association between the market value of equity
and projected benefit obligation:
xo ^ aIASSET, + a2L IABY, + a3PASSET, + a4PBQ,+ e,
=	 market value of shareholder equity
=	 book value of total non-pension assets
book value of total non-pension liabilities
market value of pension assets
projected benefit obligation
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G&S tested two hypotheses:
H1: The market participants do not regard PASSET of a firm as an
asset in assessing the market value of the firm's equity.
H2: The market participants do not regard PBO of a firm as a liability in
assessing the market value of the firm's equity.
The authors argued that if pension fund property rights were to lie fully with the firm
opposed to with the pension trust, then the coefficients a 3 and a4 corresponding to the
variables PASSET and PBO should be statistically significant. More specifically, a 3 and a4
should be >0 and <0 respectively. If either H 1 or H2 or both are not rejected, this would imply
that market participants do not consider pension assets and pension liabilities when valuing
the market value of the firm's equity.
Table 4.3 shows the result reported by G&S. The results indicate that the non-pension
variables, ASSET and LIABY have coefticients that are both highly significant and have the
correct sign that is consistent with the findings of Landsman (1986). According to G&S, the
main findings of their study indicate that investors perceive pension assets and liabilities as
part of corporate assets and liabilities. Furthermore, it appears that pension assets and
liabilities have significant information content beyond what is conveyed by non-pension
assets and liabilities.
Table 4.3: Market Value as a Function of Book Assets, Liabilities and Pension Plan Assets and
Projected Benefits (Gopalakrlshnan and Sugrue, 1993)
cm	 ca	 ci	 cc..	 R2	 DFE
PANEL A
Individual Years
1987
Estimate
t-ratio
Prob> :t:
1988
Estimate
t-ratio
Prob> :t:
PANEL B - Pooled
Estimate
ratio
Prob> :t:
-	 1.71	 -1.75	 1.18	 -1.99	 0.77	 654
	
31.88	 -29.55	 5.10	 -6.27
	
0.0001	 0.0001	 0.0001	 0.0001
-	 1.37	 -1.39	 1.22	 -0.98	 0.69	 734
	
26.79	 -25.16	 5.22	 -2.98
	
0.0001	 0.0001	 0.0001	 0.0001
-	 1.73	 -1.78	 1.42	 -1.70	 0.78	 1393
	
45.10	 -42.79	 9.57	 -8.00
	
0.0001	 0.0001	 0.0001	 0.0001
Model: MVE, = ao ^ a1 ASSET, + a2L1ABY, + a3PASSET1 + a4PBO,+
[Source: Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue (1993)]
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4.3	 Market's Valuation of Banking Firms
The main objective the study by Beaver et a!. (1989) is to examine whether cross-sectional
differences in market-to-book ratios for bank equities are captured by supplemental
disclosure. They focus on the banking industry and supplemental disclosures with respect to
default risk (non-performing loan data) and interest-rate risk (loan maturity data). Their
sample is based on 149 banks in the US with financial statement data on the 1983
Compustat tape. They develop a model that relates the market value of banks' common
equity (CEM) to the book value of common equity (CEB) and to non-performing loans (NPL),
allowance for loan losses (ALL), and the maturity structure of the loan portfolio (MAT). The
basic final model of their study is as follows:
n NPL.	
--+/3 MAT,1CE - ''°	 CE 1'2t CE	 CE a
According to the authors, if the model is correct, f3i is expected to be negative because the
generally accepted accounting principles do not require the book value of loans to be written
down to market value for many non performing loans. The maturity variable (MAT) is
intended to capture the valuation errors induced by unanticipated changes in interest rates
since the inception of the loans. If market interest rates have increased (decreased)
unexpectedly since the dates of loan origination or acquisition, t32 would be expected to be
negative (positive). On the other hand, the inclusion of allowance for loan losses (ALL) as
an explanatory variable ensures that supplemental data in the form of non-performing loans
are not proxying for the allowance for loan losses. Beaver et a!. argue that both variables
should relate directly to default risk. As a result 132 can be negative, zero or positive.
Accordingly, it is important to include ALL in the model since the authors are interested in
testing for the incremental ability of these supplemental disclosures to explain cross-
sectional variation in common shareholders' equity market-to-book ratios beyond that
provided by the financial statement variable; i.e., allowance for loan losses.
Table 4.4 reports the results of annual regressions (1 979-83) of the market-to-book ratio for
common shareholders' equity on the book values of loan-loss reserves, non-performing
loans, and the maturity variable of this study. The coefficient on non-performing loans is
negative in each of the five years, and the t-statistics range from 3.190 to 4.380. The
coefficients have the predicted sign and are statistically significant at conventional levels.
The loan-loss variable (/32) has a positive coefficient in all years. According to them,
conditional on the level of non-performing loans, the market-to-book ratio is higher for banks
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with larger allowances for loan losses. This results are consistent with contentions in the
popular financial press that increasing the allowance for loan losses is actually 'good news',
because it indicates that management perceives the earning power of the bank to be
sufficiently strong that it can withstand a 'hit to earnings' in the form of additional loan-loss
provisions.
Table 4.4: Modelling the Market-to-Book Ratio (Beaver eta!., 1989)
Variables	 1979	 1980	 1981	 1982	 1983
Intercept	 0.750	 0.640	 0.720	 0.830	 0.990
	
(10.440)	 (7.050)	 (7.900)	 (9.33)	 (9.370)
NPLJCE	 -0.570	 -0.680	 -0.770	 -0.530	 -0.650
	
(4.260)	 (3.510)	 (3.540)	 (3.190)	 (4.380)
ALL/CE	 0.378	 2.160	 2.650	 1.360	 1.400
	
(0.580)	 (2.760)	 (3.350)	 (1.660)	 (1.610)
MAT/CE	 0.020	 -0.060	 -0.120	 -0.090	 -0.080
	
(0.440)	 (1.250)	 (2.180)	 (1.630)	 (1.370)
Sample Size	 91	 91	 91	 91	 91
R2	0.200	 0.180	 0.250	 0.190	 0.250
CE'	 NPLs	 ALL	 MATt
	
Model: —i
 = + ' CE + $2t	 + '
	
+
Beaver et a!. interpreted the coefficients on the maturity variable based on the pattern of
nominal interest rates in the 1979 through 1983 period. According to them, the time series
pattern of the coefficient is as expected if promised rates on loans are a lagged function of
current nominal rates. In addition to the year by year regression model, they include Pooled
Fixed-Effects and a Pooled Regression Model in their study. The overall results suggest that
supplemental disclosures with respect to various characteristics of the loan portfolio do
possess incremental explanatory power beyond that provided by the allowance for loan
losses. Non-performing loan and loan maturity variables contribute in a statistically
significant manner to an explanation of cross-sectional variation in market-to-book ratios,
over and above the explanatory power of a number of financial statements variables that
might be expected to be correlated with the supplemental disclosure variables.
Kane and Unal (1990) report on their empirical investigation of structural and temporal
variation in the market's valuation of banking firms. The main objective of reviewing their
paper is to compare their, Statistical Market-Value Accounting Model (SMVAM) with the
basic balance sheet identity model mentioned by Landsman (1986). One particular area of
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their work which can be considered relevant to accounting for goodwill in the UK concerns
the hidden reserves that might exist by writing-off purchased goodwill in the year of
acquisition.
Kane and Unal developed a model to capture the hidden reserves in US banking firms'.
According to the authors, hidden capital exists whenever the accounting measure of a firm's
net worth diverges from its economic value. Such unbooked capital has on-balance-sheet
and off-balance-sheet sources. Their study develops a model to estimate both forms of
hidden capital and to test hypotheses about their determinants. The model makes direct use
of accounting information on the bookable position of a firm and separates bookable from
unbookable sources of value. K&U use regression analysis to partition the market value of a
firm's stock into two components: recorded capital reserves and unrecorded (or hidden) net
worth. According to them, hidden capital is, in turn, allocated between values that are either
unbooked but bookable through asset turnover or write-downs on a historical-cost balance
sheet under GAAP or values which GAAP currently designates as an unbookable off
balance-sheet item.
Basically, the model developed by K&U is based on balance sheet identity as mentioned by
Landsman (1986). However, K&U interpret their model differently. According to them, a
firm's market capitalisation, MV, is the product of its share price and the number of shares
outstanding. Invoking the principle of value additivity, they express MV as the market value
of bookable and unbookable assets, (Am + A'm), minus the market value of bookable and
unbookable liabilities (Lm + L'm).
K&U proceed by arguing that, since bookable assets and liabilities are carried at historical
cost, even (Am - Lm) cannot be observed directly. A parsimonious way to proceed is to
assume that market participants estimate the market value of elements of bookable equity
by applying the appropriate mark-up or mark-down ratio, ka and k 1 , to the accounting values
reported by the firms. As a result, the following equation can be obtained:
MV = (Am - L 'm) + KaAb - KILb
where subscripts a, I, b represent assets, liabilities, and booked values, respectively.
According to K&U, in principle, Ab and Lb are jointly determined variables, affected by many
of the same unknown exogenous variables. Treating Ab and Lb as separate and exogenous
regressors could introduce interpretative problems. They argue that at every date for every
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bank class (in their sample), the coefficient constraint that ka = k1 , not only proves
impossible to reject, but is virtually an unconstrained regression result. This supports
simplifying the model by applying a single valuation ratio, k to each institution's book equity,
BV = Ab - Lb. Expressing the market value of unbookable equity (A'm - L'm) as U and
allowing for approximation error, the authors obtain this equation:
MV=U^kBV^e.
According to them, the model's coefficients describe the de facto deceptiveness of GAAP.
Unless both U = 0 and k = 1, the accounting or book value of a bank's capital represent a
biased estimate of the market value of stockholder equity. If the estimated intercept is
significantly positive (negative), unbookable assets and liabilities serve as a net source of
(drain on) institutional capital. According to K&U, financial analysts know the problems exist
in both directions. They cite an example on the drain side: at yearend 1986, off-balance-
sheet liabilities of the five largest U.S. banking firms totalled $1.16 trillion. This value was
more than twice the $546 billion book value of these banks' assets.
4.4 Research and Development (R&D)
Shevlin (1991) investigates whether capital market investors, in assessing the market
values of R&D firms' equity, view R&D limited partnerships (LP) as increasing both the
assets and liabilities of the R&D firms. His findings show that, the contract terms between
R&D firms and the LPs suggest interpreting the LP as a call option held by the R&D firm
and using option pricing theory to estimate the assets (the present value of the LP-funded
R&D project) and liabilities (the present value of the exercise) components of the option.
Shevlin estimates the LP variables from information provided in footnote disclosure items by
R&D firms. The estimates of the LP variables are included as explanatory variables in a
cross-sectional market value regression model that is based on the balance sheet identity
that is similar to Landsman (1986). The model can be written as follows:
S = A1 -Di,
where
S	 =	 the market value of shareholders' equity
A	 =	 the market value of the assets
D	 =	 the market value of the liabilities
of firm j.
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A and D may be decomposed into the market value of the reported assets and liabilities on
the balance sheet and of non-reported assets and liabilities. According to Shevlin, one non-
reported asset for the R&D firms could be the market value of in-house R&D expenditure
(IHRD). The after-tax present value of the R&D funded by the LP (LPCA), together with the
after-tax present value of the expected exercise price to acquire the developed technology
(LPCD), could also be used by investors in assessing the market value of a R&D firm. The
Model becomes:
S=A1 -D1 ^IHRD^LPCA1^LPCD1
The samples used in this study are US firms. The market value of equity is estimated as the
fiscal year-end share price times the number of common shares outstanding. The market
value of reported debt is estimated as the sum of the book value of current liabilities and the
market (or present) value of long-term debt. For long-term debt, market price data are
collected for the issues listed in Moody's Bond record. If the market prices are not available,
present value techniques are used to estimate market values.
As mentioned by Landsman (1986), one of the major or common econometric problems
with valuation regression models is heteroscedastic disturbance terms. In order to reduce
this problem, Shevlin deflates the variables in the model using the book value of
shareholder's equity. The coefficients and t-statistics from the study are presented in Table
4.3. According to Shevlin, the results from the basic model (regression 1) suggest that the
empirical model is miss pecified since the intercept term is non-zero and the regression
coefficients on the reported asset and liability variables are significantly greater, in absolute
terms, than unity. To improve the specification, Shevlin offered three alternative estimates
of the LP variables. The results are reported in Table 4.5 as regression 2 to 4.
Several implications arise from Shevlin's study. The empirical results are consistent with the
argument that footnote disclosures allow investors to make some estimate of the value of
the LP to the firm. The results also indicate that in addition to the reported assets and debt
on the face of the balance sheet, investors use information in the footnotes to help assess
the market value of firms. Finally, Shevlin's results add further support to the empirical
usefulness of the balance sheet identity approach as used by Landsman (1986) to develop
a cross-sectional valuation model to address off-balance sheet issues.
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AdJ.
R2	 F-Stat
0.84	 34.10
(p=0.000)
0.57	 37.89
(p=0.000)
0.86	 6.45
(p=0.001)
0.84	 9.747
(p=0.000)
Table 4.5: Market Value as a Function of R&D Expenditure (Shevlin, 1991)
Predicted	 ao	 cxl	 cx2	 a3	 (14	 (15
Sign	 +	 -	 +	 +	 -
1. Margrabe	 7.05	 2.54	 -3.89	 1.06	 0.84	 -1.88
t-stat (Ho: cx=0)	 3.89	 11.88	 -9.37	 5.37	 10.49	 -5.19
t-stat (Ho: a=1)	 7.21	 -6.97	 0.30	 -2.00	 -2.43
2. Variables trimmed	 6.47	 3.46	 -4.89	 0.42	 1.24	 -2.93
t-stat (Ho: a=0)	 4.11	 13.57	 -11.93	 2.01	 9.44	 .734
t-stat (Ho: a=1)	 9.65	 -9.49	 -2.74	 1.82	 -3.02
3. Industryk	 6.56	 2.67	 -3.92	 1.05	 2.46	 -5.54
t-stat (Ho: cc=0)	 3.95	 13.09	 -10.04	 5.81	 13.36	 -7.97
t-stat (Ho: a=1)	 8.19	 -7.48	 0.27	 7.92	 -6.53
4. k * 0.50	 7.05	 2.54	 -3.89	 1.06	 1.68	 -3.77
t-stat (Ho: a=0)	 3.90	 11.89	 -9.37	 5.37	 10.49	 -5.197.22	 -6.96	 0.30	 4.24	 -3.81t-stat (Ho: a=1)
Model: Sj = cxo + alI + a2Dj + xIHRD1 + U4LPCAi + cZ5LPCDJ +El
The F-Statistic tests the null hypothesis that ai= a4 and 12= a5
The Estimation based on 53 sample firms with 145 yearly observations. All variables are deflated by the book
value of equity. Regression 1 uses the Margrabe (1978) option pricing model to estimate the LP variable LPCA
and LPCD. Regression 2 trims the variables at three standard deviations. Regression 3 uses industry estimates of
the R&D capitalisation factors k to estimate the LP variables. Regression 4 uses the time-varying R&D
capitalisation Factors reduced by 50 percent to estimate the LP variables.
The First row of t-statistics test the null hypothesis that the cri=0 for i=0 to 5. The second row of t-statistics test the
null hypothesis that cxi =1 for =1,3 and 4, cxi =-1 for =2 and 5.
4.5	 Intangible Assets and Goodwill
The main objective of a thesis by Henning (1994) is to study the relationship between
goodwill numbers and market valuation. In particular, this study tests the market valuation of
goodwill conditional on the source of goodwill and accounting practice in the US market; in
other words, the effects of differential accounting policies and sources on the ability of
goodwill accounting numbers to track market value. Henning's sample consists of all US
firms that listed goodwill in their 1992 annual reports.
Henning argues that if a company is amortising goodwill over a single or multiple period of
less than 40 years, this may, on average, reflect management's' attempt to report goodwill
assets rather than reflecting the economic substance of the underlying transactions.
Alternatively, amortising goodwill over 40 years implies that the sources and components of
goodwill cannot be identified or measured, and that goodwill accounting policies are
selected without regard for the economic substance of the assets, or that the assets indeed
have economic lives of 40 (or more) years. Therefore, while single or multiple amortisation
periods of less than 40 years may significantly improve the ability of accounting numbers to
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track market valuation, uniform uses of 40 years amortisation periods will likely diminish the
ability of accounting numbers to track market valuations.
According to Henning, market participants' valuations of goodwill accounting practices may
also be conditional on source. If pre-bid goodwill has underlying substance related to the
operating assets or other intangible assets, there is less uncertainty surrounding future
economic benefits. This diminished uncertainty may lead to accounting practices that are
consistent with the nature of the goodwill asset. On the other hand, if the benefits
associated with transaction specific premium goodwill are less obvious, then it is more
difficult to adopt accounting practices that are consistent with the economic substance of
the goodwill asset 11 . Henning develops his argument by saying that the interaction between
accounting policies and source may have a significant effect on the association between
reported accounting numbers and market value. For example, if the range of the
amortisation periods allowed includes the true useful life for virtually any situation, and if
future economic benefits surrounding pre-bid goodwill are less uncertain, then firms with a
high proportion of pre-bid goodwill that amortise over periods of less than 40 years are likely
to exhibit a higher association between reported goodwill accounting numbers and market
valuations. On the other hand, firms with a high proportion of premium goodwill over 40
years are likely to exhibit a lower association.
Henning also considers goodwill arising from contingent payments as another factor that
affects the relationship between the goodwill and market valuation of a firm. Contingent
payment goodwill is recorded only after evidence of future economic benefits are realised
through excess current earnings. In this case, the uncertainty surrounding the anticipated
future benefit of this premium goodwill greatly diminishes. The remaining uncertainty
determines the number of future periods to which this realised benefit relates. However, the
task of adopting an appropriate accounting policy is considerably easier since the specific
component creating the goodwill is known. Therefore, the expectation is that the reported
goodwill numbers will be better able to track market values for firms utilising contingent
payment purchase agreements.
Based on the above arguments, Henning developed two hypotheses to be tested, which are
as follows:
Pre-bid goodwill can be defined as the difference between pre-take-over-bid market price and the fair value of
the firms identifiable net assets. Premium goodwill is the excess that acquiring firms pay over the pre-take-over-
bid share price (Henning, 1994).
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Hi: The association between reported goodwill accounting numbers and market
valuations improves for firms with higher proportions of pre-bid goodwill that amortise over
fewer periods and diminishes for firms with high proportion of premium goodwill that
amortise over 40 years.
H2:	 The association between reported goodwill accounting numbers and market values
improves for firms utilising contingent-payment purchase agreements.
The above hypotheses are tested on the following pooled Cross-Sectional regression
models:
MV = cx + a1BV + a2GWt + a3GW1, x LONGJ +	 x MULT4O,J + a5GW1t x PREMJ +
a6GW x PREBIDJ
 + a7GW1 x PREMJ x LONGJ + a8GW11 x PREMJ x SHORT1 + (1)
And
MV, = a0 + cx1 BV + a2GW + a3GW ,t x CONTING 1 +	 (2)
where;
1. MV is the market value of common stock outstanding at the end of fiscal year t.
2. BV is the book value of common stock outstanding minus the book value of purchased
goodwill at the end of fiscal year t.
3. GW is the book value of goodwill at the end of fiscal year t.
4. LONG is the accounting method dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the
specified amortisation periods are boilerplate or 40 years.
5. MULT is the accounting method dummy variable that takes on the value of one when
multiple amortisation periods include 40 years
6. PREM is the dummy variable that takes on the value of one if firm i have a ratio of
premium to total goodwill in the sample's upper quartile.
7. PREBID is the dummy variable that takes on the value of one if firm i have a ratio of
premium to total goodwill in the sample's lower quartile.
8. SHORT is the accounting dummy variable that takes on the value of one for single
(multiple) amortisation periods less 40 years.
9. CONTING is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if firm i make contingent
purchase price payments based on operating results.
If model (1) is correct, Henning expects the goodwill number to be positively related to the
market value and the use of long or multiple periods that include 40 years to negatively
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affect the valuation relevance of goodwill measures. Furthermore, if the 40 year range of the
amortisation period is likely to include the true useful life of virtually all goodwill, then
amortising goodwill over more than 40 years should diminish the association between
goodwill and market value beyond the diminution that occurs by amortising goodwill over
multiple periods that include 40 years (a3 < cx < 0).
Similarly, if the future economic benefits for pre-bid goodwill are less certain, then the
coefficient on pre-bid goodwill should be positive, while the coefficient on premium goodwill
should be negative. Finally, premium goodwill that is amortised over long periods should
diminish the association between goodwill and market value, while pre-bid goodwill
amortised over short periods should enhance this association. The results from Henning's
study (shown in Table 4.6) are consistent with the predictions which indicate that goodwill
accounting policy and source, as well as interactions between these factors, significantly
enhance the ability of the goodwill asset to explain market values.
Table 4.6: Market Value as a Function of Book Value of Purchased Goodwill (Henning, 1994)
Model	 a2	 a3	 X4	 Z5	 U6	 a7	 ag
1. Amortisation	 0.09	 2.89	 3.38	 -0.26	 -0.12	 0.71
	
(Obs: 5839)	 (.13)	 (.01)	 (.00)	 (.03)	 (.06)
2. Source	 1.08	 2.08	 2.94	 -0.21	 0.15	 0.67
	
(Obs: 1821)	 (.10)	 (.01)	 (.00)	 (.08)	 (.06)
3. Both 1&2	 1.29	 2.13	 2.67	 -0.21	 -0.10	 -0.18	 0.12	 0.77
	
(Obs: 1821)	 (.07)	 (.01)	 (.00)	 (.05)	 (.04)	 (.06)	 (.09)
4. Full Model	 1.32	 1.99	 2.43	 -0.23	 -0.13	 -0.18	 0.12	 -0.14	 0.18	 0.81
	
(Obs: 1821)	 (.06)	 (.01)	 (.04)	 (.06)	 (.07)	 (.07)	 (.09)	 (.05)	 (.01)
Model: MVt = ao + ai BV + a2GW Jt + a3GWj,t x LONGj + a4GWj,t x MULT4OJ + a5GW x PREM + a6GWJ x
PREBID1 + a7GW J x PREMJ x LONGj + a8GWjt x PREMJ x SHORT1 + ej
[Source: Henning (1994)]
Henning's second hypothesis, that contingent-payment goodwill enhances the association
between reported goodwill accounting numbers and market value, is tested by estimating
model (2). The results from this model are presented in Table 4.7. They indicate that the
positive relation between the goodwill asset and the market value is enhanced by
contingent-payment goodwill. This evidence supports the second hypothesis, that
conditioning tests of market association on these features of the goodwill transaction
improves the explanatory power of goodwill accounting measures.
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Table 4.7: The Effect on Market Value of Contingent Payment Contracts
Obs	 a	 a2	 a
5839	 0.136	 2.267	 3.189	 0.231	 0.66
(.13)	 (.01)	 (.00)	 (.02)
Model: MV1t = ao + ai By11 + a2GWjt + a3GW1,, x CONTINGJ +
[Source: Henning (1994)]
McCarthy and Schneider (1995) analyse the market perception of goodwill as an asset in
the determination of a firm's valuation in the US market. They also examine how the market
perceives goodwill in relation to all other assets. In order to test how the market perceives
purchased goodwill when assessing the value of the firm, they estimate the following
regression model:
ME,=a0 +a1ALGW,^cx2GW1 ^a3LIAB +a4INC1+e,
where ME, ALGW, GW, LIAB and INC are the market values of common stock, book value
of assets less goodwill, book value of goodwill , book value of liabilities and an income
variable. ME is calculated by multiplying the number of common shares in issue times the
price per share of stock at the end of the fiscal year. Since the market value of firms' assets
and liabilities cannot be observed directly, the authors take book values of assets and
liabilities as proxies for market value. The above model is similar to Landsman (1986)
except that McCarthy and Schneider include variables from the income statement. They
argue that the market value of a firm's equity might be explained better by a model that
includes both parts of financial accounting: a stock concept of value (book value) and a flow
concept of value (earning adjusted for dividends or clean surplus). They offer several values
that could serve as proxies for income, namely clean surplus, net income for the period, or
abnormal returns. The authors report their results using net income as an income variable.
In this study, the main interest is the coefficient of goodwill. If the market places value on
the reported goodwill of a firm, then goodwill should be significant and positively correlated
with the firm's market value. To establish the presence of this relationship, they tested the
following null hypothesis:
H 1 : a2 = 0
If goodwill is a significant variable, another test will be carried out to ascertain whether
goodwill is priced differently from all other assets by using the following null hypothesis:
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H2 : a1 = a2
Similar to Landsman (1986) and previous researchers, M&S discuss several econometric
problems which can arise when estimating the regression equation. The first is, the
heteroscedasticitv problem. If heteroscedasticity is present, then the standard errors are
understated resulting in overstated t-statistics. M&S report all regression standard errors, t-
statistics and p-value based on White's procedure (1980).
The second problem in the regression model is multicollinearitv. There is very high
correlation between total assets less goodwill and total liabilities. To reduce this problem,
M&S estimate a different model by netting ALGW and LIAB, the variables that are highly
correlated and the cause of multicollinearity. The results from this regression related to
goodwill are consistent with the basic model.
The third potential problem in the regression model is measurement error in the regressors
due to use of the book value of assets and liabilities instead of the market value. The
authors explained that without knowledge of the specific form of measurement error and the
covariance structure of the measurement error of the explanatory variables, it is difficult to
predict what bias, if any, to expect in the estimates of the regression coefficients. In order to
explore the robustness of their findings, they use several alternative model specifications, in
reduced and deflated form. All the results from these regressions are consistent with the
basic model.
Table 4.8 shows McCarthy and Schneider's results for the first hypothesis. The coefficient of
goodwill is positive and significant at the 0.000 level in all years yielding a rejection of
Hypothesis 1. This finding suggests that investors perceive goodwill as an asset when
valuing a firm. Given that goodwill is significant in valuing a company, the authors proceed
to test the second hypothesis which examines the magnitude of the market perception, by
comparing the coefficients of goodwill and other assets. If the coefficients are significantly
different, then the market perceives reported goodwill differently from the other assets. If the
two coefficients are not statistically different, then this would suggest the market treats
goodwill the same as other assets.
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Table 4.8: Market Value as a Function of the Book Value of Purchased Goodwill
(McCarthy and Schneider, 1995)
Year	 Variable	 Parameter	 std error	 White t	 p-value	 Adj. R2	N
Intercept	 20.942	 23.076
ALGW	 1.134	 0.206
GW	 1.636	 0.330
LIAB	 -1.166	 0.207
INC	 4.312	 1.293
1989
	
Intercept	 79.370	 53.382
ALGW	 0.923	 0.212
GW	 2.637	 0.521
LIAB	 -1.006	 0.228
INC	 6.024	 2.326
1990
	
Intercept	 114.945	 21.198
ALGW	 0.164	 0.171
GW	 0.881	 0.248
LIAB	 -0.171	 0.172
INC	 9.727	 1.413
1991	 Intercept	 20.921	 46.647
ALGW	 2.080	 0.177
GW	 2.134	 0.386
LIAB	 -2.152	 0.195
INC	 7.384	 1.509
0.907
5.495
5.109
-5.626
3.334
1.486
4.338
5.061
-4.398
2.589
5.422
0.961
3.544
-0.992
6.880
0.488
11.719
5.515
-11.015
4.893
	
0.3642	 0.9449	 1106
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
	
0.1374	 0.8253	 1172
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0096
	
0.0001	 0.9202	 1227
0.3362
0.0001
0.3214
0.0001
0.6538	 0.8403	 1260
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
1988
1992	 Intercept	 47.375	 44.777	 1.058	 0.2902	 0.8448	 1451
ALGW	 2.095	 0.356	 5.879	 0.0001
GW	 2.181	 0.484	 4.500	 0.0001
LIAB	 -2.051	 0.390	 -5.253	 0.0001
INC	 3.343	 0.908	 3.678	 0.0001
Model: ME, = a0 + a1ALG W, + a2GW, ^ a3L!AB, + a4NC, ^ e
Vanab es:
ME	 = Market value of common stock
GW	 = Book value of goodwill
ALGW = Book value of assets less goodwill
LIAB	 = Book value of liabilities
INC	 = Income variable - net income
[Source: McCarthy and Schneider (1995)]
Table 4.9 shows the results reported by McCarthy and Schneider for the second hypothesis.
In absolute value, the estimated coefficient for goodwill is greater than for the other assets
in all five years. However, the null hypothesis of equal coefficient can be rejected in only two
of the five years tested. According to the authors, these results are not consistent over the
entire five-year period. Even though the coefficient for goodwill is higher than the coefficient
for all other assets in all five years and significantly higher in two of the five years, it cannot
be generally concluded that the market perceives goodwill as having a higher value than
other assets. However, a more conservative interpretation of this finding, according to M&S,
is that goodwill appears to be perceived by the market with a value at least equal to other
assets and possibly greater. As an overall conclusion, the results of this study suggest that
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MV,	 =
where
MV	 =
ABGWP	 =
GW	 =
PPE	 =
LIAB	 =
the market includes goodwill when valuing a company. Another major finding is that, relative
to book values, goodwill is valued by the market at least as much as other assets.
Table 4.9: A Comparlsqn of the Capitalisation Ratio for Goodwill and Other Assets
Coefficient
Year	 GW	 ALGW chi-square p-value
1988	 1.636	 1.134	 3.6871	 0.0548
1989	 2.637	 0.923	 13.5795	 0.0002
1990	 0.881	 0.164	 24.6443	 0.0001
1991	 2.134	 2.080	 0.0165	 0.8975
1992	 2.181	 2.095	 0.0277	 0.8678
Notes:
ALGW	 - Book value of assets less goodwill
GW	 - Book value of goodwill
(Source: McCarthy and Schneider, 1995)
Jennings et a!. (1996) also studies the relationship between purchased goodwill and market
value. In the first part of their study, the authors examine the relation between equity values
and accounting goodwill numbers in the United States during the period 1982 - 1988. In
order to examine whether recorded amounts for purchased goodwill are reflected in the
distribution of equity values, they estimate the cross-sectional regression for each of the
years, similar to Landsman (1986), Harris and Ohlson (1987), Barth (1991), Shevlin (1991)
and Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue (1993). They estimate the following regression model:
a0 + a 1ABG WP1 + a2G W1 + x3PPE1 ^ a4L lAB, + £
market values of common stock measured three months after the
end of the year
book value of total assets exclusive of goodwill and property plant
and equipment,
book value of net goodwill
book value of net property, plant and equipment
sum of the book values of liabilities and the preferred stock
component of stockholders' equity
This study focuses on a2, the slope coefficient for the book value of net goodwill. According
to Jennings et a!., at the time of an acquisition, the amount recorded as purchased goodwill
represents the present value of a stream of expected cash flows, If the book value of
purchased goodwill continues to reflect these expected cash flows, there should then be a
positive association between equity values and recorded amounts for purchased goodwill, If
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the correspondence between the book value of purchased goodwill and its economic value
diminishes rapidly following the acquisition, the authors would expect to observe no
association between recorded goodwill and equity values.
Table 4.10: Market Value as a Function of Book the Book Value of Purchased Goodwill
(Jennings, 1996)
	
R2	 N
Panel A : Year by
Year Repression
1988
Estimate	 -2.82	 1.36	 1.76	 1.76	 -1.18	 0.72	 246
f-ratio	 -2.10	 10.98	 6.55	 11.85	 -7.56
1987
Estimate	 -0.54	 1.52	 2.10	 1.75	 -1.39	 0.69	 248
f-ratio	 -0.55	 9.15	 5.30	 8.90	 -5.45
1986
Estimate	 -3.10	 2.21	 3.38	 2.27	 -2.11	 0.67	 213
f-ratio	 -1.10	 6.96	 5.54	 7.79	 -5.00
1985
Estimate	 2.86	 3.88	 2.26	 -2.87	
0.76	 191
	
-1.19	 11.35	 7.94	 12.36	 -10.06f-ratio
1984
Estimate	 -1.85	 2.18	 3.24	 1.85	 -2.31	
0.72	 178
	
-0.56	 9.72	 8.68	 8.94	 -7.38f-ratio
1983
Estimate	 -3.50	 2.53	 3.44	 1.97	 -2.81	 0.62	 160
f-ratio	 -1.27	 5.48	 5.86	 5.54	 -4.39
1982
Estimate	 -1.21	 2.55	 4.00	 1.88	 -2.67	 0.55	 145
f-ratio	 -0.29	 5.72	 5.95	 9.25	 -5.53
Avg. coefficient	 2.17	 3.11	 1.96	 -2.19
Avg. f-statistic	 8.48	 6.54	 9.23	 -6.48
Panel B:
Fixed Effects Repression
Avg. Coefficient
Avg. f-statistic	 1.16	 0.68	 1.11	 -0.98
p-value	 11.29	 2.99	 9.07	 -9.42
	
0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.00	 0.90	 1381
Model: MV, = ao + a1ABG WP, + a2G W1 ^ a3PPE, + a4L lAB1 +
[Source: Jennings et a!. (1996)] Notes: In Panel A, the table shows OLS coefficient estimates (row 1) and t-
statistics based on White's (1980) consistent covanance estimator (row 2) for each year. The last two lines show
average coefficient estimates and the average f-statistics across the seven year by year regressions. In Panel B,
the table reports results from a fixed effects' regression that includes separate intercepts for each firm and
separate intercepts and slope coefficients for each year.
As mentioned previously, one of major econometric problems when estimating cross-
sectional valuation model is that of heteroscedastic disturbance and, in order to reduce
such a problem all variables are deflated by total assets at the end of the year. Furthermore,
all the t-statistics reported in this study are based on White's (1980) consistent covariance
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MV
EEBGWD
EGWE
EDEPR
PRED
RQE
GW
PPE
estimator. Table 4.10 shows the estimation results for the study. The results from this study
indicate a strong cross-sectional relation between equity values and accounting assets and
liabilities. The estimated coefficients for recorded net goodwill are positive and highly
significant in each of the seven years. According to Jennings et a!., this result suggests that,
in the view of investors, purchased goodwill represents an economic resource. The
estimated coefficient for GW is generally larger than those for ABGWP and PPE. One
explanation given by the authors is that, on average, either purchased goodwill is amortised
'too quickly' or other assets are expensed too slowly. This explanation is consistent with the
hypothesis that investors continue to view purchased goodwill as an economic resource
after the date of acquisition.
In the second part of their study, Jennings et aL examine whether purchased goodwill is
reflected in equity values as a wasting resource. Their motivation is the fact that all US firms
are required to amortise goodwill over periods not to exceed 40 years. This requirement is
based on the argument that purchased goodwill declines in value over time because the
underlying stream of cash flows is likely to be of limited duration. However, some theorists
believed that purchased goodwill may retain its value indefinitely and that the amortisation
requirement is therefore inappropriate. In order to answer the above question, Jennings et
a!. estimate a cross-sectional regression based on income statement issues that involve
regressing equity values on components of expected future earnings, including expected
goodwill amortisation. They employed the following model:
MV	 =	 a0 + a1 EEBGWD + CC2EGWE1 + a3EDEPR + x4PRED1 + aROE1
+ a6GW + ct7PPE1 +
where
market value of equity
=	 a measure of expected future earnings exclusive of goodwill
amortisation and depreciation
=	 a measure of expected goodwill amortisation
=	 a measure of expected depreciation expenses
=	 a measure of risk
a measure of projected growth in earnings
goodwill asset balance at end of year
property, plant and equipment at end of year
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In order to reduce problems associated with heteroscedasticit y, all variables are deflated by
total assets at year-end.
This study focuses on c the slope coefficient for a measure of expected goodwill
amortisation. Jennings et a!. assume that the expected cash flows associated with
purchased goodwill are impounded in projections of earnings and earning growth (i.e., in
EEBGWD and ROE). They argued that if the stream of cash flows is expected to be finite,
goodwill amortisation should be negatively associated with equity values and conditional on
other components of projected earnings. In contrast, if purchased goodwill is expected to
generate cash flows indefinitely, there should be no association between equity values and
goodwill amortisation. The authors also separate depreciation from the other elements of
income. According to them, both depreciation and goodwill amortisation are recognised
based on the assumption that the life of the related assets is limited.
Table 4.11: The Effect on Market Value of Component of Expected Earnings
	
cZo	 cx	 a2	 X3	 X4	 X5	 a6	 a7	 R2/N
1988
Estimate	 -30.41	 12.14	 -38.71	 -11.80	 0.76	 6.45	 1.39	 -0.03	 0.89
f-ratio	 -1.81	 13.89	 -2.57	 -6.13	 2.43	 4.14	 3.61	 -0.17	 148
1987
Estimate	 -38.79	 11.40	 -8.49	 -10.67	 0.73	 4.05	 0.48	 0.01	 0.91
f-ratio	 -2.46	 14.18	 -0.73	 -5.10	 2.82	 2.20	 1.23	 0.08	 140
1986
Estimate	 -80.27	 16.42	 -15.54	 -17.77	 0.76	 9.83	 0.90	 0.04	 0.92
f-ratio	 -3.59	 14.84	 -1.69	 -9.01	 2.13	 3.42	 2.29	 0.22	 125
1985
Estimate	 -37.36	 17.35	 -51.04	 -20.43	 0.39	 6.14	 1.86	 0.04	 0.91
f-ratio	 -2.46	 18.44	 -3.21	 -9.01	 1.46	 5.30	 2.71	 0.25	 115
1984
Estimate	 1.21	 12.79	 -68.78	 -13.95	 0.37	 2.56	 1.88	 -0.11	 0.89
f-ratio	 0.07	 13.64	 -3.90	 -6.33	 0.79	 1.94	 3.38	 -0.70	 107
1983
Estimate	 40.11	 12.49	 -38.03	 -13.96	 0.32	 6.96	 1.59	 -0.30	 0.85
f-ratio	 -1.93	 7.16	 -2.55	 -5.67	 1.13	 3.26	 2.30	 -1.58	 97
1982
Estimate	 -49.96	 15.95	 -50.93	 -21.37	 1.16	 8.63	 0.24	 0.36	 0.79
f-ratio	 -1.11	 7.10	 -1.72	 -4.22	 1.46	 1.85	 0.23	 0.85	 88
Model: MVj = czo + aIEEBGWDj + Z2 EGWEj + a3EDEPRI + a4 PREDI + cxROEj + aeGWj + a7PPE +
[Source: Jennings (1996)] Notes: The table shows OLS coefficient estimates (row 1) and t-statistics based on
Whites (1980) consistent covariance estimator (row 2) for each year. In all cases, all elements of the data matrix
are deflated by total assets at year end.
However, there is general agreement that the underlying assets have an identifiable finite
life. Thus, the coefficient on expected depreciation expense can provide evidence of the
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ability of the authors' specification to detect a negative relation between equity values and
changes in the value of an economic resource that is known to be declining in value. On the
other hand, the results from the balance sheet identity model suggest that the recorded
value of purchased goodwill is associated with the expected cash flow. Therefore, the
authors also include GW and PPE into this model. The estimation results for the above
model reported in Table 4.11, show that the estimated coefficient on EGWE is significantly
negative for five of the seven years. On the other hand, the coefficient on GW is significantly
positive in six of the seven years at the five- percent confidence level. In the light of all the
results of their study, Jennings et a!. have draw the following conclusions:
1. The results indicate a strong positive cross-sectional association between equity values
and recorded goodwill assets amounts after controlling for other components of net
assets.
2. The results find evidence of a negative association between equity values and goodwill
amortisation after controlling for other components' expected earning. However, this
evidence is somewhat weak, suggesting that the relation between equity values and
goodwill amortisation may vary substantially across firms.
Aboody and Lev (1998) examine the relevance to investors of information on the
capitalisation of software costs which has been promulgated in 1985 by Financial
Accounting Standards Board No. 86 (SFAS 86). The main motivation of their study is to
provide empirical evidence as a result of the industry petition to abolish the capitalisation
standard (SFAS 86). The major argument of that petition was that, given the technological
and competitive changes that had occurred since SFAS 86 came into effect, capitalisation
of software development cost did not benefit investors. As a result, the main question
addressed in this study is as follows:
"Is reported information on software capitalisation - the annual development cost
capitalised, the book value of the software asset and the amortisation of this value -
relevant to investors' assessment of securities' values?"
The main relevance in this paper to the present thesis is the way in which the value-
relevance of software capitalisation is tested using the following price model which is similar
to that used by Landsman (1986):
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Pit
Where;
Pit
xii
By1
CAPSOFT
= a0 + a1 X + a2BV, + U3CAPSOFTft + C1
= price per share three months after fiscal year end
= reported net income
= Book value of equity minus the capitalised software asset
= the net balance of the software assets
All right-hand variables are divided by the number of outstanding shares at year-end.
Table 4.12: The Market Value and Software Capltallsation (Aboody and Lev, 1998)
Dependent Variable	 Intercept	 BV1	 CAPSOFT1t	 Adj. R2
Stock Price	 13.375	 3.509	 2.189	 0.570
(Total Sample)	 (5.85)	 (10.97)	 (19.37)	 (2.06)	 0.57
Stock Price	 2.231	 1.406	 1.771	 1.325
(Top 25% of sample firms	 (2.90)	 (3.57)	 (14.19)	 (8.39)	 0.72
ranked on capitalisation
intensity)
Model: P11 = rio + aiX + a2BV + ri3CAPSOFT1t +
The estimation of the above model is reported in Table 4.12 for two sample sizes: the total
sample and for the 25 percent of sample cases with the highest capitalisation intensity (the
ratio of the annual capitalised development cost to total development cost). The result from
the total sample indicates that the coefficient of the software asset (balance sheet value) is
statistically significant and positive as expected. The estimates of the equation run on the
total sample indicate that the coefficient of the software asset (balance sheet value) is
statistically significant and positive. The result for the reduced sample is also positive and
highly statistically significant. Based on these results, the authors argue that the coefficient
of the software asset (1.325), is only slightly lower than the coefficient of equity (book value
- 1.771), indicating that investors value, on average, the capitalised software asset slightly
less than a firm's tangible assets. The subjectivity associated with the valuation of the
intangible asset (software) leads to some, but not substantial, discounting by investors. The
authors conclude that their results find no evidence that somewhat subjective software
capitalisation values are irrelevant to investors' decisions.
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Finally, we review Pfeiffer's (1998) paper that examines the extent to which off-balance-
sheet items are reflected in firms' security prices. He focuses on one off-balance-sheet
item: originated mortgage servicing rights.
According to Pfeiffer, mortgage-servicing rights are contractual rights to receive
compensation for performing primarily collection-related duties associated with mortgage
loans. These servicing rights, which relate to mortgages originated and then sold by the
holder of the rights, are not recorded as assets in the balance sheet under FASB 1982,
even though they clearly have economic value. The main research question in this study is
to answer the following question; do stock prices reflect estimates of off-balance-sheet
assets derived from information available in the notes to the financial statements?. To
answer this question, Pfeiffer regresses the following model:
MVE	 a0 ^ a 1 OTHASSETSn - a2L lABS11 + a3OBSMSR11 + a4REVENUEII + Si
where
MVE	 =
OTHASSETS
LIABS
OBSMSR
REVENUE
the market value of common equity for firm I on the last
day of fiscal year t.
the book value of all recorded assets
the book value of all liabilities
the estimated value of off-balance-sheet servicing right
total revenues as reported in the income statement.
The model is estimated in undeflated form. According to the author, this can potentially lead
to two scale-related problems, scale bias and heteroscedastic disturbance. Pfeiffer
addresses scale bias by including a proxy for size in the model which is total revenue
(REVENUE). The problem of heteroscedasticity is addressed by using White-corrected t-
statistics.
Table 4.13: Market Value and Off Balance Sheet Items (Pfeiffer, 1998)
ao	 N/B2
Coefficient	 -25.240	 0.559	 -0.477	 0.659	 0.120	 65
OLS t	 2.25O*	 13.21 0*	 10.48O*	 4.770	 0.86	 0.96
White t
	
2.870*	 9.070*	 -6.990	 4.380*	 0.78
Model: MVE,1 = cr0 + cx1 OTHASSETS,1 - a2LIABS,t + cc3OBSMSR1t ^ Cr4REVENUEI1 + i
86
The results for the above regression model, presented in Table 4.13, below, indicate that
estimated off balance sheet servicing appears to be priced. Its coefficient (0.659) is
significantly positive according to both of the measures of significance, OLS t and White-
corrected t.
4.6 Conclusion
In our review of the literature, several econometric problems associated with the estimation
of models have been mentioned by writers such as Landsman (1986), Gopalakrishnan and
Sugrue (1993), Kane and Unal (1993), Shevlin (1991), McCarthy and Schneider (1995),
Jennings et a!. (1996) and Pfeiffer (1998). The three major problems that were discussed
were (i) heteroscedasticity, (ii) measurement error in the regressors, and (iii)
multicollinearity. Each of these econometric problems will be discussed in further detail in
Chapters 5 and 6.
To summarise, the review reported in this chapter shows that models based on a relation
between market value and book values are used extensively in the accounting literature.
Many balance sheet items have been empirically tested using this model. These include
pension fund property, research and development, purchased goodwill, intangible assets
and assets and liabilities valuation in banking industry. The next chapter will discuss the
research design and method of the present study, which has been based on the relation
between market value and book value.
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CHAPTER 5
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD
5.1	 Introduction
The previous chapters have focused on three main areas. First, we discussed the
theoretical, regulatory and historical issues relating, in general to the accounting for goodwill
but with special reference to the environment of the UK. We observed that the controversy
surrounding goodwill could be clearly seen in the theoretical issues. We then reviewed the
literature on accounting for goodwill in Chapter 3, which mentioned that although much
empirical research have been done in this area, it has only focused on the reactions and
behaviour of the managers. The main interest of the present thesis is to investigate whether
or not purchased goodwill is one of the significant variables in determining a firm's valuation.
We, employ a model based on the relationship between market and book value with special
reference to the balance sheet variables. In Chapter 4, we reviewed the previous research
using the same model.
The present chapter will concentrate on the research design and method, which is the
backbone of this thesis. Section 5.1 will discuss the proposed research, focusing on some
of the issues which led to the choice of research questions. Section 5.2 develops a model
based on the research questions raised in Section 5.1. Section 5.3 briefly discusses the
potential econometric problems associated with the estimation of the model in Section 5.2.
Finally, Section 5.4 will briefly discuss the overall perspective of this chapter.
5.2	 The Proposed Research
The competing claims over a preferred method of dealing with purchased goodwill have
received much attention, by authors such as Jennings et a!. (1996), McCarthy and
Schneider (1995), Grinyer (1995), Bryer (1995), Henning (1994) and Russell eta!. (1989). It
is evident that each of the different methods of accounting for goodwill has its own justifiable
economic rationale in appropriate circumstances, as illustrated in Table 2.2. Indeed, no
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single method will be superior to another. Nevertheless, in practice, the opposition to the
preferred treatment recommended in SSAP 22 has been strong, and is based on the two
main arguments set out below.
The first is that management should be required to justify its acquisition of other companies
by demonstrating that cash inflows expected from the acquisition exceed the cash outflows
incurred when making the investment. It is argued that appropriate reporting for the
monitoring and control of management can only be achieved if the cash outlay committed to
generate future inflows in terms of increased profit is charged as a cost in the income
statement at some time. To do otherwise is analogous to treating gross profit as the net
gain from trading during a particular period by charging all the overhead costs to reserves.
This argument is reflected in the objectives of FRS 10, which seek to ensure that purchased
goodwill and intangible assets are charged in the profit and loss account in the periods in
which they are depleted and that sufficient information is disclosed in the financial
statements to enable users to determine the impact of goodwill and intangible assets on the
financial position and performance of the reporting entity. The force of these arguments can
be seen in Appendix Ill of FRS 10, which states that:
"The practice of eliminating goodwill against reserves has weaknesses... management
is not held accountable for the amount that it has invested in goodwill; it is not taken
into account when measuring the assets on which a return must be earned, and there
is no requirement to disclose a loss if the value of the goodwill is not maintained...'
The second major argument against SSAP 22 has been, as mentioned earlier, that
internationally the treatment of goodwill was to capitalise and amortise. Indeed the IASC has
recently updated lAS 22 to extend the recommended period for amortisation to 20 years
from 5 years, in order to bring its policy more into line with treatment in the US. Now, the
choice of goodwill method in FRS 10 has brought the UK much more into line with the rest
of the world. One conclusion that can be drawn from the objectives of FRS 10 is that
purchased goodwill is seen as a key variable in the valuation of firms. The measurement of
goodwill and its recognition on the face of the balance sheet can therefore be considered
justifiable, at the very least because this might reduce search costs for analysts, but more
specifically because it will provide new information to the market
In addition to the above points, it may be argued that an acquisition giving rise to goodwill is
frequently an alternative to self-start investment which would create a business that
possesses the characteristics desired by the managers of the acquisitive company, as
explained by Nelson (1953) and Grinyer (1995). If this is the case, then it is reasonable to
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hypothesise that the benefits gained by acquisition (purchased goodwill) decline in value
over time and that the period over which the benefits extend could be expected to be no
longer than the time usually required to form and establish a company with similar
characteristics to the one acquired. In these circumstances, to comply with conventional
concepts of matching-based depreciation, the pattern of amortisation of goodwill should
reflect the declining pattern of benefit. The approach advocated in FRS 10 is to spread the
cost of goodwill through successive profit and loss accounts on the basis of a combination
of systematic amortisation over a limited period and an annual impairment review. In the
case of amortising over a limited period, FRS 10 gives little guidance on how to predict an
asset's useful economic life. However, the standard states that (I) there is a rebuttable
presumption that the useful economic life is 20 years or less (only in specific circumstances
will there be good reason for assigning a longer useful economic life); (ii) uncertainty about
the useful economic life is not a good reason for choosing one that is unrealistically short;
and (iii) such uncertainty is not a good reason for adopting a 20 year useful economic life by
default.
Thus, whatever the useful economic life chosen, the company should be able to justify it,
and it should be reviewed annually and revised if appropriate. Indeed, the asset should have
an impairment review after the first year to ensure that its performance has been as
expected. If this review shows that the results are as predicted, no other review will be
required unless events or changes in the future indicate that the value of the goodwill may
not be recoverable. If the review shows that the post-acquisition performance is poorer than
anticipated, a full review is required in accordance with FRS 11, Impairment of Fixed Assets
and GoodwilL
Considering these arguments, FRS1O leads us to consider a number of research questions;
which are:
(I)	 'whether purchased goodwill is an important component of a firm's market value'
(ii) 'whether purchased goodwill which is off balance sheet is given a significant
weighting in arriving at market value' and
(iii) 'whether purchased goodwill shows a decline in value such that the impairment test
required by FRS 10 is relevant'.
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5.3	 Market Value Test Methodology
The main objective of this study is to examine whether the market perceives purchased
goodwill as an important variable in the determination of the value of a company. The
second objective is to test whether the market treats purchased goodwill in the same
manner as other assets. The third is to analyse whether purchased goodwill declines in
value.
McCarthy and Schneider (1995) mention that there are several ways in which these
objectives can be achieved. One approach is to use a return/earnings study. However this
type of study can only be employed if the accounting treatment of purchased goodwill is
amortisation since it is through amortisation that goodwill affects earnings. As the present
study focuses on companies that choose to eliminate purchased goodwill immediately
against reserves, this method is obviously not suitable for this study.
An alternative to the above approach is to study the ratio of a share's price to its book value.
Using this approach leads to several limitations; namely, that firms with negative net worth
must be eliminated; 'outliers' occur, because of small firms with small book values; and the
ratio of dependent variables cause the distributional properties to be very complex. In order
to overcome the above problems, McCarthy and Schneider employed a level approach in
their study. They mentioned that choosing a level approach has several advantages. First,
no estimates of the variables are required. Second, no firms have to be discarded or
become potential outliers as a result of negative book values or small book values, thus, all
firms in a level study will have positive market value.
The model adopted for this study is developed from the balance sheet identity first
introduced in this context by Landsman (1986), in which the book value of equity is written
as Shareholders' Equity (Net Assets) = Total Assets - Total Liabilities. Denoting these as
book values of equity (ByE), assets (BVA) and liabilities (BVL) for company j in year t, we
get
BVEI = B VAJ - BVL1 .	 (1)
Likewise, the market value of shareholders' equity (MVE) can be written as:
MVE= MVA1 - MVL
	
(2)
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where MVA and MVL denote the market value of the on- and off-balance sheet assets and
liabilities of companyjin year t.
This assumes that the market values of assets and liabilities are linearly and additively
related to equity value. However, because the above model is stated in terms of market
values rather than of book values, the accounting identity is not necessarily preserved. For
example, the market value of the residual claim may exceed the market value of corporate
assets less the market value of corporate liabilities, as the Miller and Modigliani (1966)
models of capital market equilibrium suggest. Following Landsman, the market value of
shareholders' equity given by Equation 2 may be restated as:
MVE1 = a0 + a1 MVAfl
 - a2 M VL1 +	 (3)
Landsman uses the model in Equation (3) to test the market's perception of firms' pension
assets and liabilities. If the theoretical model is correct, then the empirical value of a 0 should
be zero. While the market value of shareholders' equity is defined as the number of shares
outstanding as of December 31 for each year, multiplied by the share price, the book value
of assets and the book value of total liabilities are used as a proxy for the respective market
values MVA and MVL, as the latter are not observable. In theory, according to Miller's
(1977) model, the pricing mechanism would ensure that the coefficients of MVA and MVL
are +1 and -1 respectively.
The present study focuses on market perceptions regarding the amount reported for
goodwill, other assets and liabilities. Following McCarthy and Schneider (1995) and
Jennings et aL, (1996), we may incorporate into the right hand side of Equation (2) book
values instead of market values, while also separating reported assets into goodwill and
assets net of goodwill. The expanded version (2) can now be written as follows:
MVEfl	 =	 a0^a1BVOA1-a2BVL ^a3BVGW +eft	(4)
where,
MVE1	 Market value of shareholders' equity in firm j in year t
BVGWJ	 =	 Book value of the goodwill of firm j in year t
B V0A11	 =	 Book value of the assets of firm j in year t excluded goodwill
BVL1	 =	 Book value of the liabilities of firm in year t
92
Both of the above-mentioned studies used balance sheet data for firms operating in the US,
where goodwill is capitalised and amortised, and the net amount appears in the balance
sheet amongst assets. If we follow the argument of Kane and Unal (1990), the intercept in
equation (4) would be interpreted as unbooked assets and liabilities. In the UK context, we
would expect a0
 to be positive and significant because all the companies in the present
study choose to write off purchased goodwill against reserves in the year of acquisition, and
goodwill appeared in neither the balance sheet nor the income statement. Nevertheless, UK
companies are required to disclose information about the treatment of goodwill in the notes
to the accounts. Introducing an estimate of goodwill based on amounts eliminated would
cause a0
 to decline. To do so, one option would be to accumulate the purchased goodwill
that has been eliminated over n years. For instance, if n = 1, this would be equivalent to
estimating the off-balance sheet goodwill of a UK company as the amount eliminated in the
current period, implying that the appropriate amortisation schedule would be 100% depletion
in the second period. For greater values of n, the implicit assumption is that goodwill retains
its full value for the period of n years and is then fully depleted. It is on the basis of this
reasoning that our analysis proceeds, inferences being drawn from the behaviour of a 0 . In
summary, we estimate the off-balance sheet goodwill of the /h firm at the end of period ton
the basis of eliminated goodwill. GWEJ, accumulated over n prior periods; i.e.,
GWn,=GWEj
leading to
MVEg= a0
 + a 1 BVOA1 - a2BVLft + a3 GWr + eft	 (5)
Finally, it should be noted that the above models consider only the balance sheet in trying to
explain the market value of a company. Elsewhere, others have included only income
statement items in their model. For instance, in order to estimate the market valuation of
pension costs reported in the income statement, Barth et a!. (1992) model shareholders
equity as MVE= a1 Ni+ e, where a 1
 is the inverse of a discount rate and net income (NI) is
separated into sales, the different components of pension expenses and non-pension
expenses. According to Ohlson (1995), however, a model that includes both a stock
concept of value and a flow concept of earnings might better explain the market value of a
company's equity. There are various proxies for earnings (see McCarthy and Schneider,
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(1995), for instance), one being clean surplus earnings, that is the change in the net book
value of the firm from the beginning to the end of the fiscal year plus cash dividends less
new equity raised, and others being unexpected income or net income itself. For the
purpose of this study, a measure of net income is used in the form of income earned for
ordinary shareholders (EARN); i.e., net profit after tax, minority interest and preference
dividends but before any post-tax extraordinary items. On the basis of the above, Equation
(5) would be expanded as follows:
MVEfi = a0
 + a1 B VOA1 - a2 B VLfi + a3 G Wnfl
 + a4EARNj + ejt 	 (6)
With the introduction of a flow concept or income variable into the model, the theoretical
values for the coefficients become different. According to Ohlson (1995), the coefficients will
still add up to one, when averaged over the balance sheet variables and flow variables. In
addition there is a multiplier associated with the flow of income.
5.4	 The Model and Expected Coefficient Values
The previous section discussed the development of the models, that is, a more general
version of the accounting identity which holds that the net assets equal total assets less total
liabilities. For instance, net assets represent a residual claim that corporate shareholders
have to corporate assets after deducting the claims of debt holders. According to Landsman
(1986), if the identity is stated in terms of market values, then the net assets represent the
market value of that residual claim. However, once the identity is stated in terms of market
values rather than accounting book values, the tautology of the accounting is not necessary
preserved. For example, the market value of the residual claim may in fact exceed the
market value of corporate assets less the market value of corporate liabilities as the Miller
and Modigliani (1966) model of capital market equilibrium suggests. In his study, Landsman
used historical cost accounting as a proxy for the market value of assets and liabilities
because the two are unobservable.
An extension of this model that included both parts of financial accounting; i.e., a stock
concept of value (book value) and a flow concept of value (earnings) was used by McCarthy
and Schneider (1995) and by Pfeiffer (1998) in order to better explain the market value of a
firm's equity. As a result, our final selection of the model for this thesis (which is based on 8
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years cumulative purchased goodwill) follows Equation (6), explained in the previous section
as:
MVE1 = a0 + a1B VOA1 - a2BVL1 + a3 GWn11 + a4EARN1 + eft
The first research question to be addressed in this study is whether purchased goodwill
should be considered as an important element when determining a firm's market value. In
order to answer this question, a 3
 is the coefficient of main interest. If the market places
value on the reported goodwill of a firm, then goodwill should be significant and positively
correlated with the firm's market value. To check for this relationship the following null
hypothesis is tested:
Hi: a3
 = 0
If a3
 is positive and statistically significant, it represents evidence that investors look beyond
the face of the financial statements to information contained in the notes to the accounts,
and that they can identify past write-oHs and include them in current valuations. Moreover, if
goodwill is long-lived, a3
 is expected to decline in absolute value as the number of years of
accumulation increases. If goodwill is a significant variable, then further examination should
test how the market perceives goodwill in relation to all other assets. In other words, is it
priced differently from other assets?
To answer this question, we established the following null hypothesis:
Hi: a1 = a3
Again, as GW is obtained through accumulation, then we expect a1
 to increase in absolute
value compared to a3
 when the number of years of cumulative GW is increased. The third
issue is that of determining whether and how purchased goodwill declines in value. If
Equation (6) allows GW as a cumulative figure, then we expect a 0 to be significant and
positively related to the market value of the firm when the accumulation period is short,
reflecting the understatement of booked assets attributable to the goodwill proxy. We expect
the a0
 to decrease in absolute value with an increase in n, the number of years over which
goodwill elimination is accumulated. It follows that the behaviour of a 0 will provide a basis on
which to draw inferences about the expected life of goodwill.
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5.5	 Econometric Issues
In Chapter 4, we discussed previous studies that were based on the relationship between
market value and b.00k value. Several potential econometric problems associated with the
estimation of Equation 9, were noted in models which are relevant to the present study; e.g.
in Landsman (1986), Harris and Ohlson (1987), Barth (1989), Shevlin (1991),
Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue (1993), McCarthy and Schneider (1995) and Jennings et a!.
(1996), several potentials econometric problem associated with estimation of equation (9)
were mentioned. Three of these problems - heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity and
measurement errors - are briefly discussed in this section and will be dealt with further in the
discussion of the data in Chapter 6.
One potential econometric problem when estimating valuation models is the problem of
heteroscedastic disturbance, which arises from the fact that, large (small) companies tend
to produce large (small) disturbances. If heteroscedasticity is present, then the standard
errors are understated, resulting in overstated t-statistics. The second potential problem in
the regression model is multicollinearity. The estimates of regression coefficients are
unbiased if multicollinearity is present, but there are several potential problems; e.g., the
imprecision of estimation (high sampling variances); and a high degree of sensitivity in the
estimates of the coefficients to particular sets of sample data. The presence of a severe
multicollinearity problem could result in drawing misleading inferences from sample t-
statistics. In particular, even if the sample t-statistics are unbiased (there are no other
econometric problems), it is still difficult to determine whether the sampling variances are
large because of multicollinearity, or whether the variance of the true population is large.
The third potential problem in the regression model (Equation 6) is measurement error in
the regressors. This is because none of the market values for each of the explanatory
variables in Equation (6) are directly observable; thus the estimation of Equation (6) may
result in biased coefficients. However without knowledge of (a) the specific form of
measurement error; i.e., whether it is systematic or random noise and (b) the covariance
structure of the measurement error of the four explanatory variables, it is difficult to predict
what bias - if any - to expect in the estimates of the regression coefficients. These issues
and ways to overcome the problems will be discussed again in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 6
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: OVERVIEW AND DATA
6.1	 Introduction
The previous chapter developed the research questions, and presented three hypothesises
and a description of the research method to be employed in this thesis. The main purpose
of this thesis is to address part of the controversy surrounding purchased goodwill that has
been eliminated in the year of acquisition in the UK environment. The most important
question is whether that 'goodwill number' has value-relevance for investors when they are
determining the value of a company. Another important question is how they relate
purchased goodwill to other assets. Does purchased goodwill decline in value? In this
chapter, the data used to assess these questions are described. We explain the data
source and describe the sample and selection criteria in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 defines the
variables required in the regression models and Section 6.4 reports the descriptive
statistical analysis of the data. Section 6.5 presents the exploratory analysis. We began with
a discussion of the overall relationship between market value and book value using the
balance sheet model as employed by Kane and Unal (1990). The analysis incorporates the
growth of accounting goodwill mentioned by Higson (1998). We then elaborate on the main
econometric issues relating to the model. Finally, Section 6.6 presents a brief summary of
this chapter.
6.2	 Data and Sample Selection
The empirical analogue of the theoretical model developed in Chapter 5 is:
MVE1	=	 a0+a1BVOAft-a2BVLft +a3 GWn1 +a4EARN1 + ejt
Where
MVE1
BVA
BVL1
GWn
EARNJ
=	 Market value of shareholders' equity of firm j in year t
=	 Book value of the assets of firm j in year t
=	 Book value of the liabilities of firm j in year t
=	 Cumulative acquired goodwill of firm j in year t for n year
=	 Net Profit after tax of firm j in year t
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In this study we examine the market valuation of UK firms reporting the elimination of
purchased goodwill in the three-year period 1994-96. Into the valuation model we
incorporate estimates based on the accumulation of goodwill elimination over a longer
period; i.e. the ten years from 1987 through 1996. We have chosen this as the relevant time
period for the following reasons: first, because the ASC published the Statement of
Standard Accounting Practice 22 (the SSAP recommending that positive goodwill should be
eliminated reserves in the period in which it is acquired) in 1985. A study by Russell et a!.
(1989) and Higson (1990) shows that, by 1987, almost all the UK companies had chosen
the immediate elimination treatment for goodwill.
Secondly, the ASB issued Financial Reporting Standard FRS 10 (Goodwill and Intangible
Assets) in December 1997, requiring purchased goodwill to be capitalised and amortised.
Although this standard was effective only in financial statements relating to accounting
periods ending on or after 23 December 1998, we chose the sample year 1996 as a final
accounting year end, thus excluding the impact of companies which voluntarily changed
their accounting policy in advance, with prior knowledge of the FRS1 0 ruling.
The data for this study were obtained from Datastream, and our selection procedures are
summarised in Table 6.1. We organised the sample selection on the basis of two criteria: (i)
to include any listed company, except firms in the banking sector, that recorded the
elimination of goodwill on acquisition in any year from 1994 to 1996; (ii) to exclude any
company which recorded an intangible asset in the balance sheet during the previous eight
years, thus avoiding companies which changed their accounting policy on the treatment of
purchased goodwill. As a result, the final sample consists of 137 companies, with 275
eliminations made by the sampled companies in the three years from 1994 to 1996. The
maximum number of firm-year observations for this sample would be 411 (Le. 3 x 137).
Table 6.1: Selection of Companies
First Step	 Second Step	 Third Step	 Final Sample
Select All companies -	 Exclude companies	 Exclude companies which	 137 Comranies:
Datastream Total	 without purchased	 recorded Intangible assets 	 Eliminating goodwill in:
Market Listing at 31 	 goodwill for any year in the Balance Sheets for
	 1996: 68 companies
Dec. 1996 (mnemonic	 during 1994 - 1996	 any year during 1994 -
	 1995: 99 companies
LTOTMKUK)	 1996	 1994: 108 companies
275 companies years
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Number of
!J?!!Y	 PE
1	 0.73
1	 0.73
1	 0.73
2	 1.46
2	 1.46
2	 1.46
2	 1.46
2	 1.46
2	 1.46
4	 2.92
4	 2.92
5	 3.65
5	 3.65
5	 3.65
5	 3.65
6	 4.38
7	 5.11
7	 5.11
7	 5.11
8	 5.84
9	 6.57
9	 6.57
11	 8.03
12	 8.76
18	 13.14
137	 100.00
Sector
1. Alcoholic Beverages
2. Diversified Industrial
3. Oil & Gas
4. Electricity
5. Mining
6. Pharmaceuticals
7. Retailer, Food
8. Telecommunications
9. Water
10. Constructions
11. Breweries, Pubs & Rest
12. Electronic & Elect
13. Engineering. Vehicles
14. Leisure & Hotel
15. Media
16. Distributors
17. Chemicals
18. Household Goods and Text
19. Retailer, General
20. Transport
21. Printing and Paper
22. Support Services
23. Food Manufacturer
24. Building Materials
25. Engineering
Total
Table 6.2: Years of Cumulative Purchased Goodwill, Sample Size, Number of Companies and
Accounting Year-ends
Number of
Accounting Year Epanies
31 January	 3
28 February	 3
31 March	 29
30 April	 8
3lMay	 2
30 June	 4
31 July	 1
31 August	 3
13 September	 1
30 September	 11
31 October	 2
31 December	 70
Total	 137
rvear of Cumulative '1	 I
LPurchased Goodwill	 Sample Slze
1996: 68
1995: 99
1994: 108
Total: 275
2 1996: 110
1995: 137
1994: 119
Total: 366
3 1996: 132
1995: 136
1994: 123
Total: 391
4 1996: 131
1995: 137
1994: 127
Total: 395
5 1996: 134
1995: 137
1994: 128
Total: 399
6 1996: 135
1995: 137
1994: 129
Total: 401
7 1996: 135
1995: 137
1994: 130
Total: 402
8 1996: 137
1995: 137
1994: 130
Total: 404
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The models are estimated on pooled samples of firm-years, with subsampling based on the
number of years, n, over which purchased goodwill is accumulated (i.e. from one to eight
years). Hence, a firm which reports elimination of positive goodwill in 1996 and 1992 would
be included as a firm-year observation once in the case of GW 1 (1996), once in the case of
GW 2
 (1 995-6), twice in the case of GW 3
 (1 994-6 and 1992-4), and so on. The subsample
sizes increase from 275 when n=1 to 404 when n=8, a small number of negative goodwill
elimination in prior years causing the shortfall from the maximum possible sample size. A
summary of the number of companies in each subsample is presented in Table 6.2; along
with an industry decomposition of the sample as a whole showing the broad spread of
companies involved. Details concerning accounting year-ends are also provided. As can be
seen in the table which indicates that the sample largely comprises firms with December
and, to a lesser extent, March year ends.
6.3	 Definition of Variables
The Market value of shareholders' equity (MVE) is defined as share price (mnemonic - P)
multiplied by the number of shares in issue adjusted for rights and script issues subsequent
to the accounting year-end. In order to get the number of shares outstanding, earned
income for ordinary (item 625) is divided by net earning per share (item 254). In this study,
prices are drawn from Datastream on two different dates, at the accounting year-end and
three months after the year-end. The book value of total assets (BVOA) and book values of
total liabilities (BVL) are also taken from Datastream using five different Datastream
variables. We add the total assets employed (item 391) to current liabilities (item 389) for
the book value of total assets. For total liabilities we add current liabilities to total loan capital
(item 321) and preference capital (item 306). Data on purchased goodwill 12 are drawn from
Datastream (item 498, goodwill on acquisition).
For the purpose of this study, we traced back all the goodwill on acquisition for the past
eight years in order to determine the cumulative figure that had been written off. As a result,
the data for purchased goodwill consist of eight-year periods for each of the accounting
year-ends of 1994, 1995 and 1996. To ensure that no company recorded purchased
goodwill in any year, we check item 343 (goodwill and other intangibles). According to
Ohlson (1993), a model that includes a stock concept of value and a flow concept of
earnings might better explain the market value of a company's equity. For the purpose of
this study, a measure of net income in the form of earned income for ordinary (item 625) will
12 We validate item 498 with data set used by OHanlon (1997). This data was obtained directly from financial
Statements.
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Item No.
P
625
254
391
389
389
321
306
498
625
104
343
be used as a proxy. The summary of the Datastream variables required for the regression
mod&s is presented in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: DefInition of Variables
Variables Required for Regression
Market Value of Equity
Book Value of Total Assets
Book Value of Total Liabilities
Eliminated Purchased Goodwill
Earnings
Book Value of Equity
Other Variables used:
() Deflator:
Total Sales
(ii) Exclusion of companies capitalising goodwill:
Book Value of Goodwill and Other
Intangibles
(ii) Calculation of ordinary Shares outstanding:
Earned for ordinary
Net Earning per share
Datastream Variables
MVE	 Share Price
x Ordinary Share outstanding
BVOA Total Asset Employed
+ Current Liabilities
BVL	 Current Liabilities
+ Total Loan Capital
+ Preference Capital
GW	 Goodwill on acquisition
EARN Earned for Ordinary
BVE	 BVOA-BVL
Total Sales
Goodwill and Other
Intangible
Earned for ordinary
Net Earning per Share
625
254
Definitions of each of the Datastream variables are as follows13:
• Earned for Ordinary (625) - This is the net profit, after tax, minority interest and
preference dividends but before any post-tax extraordinary items.
• Net Earning per Share (254) - This is the published earned for ordinary (item 625)
divided by the year end number of shares. The average number of shares is adjusted
for rights and script issues subsequent to the year-end.
• Total assets employed (391) - This shows the sum of all assets less all current
liabilities.
• Current liabilities (389) - This includes current provisions, creditors, borrowings
repayable within one year and any other current liabilities. It also includes trade
accounts payable after one year.
• Total loan capital (321) - This relates to all loans repayabte in more than one year.
13 All definitions are drawn from Datastream Manual.
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Loans from group companies and associates are included.
• Preference capital (306) - This shows capital that has a fixed dividend and does not
participate further in the company's profit.
• Goodwill on acquisition (498) - This is the excess of consideration over the net book
value of assets acquired.
• Total Sales (104) - The amount of sales of goods and services to third parties, relating
to the normal activities of the company. This amount does not include Value Added Tax
or any other taxes relating directly to turnover, and will be net of trade discounts.
• Goodwill and other Intangibles (343) - This includes goodwill on consolidation and
represents the excess of consideration over the book value of subsidiaries' assets
acquired, less any amounts subsequently written off. The item also includes patents,
trade marks, copyrights, concessions, start-up costs, deferred charges, costs
attributable to other years, and preliminary expenses and concessions.
6.4	 Descriptive Statistics
The ratio of purchased goodwill to book value of assets is presented in Table 6.4. It can be
seen that the goodwill acquired which has been written off for the past eight years was over
16% of the total assets. If we take a one year cumulative figure, the ratio was nearly 4%,
which can be considered as a significant amount.
Table 6.4: Ratio of Cumulative Purchased Goodwill to Total Assets
Number of Years Total BVAJ%L
GW 1	3.25
GW2	6.29
GW3	7.78
GW4	8.89
GW5	10.27
GW6	12.27
GW7	14.52
GW8	16.56
As mentioned earlier, various studies in the literature show that most of the companies in
the UK choose the immediate write-off treatment. According to Rutteman (1990), in extreme
cases the consolidated balance sheets of some companies started showing negative net
worth following the elimination of reserves due to goodwill write-offs. Indeed, the goodwill
policies of some companies made their accounts look too weak; i.e., their gearing ratios
became so high as to endanger covenants or to cause acute embarrassment when raising
finance (Nobes, 1992).
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0.152
0.162
0.111
0.142
0.322
0.401
0.242
0.331
0.217
0.240
0.196
0.218
0.334
0.408
0.269
0.343
In order to assess how material the purchased goodwill written off for the past eight
cumulative years was, we present the ratio of purchased goodwill to net assets in Table 6.5.
It can clearly be seen that the goodwill acquired and written off was very material and
significant over net assets. The ratio is slightly above 5% for the one-year cumulative figures
and nearly 35% if we consider the 8 years cumulative figures. The descriptive statistics for
cumulative purchased goodwill are based on year to year figures. They can be seen in
Table 6.6. The overall descriptive statistics for Market Value (MVE), Book Value Assets
(BVOA), Book Value of Liabilities (BVA) and Earnings (EARN) are presented in Table 6.7.
The Pearson Correlation Coefficients are presented in Table 6.8.
Table 6.5: Ratio of Cumulative Purchased Goodwill to Net Assets
Number of Years
GW1
GW2
GW3
GW4
GW5
GW6
GW7
GW8
Net Assets (%)
6.45
12.50
15.45
17.65
20.40
24.38
28.84
32.89
Table 6.6: Descriptive Statistics - Purchased Goodwill (Deflated by Sales)
Statistics	 Year	 GW1	 GW2	 GW3	 GW4	 GW5	 GW6	 GW7	 GW8
Mean	 1996	 0.092	 0.128
1995	 0.135	 0.143
1994	 0.083	 0.100
Total	 0.104	 0.124
Std. Deviation	 1996	 0.216	 0.295
1995	 0.414	 0.396
1994	 0.241	 0.242
Total	 0.310	 0.322
	
0.167	 0.173	 0.192	 0.206
	
0.172	 0.191	 0.201	 0.222
	
0.132	 0.149	 0.166	 0.186
	
0.157	 0.172	 0.189	 0.205
	
0.327	 0.325	 0.337	 0.336
	
0.401	 0.408	 0.406	 0.406
	
0.260	 0.260	 0.261	 0.268
	
0.336	 0.338	 0.341	 0.342
Median	 1996	 0.024	 0.034	 0.047	 0.055	 0.068	 0.079	 0.091	 0.108
1995	 0.022	 0.033	 0.040	 0.054	 0.067	 0.088	 0.098	 0.112
1994	 0.018	 0.027	 0.040	 0.057	 0.082	 0.099	 0.108	 0.117
Total	 0.021	 0.032	 0.041	 0.055	 0.069	 0.087	 0.099	 0.113
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Table 6.7: Descriptive Statistics - Market Value of Equity, Book Values of Assets
and Liabilities, and Earnings
Variables
GW1
1arket Value of Equity 1
Aarket Value of Equity 2
Book Value of Assets
Book Value of Liabilities
Earnings
GW2
Market Value of Equity 1
Market Value of Equity 2
Book Value of Assets
Book Value of Liabilities
Earnings
GW3
Market Value of Equity 1
Market Value of Equity 2
Book Value of Assets
Book Value of Liabilities
Earnings
GW4
Market Value of Equity 1
Market Value of Equity 2
Book Value of Assets
Book Value of Liabilities
Earnings
GW5
Market Value of Equity 1
Market Value of Equity 2
Book Value of Assets
Book Value of Liabilities
Earnings
GW6
Market Value of Equity 1
Market Value of Equity 2
Book Value of Assets
Book Value of Liabilities
Earnings
GW7
Market Value of Equity 1
Market Value of Equity 2
Book Value of Assets
Book Value of Liabilities
Earnings
GW8
Market Value of Equity 1
Market Value of Equity 2
Book Value of Assets
Book Value of Liabilities
Earnings
N	 Mean
275
2.680
2.727
1.082
0.513
0.180
366
2.593
2.651
1.053
0.501
0.168
391 2.722
2.795
1.079
0.503
0.173
395 2.703
2.778
1.075
0.501
0.173
399 2.695
2771
1.073
0.499
0.172
401 2.698
2.772
1.072
0.499
0.172
2.692
402 2.766
1.070
0.497
0.171
2.691
404 2.763
1.071
0.498
0.172
Std. Deviation I Median
	
4.125
	
1.513
	
4.048
	
1.543
	
1.069
	 0.836
	
0.528	 0.394
	
0.439
	
0.086
	
3.866
	
1.450
	
3.829
	
1.507
	
1.006
	
0.827
	
0.508
	
0.392
	
0.411
	
0.081
	
3.977
	
1.506
	
4.044
	
1.554
	
1.090
	
0.837
	
0.497
	
0.393
	
0.425	 0.082
	
3.962
	
1.495
	
4.029	 1.543
	
1.086	 0.836
	
0.495
	 0.392
	
0.423
	
0.082
	
3.944
	
1.495
	
4.012
	
1.543
	
1.082	 0.828
	
0.493	 0.392
	
0.421
	 0.082
	
3.935
	
1.506
	
4.002	 1.554
	
1.079
	 0.828
	
0.492
	
0.392
	
0.420
	
0.082
	
3.932	 1.501
	
3.999
	
1.549
	
1.078
	
0.828
	
0.492
	
0.390
	
0.420
	
0.082
	
3.922
	
1.510
	
3.989
	
1.556
	
1.076
	 0.832
	
0.491
	
0.392
	
0.419
	
0.082
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Table 6.8: Sample Correlation Matrix
Accumulation Pbriod
n = 1 1996: 68 MVE1
1995: 99 MVE2
1994: 108 BVOA
Total: 275 BVL
GW
3VOA BVL GW EARN
	0.676	 0.600	 0.225	 0.860
	
0.678	 0.596	 0.238	 0.834
	
0.957	 0.536	 0.499
	
0.587	 0.404
-0.106
n=2
n=3
n=4
n=5
n=6
n=7
n=8
1996: 110 MVE1
1995: 137 MVE2
1994: 119 BVOA
Total: 366 BVL
GW
1996: 132 MVE1
1995: 136 MVE2
1994: 123 BVOA
Total: 391 BVL
GW
1996: 131 MVE1
1995: 137 MVE2
1994: 127 BVOA
Total: 395 BVL
GW
1996: 134 MVE1
1995: 137 MVE2
1994: 128 BVOA
Total: 399 BVL
GW
1996: 135 MVE1
1995: 137 MVE2
1994: 129 BVOA
Total: 401 BVL
GW
1996: 135 MVE1
1995: 137 MVE2
1994: 130 BVOA
Total: 402 BVL
GW
1996: 137 MVE1
1995: 137 MVE2
1994: 130 BVOA
Total: 404 BVL
GW
	0.65 	 0.544	 0.229	 0.848
	
0.648	 0.534	 0.241	 0.828
	
0.943	 0.489	 0.466
	
0.556	 0.338
-0.099
	
0.666	 0.541	 0.223	 0.825
	
0.690	 0.527	 0.231	 0.782
	
0.883	 0.416	 0.427
	
0.528	 0.034
-0.078
	
0.667	 0.543	 0.222	 0.825
	
0.691	 0.528	 0.229	 0.782
	
0.884	 0.410	 0.428
	
0.519	 0.336
-0.076
	
0.667	 0.543	 0.214	 0.825
	
0.691	 0.529	 0.221	 0.428
	
0.884	 0.402	 0.337
	
0.511	 0.337
-0.076
	
0.667	 0.542	 0.201	 0.825
	
0.691	 0.528	 0.208	 0.782
	
0.883	 0.395	 0.428
	
0.503	 0.336
-0.08 1
	
0.667	 0.542	 0.194	 0.825
	
0.691	 0.528	 0.201	 0.782
	
0.883	 0.390	 0.428
	
0.502	 0.337
-0.085
	
0.667	 0.542	 0.189	 0.825
	
0.691	 0.528	 0.196	 0.782
	
0.957	 0.536	 0.499
	
0.587	 0.404
-0.106
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6.5	 Exploratory Data Analysis
We divided the exploratory data analysis (EDA) into four main sections. Firstly, we will
discuss the oveall perspective of the market value and book value relationship in the spirit
of Kane and Unal (1990) for the UK market from 1980 to 1996. Based on this analysis, we
will incorporate the growth of goodwill accounting (Higson, 1998) from 1976 to 1991 in order
to give some early indication of the relationship between market value, book value and
goodwill.
Secondly, we will run the regression using the same model employed in this thesis for the
left-over" samples. This sample includes companies that do not have any purchased
goodwill or recorded purchased goodwill in the balance sheets. The results from this
analysis will be compared with the main results.
Thirdly, we will perform variance analysis for each of variables to determine whether any of
the variables in the sample size are statistically significantly different due to the different
year factors. Finally we will discuss the econometric issues.
6.5.1 Market Value and Book Value Analysis
The empirical analysis of this study is based on the market value and book value
relationship. As introduced by Landsman (1986), this analysis can be performed by using
the balance sheet identity (accounting figures):
MVE =
where
MVE1 =
BVE =
=
a0 + a 1 B VE + ejj
Market value of shareholders' equity of firm j in year t
Book value of shareholders' equity of firm j in year t
error term
Kane and Unal (1990) believe that hidden capital exists whenever the accounting measure
of a firm's net worth diverges from its economic value. They identify two sources of hidden
capital: accountants' misvaluations of portfolio positions that accounting principles designate
as on-balance-sheet items and the systematic neglect of off-balance-sheet sources of value
that these principles do not permit to be formally booked. Using the above model (MVE1 =
a0 + a 1 B VE1 .i- ejt), they estimate both forms of hidden capital.
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The model's coefficients describe the de facto deceptiveness of Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP). Unless both a0 = 0 and a 1 = 1, the accounting or book value
of a firm's capital represents a biased estimate of the market value of stockholder equity. If
the estimated intercept is significantly positive (negative), unbookable assets and liabilities
serve as a net source of (drain on) institutional capital, and this problem exist in both
directions. The present study estimates a0 and a 1 using the same model for UK firms for 16
years, from 1981 to 1996. The main objective of this analysis is to see whether there was
any pattern, in particular related to the unbookable assets and liabilities. This interest is
relevant to the UK environment, especially the discussion of accounting for goodwill that has
been eliminated in the year of acquisition, which might influence the coefficient of intercept
over times.
Table 6.9 reports the result of the analysis. The regressions show that the accounting
representations of the economic performance of all firms are illusory. For all the years, the
Wald test of restrictions imposed on parameters rejects the combined a0 = 0 and a 1 = 1,
condition necessary for recorded equity to be an unbiased estimate of market value. The
values for a 1 are significant at the 5% level throughout 16 years under study. In 11 out of
thel6 years under study, the coefficient shows a significant premium (a 1 > 1). During the
1981 -86 period the coefficient shows a significant premium ranging from 4.978 (1984) to
1.074(1986). However the coefficient drops significantly below unity for five years from 1987
to 1992 (except for 1989 when the coefficient is 1.429). From 1993 until 1996, the
coefficient raises significantly above unity, ranging from 1.812 (1994) to 2.982 (1995).
The most interesting result is related to the intercept value. Deviations of a 0 from zero show
a definite time pattern. Before 1985, the market value of unbookable equity is negative and
significant. This suggests that off-balance-sheet items serve as a drain on capital value
before 1985 and becomes positive but insignificant in 1985. During the 1986-92 period, the
intercept value becomes positive and highly significant (except for 1989, which is significant
at the 10 percent level). We plot the intercept values over time in Figure 6.1. We might
conclude that during the 1986-92 period, unbookable equity is relatively very high and
significant compared to the 1981-85 period. One major reason for this situation is that
during the 1980's, acquisitions had been increasingly common as a means of growth. As
the relative size of acquisition grew, so too did both the amount and the proportion of the
purchase price assigned to goodwill that was eliminated straight away to the reserves
account. Higson (1998) describes the accounting goodwill in UK take-overs between 1976
and 1992. He documents the dramatic growth of goodwill in the mid-1980s (Figure 6.2)
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which are consistent with Russell et a!. (1989) and Bryer (1995). At face value, a
comparison of Figure 6.1 and 6.2 might result in the conclusion some relationships exist
between the intercept value (Figure 6.1) and the growth of goodwill (Figure 6.2). This issue
will be discussed further when we discuss the results in Chapter 7.
Table 6.9: Market Value to Book Value Regressions: Time-varying parameters
Wald Test
Year	 ao	 a1	 N	 AdJ. R2 CHSQ p-Value
1981	 1.259***	 3 . 822***	 187	 0.866	 30.853	 0.000
white - t	 -5.536	 7.391
1982	 0.364***	 1.900***	 192	 0.846	 27.051	 0.000
white - t	 -4.680	 11.066
1983	 1.542***	 4•559***	 201	 0.884	 27.975	 0.000
white - f	 -5.170	 6.630
1984	 1.630***	 4 . 978***	 211	 0.847	 15.030	 0.001
white - 1	 3.652	 4.840
1985	 0.148	 1.498***	 217	 0.445	 48.583	 0.000
white - 1	 1.504	 6.383
1986	 0.419***	 1.074***	 222	 0.338	 97.466	 0.000
white - 1 7.599	 9.745
1987	 0.785***	 0.719***	 240	 0.661	 138.684	 0.000
white - 1 10.328	 14.890
1988	 0.638***	 0.785*	 256	 0.548	 70.227	 0.000
white - f 8.043	 5.382
1989	 0.675*	 1.429**	 274	 0.477	 25.478	 0.000
white - f 1.825	 2.196
1990	 0.480	 0.865***	 286	 0.528	 29.421	 0.000
white - f 5.104	 5.953
1991	 0.498***	 0.823***	 294	 0.644	 78.751	 0.000
white - f 6.908	 8.213
1992	 0.707***	 0.562**	 303	 0.246	 95.382	 0.000
white - f 6.478	 3.190
1993	 0.001	 2.159***	 315	 0.526	 77.628	 0.000
white - f 0.005	 4.536
1994	 0.295	 1.812***	 337	 0.934	 75.796	 0.000
white - f 2.180	 12.689
1995	 -0.273	 2.982***	 348	 0.654	 45.410	 0.000
white -	 0.865	 5.997
1996	 0.538	 2.131***	 360	 0.401	 95.303	 0.000
white - t 1.178	 2.724
Notes: The table indicates significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.
Model: MVEj = ao + aiB VE11 ^ eft :Parameter Restrictions: a = 0 and a = 1
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Figure 6.1:lntercept Value (1981-96)
Model: MVE1, = a0
 .: a,B VE1t + ep
Figure 6.2: The Growth of Goodwill
76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
Year
Note: This figure plots the annual equal-weighted average ratio of the accounting goodwill In each take-
over to the book net worth of the acquirer at its previous accounting year end, with the bottom and top
quartile excluded. The solid line shows the median (Scanned from Higson, 1998)
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6.5.2 Market Value and Book Value Analysis (Company without Goodwill)
The main purpose of this study is to determine whether purchased goodwill has value-
relevance to investors when they determine the value of a company. The criteria for
selecting our sample were: (i) to include any listed company, except firms in the banking
sector, that recorded the elimination of goodwill on acquisition in any year from 1994 to
1996; (ii) to exclude any company which recorded an intangible asset in the balance sheet
during the previous eight years, thus avoiding companies which changed their accounting
policy on the treatment of purchased goodwill. Therefore, the excluded companies are
those that did not make any acquisitions during the period under study or companies that
recorded purchased goodwill on the face of balance sheet. It is interesting to assess
whether these companies have some special characteristic that can be compared with our
main results presented in Chapter 7. For the purpose of comparison we regress the
samples using the basic model introduced in Chapter 5 and mentioned earlier in this
chapter but without purchased goodwill. The model is as follows:
MVEJt =
where:
MVE =
BVNAJ, =
EARNJI =
ejt 	 =
a0 + a 1 BVNA + a2EARN+ e
Market value of shareholders' equity of firm j in year t
Book value of shareholders' equity of firm j in year t
Net Profit after tax of firm j in year t
error term
Table 6.10: Market Value to Book Value Regressions: Fixed Effects
Based on Whites Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E.s
Dependent variable is MVE
623 observations used for estimation from 1 to 623
Regressor	 Coefficient	 Standard Error T-Ratlo[Prob.]
Intercept	 0.1879	 0.1484	 1.2666[.206]
BVNA	 1.3557	 0.3246	 4.1758[.000]
EARN	 5.0791	 2.6166	 1.9411[.053]
R2 = 0.4567
Model: MVE1t = a + a 1 B VNA1 + a2EARN1t + ojt
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Table 6.10 reports this result. The intercept value is positive but not statistically significant.
The coefficients of BVNA (1.3557) and EARN (5.0791) are positive and statistically
significant at 1% and 6% respectively. The most interesting result is that the intercept value
is consistent with the overall analysis presented in Table 6.9. As the sample run in this
model is without the elimination of purchased goodwill in the year of acquisition, and if the
arguments of Kane and Unal (1990) are valid, the coefficient value of the intercept is
justifiable. This result will be discussed again in Chapter 7.
6.5.3 Analysis of Variance
We mentioned previously that the models in this study are estimated on pooled samples of
firm-years from 1994 - 96. We next perform analysis of variance in order to see whether
each of the variables in the sample size exhibits a statistically significant difference due to
the different year factors. Table 6.11 reports results from this analysis which show that none
of the variables are statistically significantly different for the three years under study.
Table 6.11: Analysis of Variance
Source/Variable DF	 BVOA	 BVL	 GW	 EARN
GW.
Adj MS - Year	 2	 0.7040	 0.2717	 0.0778	 0.0281
Adj MS - Error	 272	 1.1460	 0.2790	 0.0960	 0.1937
F-test	 0.6100	 0.9700	 0.8100	 0.1400
p-Value	 0.5410	 0.3790	 0.4660	 0.8650
QL2
Mj MS - Year	 2	 0.4880	 0.1343	 0.0619	 0.0212
Mj MS - Error	 363	 1 0140	 0.2588	 0.1040	 0.1699
F-lest	 0.4800	 0.5200	 0.6000	 0.1200
p-Value	 0.6180	 0.5950	 0.5520	 0.8830
Adj MS - Year	 2	 0 2380	 0.1326	 0.0929	 0.0047
MI. MS - Error	 388	 1.1930	 0.2474	 0.1093	 0.1816
F-lest	 0.2000	 0.5400	 0.8500	 0.0300
p-Value	 0.8190	 0.5860	 0.4280	 0.9740
Adi MS-Year	 2	 0.3020	 0.1468	 0.0601	 0.0030
Adl MS- Error	 392	 1.1850	 0.2456	 0.1131	 0.1798
F-test	 0.2500	 0.6000	 0.5300	 0.0200
p-Value	 0.7750	 0.7750	 0.5880	 0.9840
Ow'
AdI MS - Year	 2	 0.3120	 0.1541	 0.0600	 0.0038
Ad MS- Error	 396	 1.1740	 0.2434	 0.1142	 0.1781
F-test	 0.2700	 0.6300	 0.0200	 0.2700
p-Value	 0.7670	 0.5310	 0.9790	 0.7670
GW
Adj MS - Year	 2	 0.3160	 0.1641	 0.0552	 0.0043
AdI MS-Error	 398	 1.1690	 0.2424	 0.1165	 0.1773
F-lest	 0.2700	 0.6800	 0.4700	 0.0200
p-Value	 0.7630	 0.5090	 0.6230	 0.9760
Adt. MS - Year	 2	 0.3400	 0.1718	 0.0442	 0.0038
Adl. MS - Error	 399	 1.1660	 0.2419	 0.1173	 0.1769
F-test	 0.2900	 0.7100	 0.3800	 0.0200
p-Value	 0.7470	 0.4920	 0.6860	 0.9790
Gw,
Adj. MS - Year	 2	 0.3400	 0.1696	 0.0654	 0.0025
Adj. MS- Error	 401	 1.1610	 0.2409	 0.1 177	 0.1765
F-test	 0.2900	 0.7000	 0.5600	 0.0100
p-Value	 0.7460	 0.4950	 0.5740	 0.986C
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6.5.4 Econometric Issues
The discussion in Chapter 5 touched on several potential econometric problems associated
with estimation of the model. These problems are related to the procedure for the
estimation of the parameters of a population regression line provided by the ordinary least
squares (OLS) method. A number of assumptions about the variables and the error term of
OLS must be satisfied in order to ensure that the interpretations of the regression estimates
are valid. Five major assumptions will be discussed in this section: normality, serial
correlation, linearity, heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity assumptions.
According to Gujarati (1995), under these assumptions, the OLS estimators of the
regression coefficients are the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE). Therefore, the results
presented in the next chapter depend on whether or not our regression model has satisfied
the standard assumptions of the OLS estimation. All the calculations, and diagnostic tests
for the validity of these assumptions were carried out using MICROFIT, an interactive
econometric software package introduced by Pasaran and Pasaran (1997). These tests
employed the following model (mentioned in Section 6.2), where MVE is based on two dates
[three months after year-end (model 1) and year-end (model 2)]:
MVEfl = a0 + a1 B VOA1 - a2BVL1 + a3 GWnft + a4EARN1 + eft
6.5.4.1 Serial Correlation Assumption
One of the important assumptions of the classical linear model is that there is no
autocorrelation or serial correlation among the disturbances entering into the population
regression function; i.e.,
E(,e)=O where i^j
Serial Correlation is defined by Kendall and Buckland (1971) as "correlation between
members of series of observations ordered in time (as in time series data) or space (as in
cross-sectional data). If serial correlation is present then the usual OLS estimators, although
unbiased, no longer exhibit minimum variance among all linear unbiased estimators. In
short, they are no longer BLUE (Gujarati, 1995). In the MICROFIT software package, the
Langrange multiplier (LM) test statistics are included in the diagnostic test table, and is
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0.3400
0.4990
0.2780
0.3680
0.41 30
0.6490
0.6440
0.6050
	
1.3699	 0.2420
	
1.0609	 0.3030
	
1.6604	 0.1980
	
1.7816	 0.1820
	
1.5208	 0.2170
	
0.8561	 0.3550
	
0.8684	 0.3510
	
0.8411	 0.3590
GW 1	 0.91 03
GW 2	 0.4563
GW3	 1.1761
GW4	 0.8100
GW 5	 0.6980
GW 6	 0.2069
GW 7	 0.21 37
GW 8	 0.2671
applicable to models with and without lagged dependent variables. The LM is appropriate
for testing the hypothesis; that the disturbances are serially uncorrelated against the
alternative hypothesis; that they are autocorrelated of order p (either as autoregressive or
moving average processes). Symbolically;
Ut = Pi Uti + P2Ut.2 + P3Ut3 +.....PpUt.p + et
where et is a purely random disturbance term with zero mean and constant variance. The
null hypothesis H 0 is: p = P2 = p3 = ... .pj, = 0, that all autoregressive coefficients are
simultaneously equal to zero; that is, there is, no autocorrelation of any order. Table 6.12
reports the LM statistics test from the regression of the basic model. In all cases for both
models, the null hypotheses of no serial correlation was not rejected.
Table 6.12: DIagnostic Test for the Serial Correlation Assumption
Cum. Goodwill	 Model 1	 Model 2
CHSQ	 p-value	 CHSQ	 p-value
Langrange Multiplier test of residual serial correlation
Model: MVE1t = ao+ a 1 BVOA1t + a2BVL1t+ a 3GWnjt+ a4EARNj +e
6.5.4.2 Linearity Assumption
The classical linear regression model assumes that the relationship between the dependent
and independent variables is correctly specified by means of a linear functional form. The
linearity assumption for the basic models (MVE = a 0 + aiBVOAt + a2BVL1 + a3 GWn1 +
a4EARNt + ,) is tested using a general test of specification error called RESET (Regression
Specification Error Test) proposed by Ramsey (1969). The RESET test statistic follows the
Chi-square distribution with 1 degree of freedom 	 under the null hypothesis that the true
model is linear at significance level c. If the RESET statistics value exceeds the critical
value at the chosen level of significance, then the regression model is misspecified. In the
MICROFIT software package, the diagnostic test for the linearity assumption is reported as
a part of the standard results using RESET. Table 6.13 reports the RESET statistics from
the regression of the basic model. Just one case for the two models, the null hypotheses
that the true model is linear is rejected at the 1-% level of significance.
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Table 6.13: Diagnostic Test for the Linearity Assumption
Cum. Goodwill	 Model 1	 Model 2
CHSQ	 p-value	 CHSQ	 p-value
GW 1	 10.3978	 0.0010	 4.9587	 0.0260
GW 2	 0.2360	 0.6270	 0.4637	 0.4960
GW 3	 0.4634	 0.4960	 0.2360	 0.6270
GW 4	 0.7441	 0.3880	 0.4774	 0.4900
GW 5	 1.0427	 0.3070	 0.7112	 0.3990
GW 6
	
0.9494	 0.3300	 0.6586	 0.41 70
GW 7	 0.8933	 0.3450	 0.6047	 0.4370
GW 8
	
0.5799	 0.4460	 0.3696	 0.5430
Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values
Model: MVE1t = a 0+ aiBVOA1 + a2BVLj+ a 3GWn1+ a4EARNj +e
6.5.4.3 Heteroscedasticity Assumption
One of the major econometric problems when estimating cross-sectional valuation models
is the problem of heteroscedastic disturbances that arises from the fact that large (small)
firms tend to produce large (small) disturbances. According to Gujarati (1995), if
heteroscedasticity is present, then the usual OLS estimators, although unbiased, no longer
exhibit minimum variance among all linear unbiased estimators. In short, they are no longer
BLUE.
Previous researchers such as Landsman (1986), Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue (1993), Kane
and Unal (1993), Shevlin (1991), McCarthy and Schneider (1995), Jennings et aL (1996)
mentioned problems of heteroscedasticity in their studies (see Chapter 4). According to
Landsman (1986), to produce more efficient estimates, one can, in principle, transform the
variables in a particular regression model to produce a constant (but still unknown)
variance. One common deflation technique involves transforming the variables by deflating
by the independent variable. This procedure implies that the true error variance is
proportional to the square of the independent variable. Studies by McCarthy and Schneider
(1995) and Landsman (1986) used total sales as a deflator. However, Landsman, instead of
simply deflating by sales, generalises a technique by Park (1966) to deflate the variables.
On the other hand, Shevlin (1991) and Jennings et a!. (1996) used the book value of
shareholders' equity and total assets, respectively, as the deflators. All the elements of data
previously discussed are deflated by total sales to reduce the heteroscedasticity problems.
Because heteroscedasticity has been a major problem in previous studies, it is necessary to
test the heteroscedasticity assumption for the basic models in order determine whether the
variance of the residuals in the basic models is constant throughout the sample.
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Symbolically,
Var(E)= .2 t=1,2...n
In the MICROFIT software package, the diagnostic test for heteroscedasticity is reported as
a part of the standard results using the Langrange Multipliers (LM) test. The test statistic is
performed by regressing the square of the residual ct2 as the dependent variable on the
predictive values, MVE, symbolically,
= f3 + J3I MVEJ, + UJ
2	 .	 .	 2We then calculate LM = nR which is La with 1 degrees of freedom under the null
hypothesis that the error term is homoscedastic where n and R 2 are the sample size and
coefficient of determination receptively, obtained from the above regression. Table 6.10
reports the heteroscedasticity test statistics, which are
	
with 1 degree of freedom under
the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals of the model is
constant throughout the whole sample is rejected at the 1-% level of significance for all
cases for both models. Thus, there is evidence that the variance of the residuals is not
constant in the sample.
Table 6.14: DiagnostIc Test for Heteroscedasticity Assumption
Cum. Goodwill 	 Model 1	 Model 2
CHSQ	 p-value	 CHSQ	 p-
value
*Ramseys RESET test using the square of the fitted values
Model: MVE1 = ao+ aiBVOAi + a2BVLj+ a3GWnj+ a4EARN1 +ejt
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6.5.4.4 Multicollinearity Assumption
Another major assumption of the classical regression model is that there is no
multicollinearity among the regressors included in the regression model. According to
Gujarati (1995), the term multicollinearity is used where the variables (regressors) are
intercorrelated (perfect or non-perfect). Symbolically, it can be written as follows:
A1X1......... XkXk +Vj =0
where V 1
 is a stochastic error term.
If multicollinearity is perfect, the regression coefficients of the X variables are indeterminate
and their standard errors are infinite. If multicollinearity is less than perfect, the regression
coefficients, although determinate, possess large standard errors (in relation to the
coefficients themselves), which means that the coefficients cannot be estimated with great
precision or accuracy. Therefore, the presence of a severe multicollinearity problem could
result in drawing misleading inferences from sample t-statistics. The simple correlation
(based on the Pearson product moment coefficient of correlation) of BVOA and BVL, as
presented in Table 6.5, exceed 0.88. Further tests by using Spearman's p (rank correlation
coefficient) confirm that BVOA and BVL are highly correlated. Apparently, the correlation
coefficients can be considered high enough to create problems of multicollinearity.
Table 6.15: Spearmans Rank Correlation
Cumulative Goodwill
	 Coefficients Correlation	 P
GW 1	 0.9574	 0.000
GW 2	 0.9429	 0.000
GW 3	 0.8834	 0.000
GW 4	 0.8837	 0.000
GW 5	 0.8836	 0.000
GW 6	 0.8834	 0.000
GW 7	 0.8834	 0.000
GW 8	 0.8834	 0.000
(Rank correlation coefficients between BVOA and BVL)
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6.5.4.5 Normality Assumption
Under the normality assumption, the error term (c) follows a normal distribution for all j. We
were able to establish that the OLS estimators of the regression coefficients follow the
normal distribution, that (n - k) ( a 2 Ia 2 ) has the x2 distribution and that one could use the t
and F tests to test various statistical hypotheses regardless of the sample size. However,
according to Gujarati (1995), the normality assumption is not essential if the objective is
merely estimation. A commonly quoted justification of least-squares estimation, called the
Gauss-Markov theorem, states that the least-squares coefficients are the most efficient
unbiased estimator; that is, linear functions of the observation . This result depends on
assumptions of linearity, constant error variance, and independence, but does not require
normality (Fox, 1991).
Furthermore, if the residuals are not normally distributed, then the t and F-tests are only
valid asymptotically in large samples. The sample sizes in this study vary from 275 to 404,
which can be considered large. As a result, the test for normality is not absolutely necessary
for these sizes of sample. However, the results of this test are also reported. In the
MICROFIT software package, the diagnostic test for the normality assumption is reported
as a part of the standard results based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals.
Table 6.6 reports the diagnostic test results for the normality assumption from the
regression of the basic model. In all cases, the null hypothesis that the residuals in the
model are normally distributed is rejected.
Table 6.16: DIagnostic Test for the Normality assumption
Cum. Goodwill 	 Model 1	 Model 2
CHSQ	 p-value	 CHSQ	 p-value
GW 1	 5064.8	 0.0000	 2678.8	 0.0000
GW 2	 4956.5	 0.0000	 3363.5	 0.0000
GW 3	 3719.0	 0.0000	 2488.9	 0.0000
GW 4	 3992.0	 0.0000	 2641.3	 0.0000
GW 5
	
4189.7	 0.0000	 2720.9	 0.0000
GW 6
	
4347.4	 0.0000	 2774.5	 0.0000
GW 7	 4446.8	 0.0000	 2825.0	 0.0000
GW 8	 4513.7	 0.0000	 2861.6	 0.0000
*Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals
Model: MVEj = ao+ aiBVOAt + a2BVL1t+ a3GWnj+ a4EARN,t +e
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6.6 Summary
This chapter has described the source, sample and selection of the data and has also
presented an exploratory data analysis to test whether the data sets used in this study
satisfy a number of assumptions under the OLS method. We tested five major assumptions
in this chapter: normality, serial correlation, linearity, heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity
assumptions. We discovered that there are major problems of heteroscedasticity and
multicollinearity. The normality test also showed that the distribution of the residuals is not
normal. These problems will be discussed again (along with the techniques used to deal
with these issues) when we present the empirical results in the next chapter.
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MVE1
where
MVE
BVOA1
BVL
GWn
EARNJ
CHAPTER 7
MARKET VALUE, BOOK VALUE AND GOODWILL
Results and Interpretations
7.1	 Introduction
The two previous chapters have discussed the research design, method and overview of
the data employed in this study. This chapter will present the empirical results of the study.
Just for a brief refreshing introduction we would like, once again, to highlight the three
research questions and the model employed in this study.
Research Question 1
"Is purchased goodwill considered as an important element when determining
a firm's market value?"
Research Question 2
"If the market perceives purchased goodwill as an important element when
determining a firm's market value, how does the market perceive purchased
goodwill in relation to all other assets?"
Research Question 3
"Does purchased goodwill decline in value in such a way that the impairment
test required by FRS 10 is relevant?"
Multiple regression analysis is used to test the theoretical model in Equation (6). The
empirical model is:
= a0 + a1 B VOAft - a2BVL + a3 G Wn + a4EARN + eft
= Market value of shareholders' equity of firm j in year t
= Book value of the assets of firm j in year t
= Book value of the liabilities of firm j in year t
= Cumulative acquired goodwill of firm j in year t that has been
written off to reserves
= Net Profit after tax of firm j in year t
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The organisation of the empirical results is as follows. Section 7.2 provides the results to the
question of whether purchased goodwill that has been written off in the year of acquisition is
of value-relevance to investors when they value a company. These results are presented
after taking into consideration the econometric issues discussed earlier. Section 7.3
presents the Wald's test to determine the relationship between purchased goodwill and
other assets. Section 7.4 provides evidence as to whether purchased goodwill declines in
value, in response to the third research question. Section 7.5 briefly discusses value-
relevance of off-balance sheet information and Section 7.6 concludes.
7.2	 Value - Relevance of Purchased Goodwill
To test the value - relevance of purchased goodwill which has been written-off in the year of
acquisition, Tables 7.1 and 7.2 provide estimates from the models mentioned in Section 7.1.
We focus on a3, the slope coefficient for purchased goodwill that has been written off during
the year of acquisition. If the market places value on the reported goodwill of a firm, then
purchased goodwill should be significant and positively correlated with the firm's market
value. Tables 7.1 (Model 1) and 7.2 (Model 2) list the summary statistics from the basic
regression models that have defined the market value of shareholders' equity (MVE) as the
share price times the number of shares outstanding three months after the year-end and
also as the share price at year-end. The reason for using the share price three months after
the year-end is based on the assumption that all the information contained in this study is
released to the market via annual financial reports. However, we believe that some of the
information is already available to the market earlier than that date. Thus, the main purpose
of using both share prices is to ensure that the results presented in this chapter are more
robust.
There are several prominent general findings associated with the results appearing in these
tables. The key findings now can be summarised as follows; first, BVOA, BVL, GW and
EARN consistently have coefficients of either above 1 or above -1 in absolute value for the
MVE which is calculated using share prices three months after the year-end. The only
difference is in Model 2 where BVOA and BVL shows that the absolute value is below 1 for
the first year and -1 for the first and two years of cumulative goodwill. All the variables have
coefficients of the correct sign. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the
empirical version of BVOA and BVL may systematically understate the true values of the
theoretical variables. According to Landsman (1986), the book value historical cost
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measures of total assets and total liabilities may systematically understate the market value
for a variety of reasons.
These include: (a) book value measures do not include measures of off-balance assets and
liabilities; and (b) book value measures do not adequately capture the magnitude of the
many intangible assets owned by the firm. Although the model allows purchased goodwill as
a separate variable, non-purchased goodwill remains unknown. These arguments are
completely similar to those of Kane and Unal (1990), (see Chapter 6) who believe that the
accountants' misvaluations of portfolio positions that accounting principles designate as on-
balance-sheet items and also the systematic neglect of off-balance-sheet sources of value
that these principles do not permit to be formally booked become sources of hidden capital.
Second, the intercept term (a0) is significantly non-zero for the first three years of cumulative
goodwill at the 5% level. Normally, the presence of a statistically significant intercept term
for the first three years of cumulative goodwill suggests that the empirical intercept may be
picking up part of the explanatory power of some omitted variables. Another possible
explanation might be due to the tact that the intercept may include an amount of acquired
goodwill that was not included in the first three years of cumulative goodwill. According to
Kane and Unal (1990), the intercept of this model can be interpreted as a hidden reserve,
and in the present study, it seems that this occurs in the firms that are most likely to have
written oft purchased goodwill. Our findings show that the intercept decreases in absolute
value and becomes zero when the cumulative goodwill increases.
The most important feature of this finding concerns a 3, the slope coefficient for purchased
goodwill that has been written off during the year of acquisition. The coefficient is
significantly non-zero for both models. The absolute value is above 1 and decreases when
the cumulative goodwill increases. At face value, these findings suggest that the market
takes into consideration the amount of goodwill write-off in its determination of the
company's valuation. One could argue that this value does not diminish for at least two
years after acquisition has taken place. However, there are several potential econometric
problems associated with estimation of the above model. The exploratory data analysis in
Chapter 6 showed evidence of two major econometric problems in this model, namely
heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity. We will now discuss the techniques we have used
to deal with these issues and also presents the extension results.
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Table 7.1: Basic Model Regression Summary Statistics (Share Price 3 months after year-end)
Predicted	 a0	 ai	 a2	 a3
Sign	 +	 -	 +	 +
GW1	 0.452**	 1.266***	 -1.351	 3.177***	 7.063***
OLS - t
	
2.934	 3.349	 -1.844	 6.682	 21.662
p-Value	 0.004	 0.001	 0.066	 0.000	 0.000
GW2	 0.402**	 1.473***	 1.671***	 2 . 954***	 6.966***
OLS - t	 3.138	 4.967	 -2.965	 8.402	 25.474
p-Value	 0.002	 0.000	 0.003	 0.000	 0.000
GW3	0.286**	 2.563***	 3 .329***	 2 .559***	 6.099***
OLS - t	 2.220	 13.960	 -8.016	 7.603	 24.899
p-Value	 0.027	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000
GW4	 0.232*	 2.552***	 3 .244*	 2.41 4***	 6.073***
OLS-t	 1.815	 13.921	 -7.859	 7.401	 24.857
p-Value	 0.070	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000
GW5	0.192	 2.550***	 3 . 165***	 2 .249***	 6.038***
OLS - t	 1.506	 13.889	 -7.675	 6.997	 24.693
p-Value	 0.133	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000
GW6	 0.157	 2.547***	 3 .092***	 2 .084***	 6.01 0***
OLS - t
	
1.224	 13.825	 -7.491	 6.572	 24.469
p-Value	 0.222	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000
GW7	0.119	 2.558***	 3 . 101***	 2 .049***	 6.009***
OLS - t
	
0.930	 13.873	 -7.485	 6.480	 24.436
p-Value	 0.353	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000
GW8	 0.086	 2.569***	 3 . 122**	 2.055*	 5999***
OLS - t	 0.671	 13.941	 -7.540	 6.545	 24.421
p-Value	 0.615	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000
Notes: The table indicates significance at 1% (***), 5% (.) and 10%(*) levels.
Model: MVEi = ac + a 1 BVOAj + a2BVL1t + a3GWn + a4EARN1t +
Where:
MVE	 = Market value of shareholders' equity of firm j in year
BVOAi = Book value of the assets of firm j in year
BVL1t	 = Book value of the liabilities of firm j in year
GWn	 = Cumulative acquired goodwill of firm j in year t for n year
EARNJ = Net Profit after tax of firm j in year
ejt	 = error term
Adi. R2	N
0.815	 275
0.810	 366
0.809	 391
0.808	 395
0.805	 399
0.802	 401
0.802	 402
0.801	 404
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Table 7.2: Basic Model Regression Summary Statistics (Share Price as at year-end)
Predicted	 ao	 a,	 a2	 a3	 a4
Sign	 +	 -	 +	 +	 Adj. R2	N
GW 1	0.379**	 0.813**	 -0.529	 3.159***	 7.598***	 0.848	 275
OLS-t	 2.657	 2.328	 -0.781	 7.188	 25.213
p-Value	 0.008	 0.021	 0.436	 0.000	 0.000
GW2	0.317**	 1.047***	 -0.808	 2.784***	 7.342***	 0.833	 366
OLS - t
	
2.621	 3.737	 -1.516	 8.377	 28.410
p-Value	 0.009	 0.000	 0.130	 0.000	 0.000
GW3	0.253**	 1.749***	 1.808***	 2 .380***	 6.662***	 0.827	 391
OLS - t	 2.101	 10.182	 -4.655	 7.559	 29.073
p-Value	 0.036	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000
GW4	0.201*	 1.738***	 1.733***	 2 .251*	 6.640***	 0.826	 395
OLS-t	 1.686	 10.139	 -4.488	 7.381	 29.058
p-Value	 0.093	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000
GW5	0.166	 1.737***	 1.665***	 2 . 108***	 6.609***	 0.824	 399
OLS-t	 1.391	 10.124	 -4.319	 7.018	 28.921
p-Value	 0.165	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000
GW6	0.136	 1.738***	 1.604***	 1 .949***	 6.583***	 0.821	 401
OLS - t
	
1.133	 10.088	 -4.156	 6.575	 28.663
p-Value	 0.258	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000
GW7	0.101	 1.748***	 1.613***	 1.918	 6.585***	 0.821	 402
OLS-t	 0.840	 10.141	 -4.164	 6.488	 28.623
p-Value	 0.401	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000
GW8	0.071	 1.758***	 1.628***	 1 . 915***	 6.572***	 0.820	 404
OLS - t
	
0.587	 10.203	 -4.206	 6.523	 28.615
p-Value	 0.558	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000
Notes: The table indicates significance at 1% (***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) level of confidence.
Model: MVEj = ao + a i B VOA1, + aBVLp + a3 GWnft + a4 EARNfl + eft
Where:
MVE1,	 = Market value of shareholders equity of firm j in year
BVOA - Book value of the assets of firm j in year
BVL1,	 = Book value of the liabilities of firm j in year
GWnjt	= Cumulative acquired goodwill of firm j in year t for n year
EARNf = Net Profit after tax of firm j in year
=error term
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7.2.1 Heteroscedasticity
One potential econometric problem when estimating cross-sectional valuation models is the
problem of heteroscedasticity. Small companies tend to produce small disturbance and
large ones, large disturbance. If the models are estimated in undeflated form, this also
potentially leads to another scale-related problems, scale bias. To address these issues we
transformed the entire variable by deflating by means of the independent variable; in this
case total sales in order to produce a constant (but still unknown) variance. By using this
'deflation technique' we hope to remove the scale bias and the heteroscedasticity problems.
This technique is not new in the accounting literature but has already been employed by the
previous researchers such as Landsman (1986), Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue (1993),
Shevlin (1991), McCarthy and Schneider (1995), and Jennings et a!. (1996).
All the elements of data for the basic models reported in the previous section are deflated
by total sales to reduce the heteroscedasticity problems. We have already tested the
heteroscedasticity assumption for the basic models in the Chapter 6. Table 6.10 reports the
heteroscedasticity test statistics. The null hypothesis that the variance of the residuals of the
model is constant throughout the whole sample is rejected at the 1% level of significance for
all cases for the both models. Thus, there is evidence that the variance of the residuals in
not constant in the sample. The standard testing procedure reported in Tables 7.1 and 7.2
might be very misleading although the heteroscedasticity does not destroy the
unbiasedness and consistency properties of the OLS estimators (Gujarati, 1995).
White (1980) established a procedure, which is known as the heteroscedasticity-consistent
covariance matrix estimators (HCCME) to obtain consistent estimates of the variances and
covariances of OLS estimators even if there is heteroscedasticity. White's
heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors are available with the MICROFIT software
package as a standard output. Thus it is possible to compare the results from the regular
OLS (as reported in Tables 7.1 and 7.2) with the adjusted one. Tables 7.3 (Model 1) and 7.4
(Model 2) list the summary statistics from the basic regression models that are based on
White's heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors. Comparing these two results, it is
obvious that the White's heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors are considerably
larger than the OLS standard errors and therefore the estimated t values are much smaller
than those obtained by OLS. Although the t values are smaller, the overall results are
consistent with the results reported in Section 7.1. Based on these findings, it appears that
the market takes into consideration the amount of goodwill write-off in determining of a
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company's valuation. Therefore, even after taking into consideration the heteroscedasticity
problems in the models, we still can conclude that purchased goodwill written-off in the year
of acquisition is value - relevant to the investor.
Table 7.3: Basic Model Regression Summary Statistics
Based on Whites Heteroscedasticity Adjusted S.E.s (Share Price 3 months after year-end)
a0
	 i	 a2	 a3	 a4
Predicted	 +	 •	 +	 +	 Adj. A2 	N
Sign
GW 1
	0.452	 1.266**	 -1.351	 3.177	 7.063***
	
0.815	 275
t-statistics	 2.123	 2.649	 -1.350	 2.232	 9.519
p-Value	 0.035	 0.009	 0.178	 0.026	 0.000
GW2 	0.402**	 1.473***	 -1.671 k	2.954**	 6.966***	 0.810	 366
f-statistics	 2.515	 3.674	 -2.216	 2.699	 10.895
p-Value	 0.012	 0.000	 0.027	 0.007	 0.000
GW3 	0.286	 2.563	
-3.329k	 2 .559**	 6.099***
	
0.809	 391
(-statistics	 1.613	 6.450	
-4.055	 2.779	 10.444
p-Value	 0.108	 0.000	 0.000	 0.006	 0.000
GW 4 	0.232	 2.552k	 -3.244
."	 2.414k	6.073
	
0.808	 395
f-statistics	 1.329	 6.479	 -3.996	 2.732	 10.511
p-Value	 0.185	 0.000	 0.000	 0.007	 0.000
GW 5 	0.192	 2.550***	
-3.165."	 2.249k	6.038***
	
0.805	 399
(-statistics	 1.105	 6.506	 -3.908	 2.585	 10.403
p-Value	 0.270	 0.000	 0.000	 o.000	 0.000
GW6 	0.157	 2.547"	 -3.o92
	
2.084k	 6.01 0***	 0.802	 401
(-statistics	 0.903	 6.522	
-3.838	 2.432	 10.414
p-Value	 0.367	 0.000	 0.000	 0.015	 0.000
GW7 	0.119	 2.558***	 -3.1o1
	
2.049k	 6.009	 0.802	 402
(-statistics	 0.685	 6.627	
-3.858	 2.414	 10.458
p-Value	 0.494	 0.000	 0.000	 0.016	 0.000
GW8 	0.086	 2.569***	 -3.122	 2.055	 5.999
	
0.801	 404
(-statistics	 0.489	 6.720	 -3.911	 2.468	 10.528
p-Value	 0.625	 0.000	 0.000	 0.014	 0.000
Notes: The table indicates significance at 1% (**), 5% (") and 10%() levels.
Model: MVEj ac + a B VOAfi + a2BVLp + a3GWnI + a4 EARNfl +
Where:
MVE1	 = Market value of shareholders' equity of firm j in year
BVOA = Book value of the assets of firm j in year
BVL	 = Book value of the liabilities of firm j in year
GWn11
	= Cumulative acquired goodwill of firm j in year t for n year
EARNJ1
 = Net Profit after tax of firm I in year
= error term
125
Table 7.4: BasIc Model Regression Summary Statistics
Based on Whites Heteroscedasticity Adjusted S.E.'s (Share Price as Year-end)
a0
	 i	 a2	 a3	 a4
Predicted	 +	 -	 +	 +	 Adj. A2	N
Sign
GW 1	0.379**	 0.813*	 -0.529	 3.159**	 7.598***	 0.848	 275
(-statistics	 2.126	 1.730	 -0.604	 2.413	 11.536
p-Value	 0.034	 0.085	 0.546	 0.016	 0.000
GW2	 0.317**	 1.047**	 -0.808	 2.784**	 7.342***	 0.833	 366
f-statistics	 2.358	 2.764	 -1.245	 2.797	 12.645
p-Value	 0.019	 0.006	 0.214	 0.005	 0.000
GW3	0.253*	 1.749***	 1.808***	 2 .380**	 6.662***	 0.827	 391
f-statistics	 1.829	 7.084	 -3.341	 2.880	 13.146
p-Value	 0.068	 0.000	 0.001	 0.004	 0.000
GW4	0.201	 1.738***	 1.733***	 2 .251**	 6.640***	 0.826	 395
f-statistics	 1.485	 7.105	 -3.252	 2.838	 13.222
p-Value	 0.138	 0.000	 0.001	 0.005	 0.000
GW5	0.166	 1.737***	 1.665**	 2.108**	 6.609***	 0.824	 399
f-statistics	 1.229	 7.129	 -3.126	 2.698	 13.115
p-Value	 0.220	 0.000	 0.002	 0.007	 0.000
GW6	0.136	 1.738***	 1.604**	 1.949**	 6.583***	 0.821	 401
(-statistics	 1.008	 7.191	 -3.033	 2.527	 13.137
p-Value	 0.314	 0.000	 0.003	 0.012	 0.000
GW7	0.101	 1.748***	 1.613**	 1.918***	 6.585***	 0.821	 402
I-statistics	 0.744	 7.345	 -3.051	 2.508	 13.189
p-Value	 0.457	 0.000	 0.002	 0.013	 0.000
GW8	0.071	 1.758***	 1.628**	 1.915**	 6.572***	 0.820	 404
(-statistics	 0.512	 7.479	 -3.103	 2.549	 13.277
p-Value	 0.609	 0.000	 0.002	 0.011	 0.000
Notes: The table indicates significance at 1% (***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) level of confidence.
Model: MVEj = a + a 1 B VOAfi + a2BVLj + a3 GWnft + a4EARNj +
Where:
MVE1	 = Market value of shareholders' equity of firm j in year
BVOA, = Book value of the assets of firm j in year
BVL1t	 = Book value of the liabilities of firm j in year
GWn1,	 = Cumulative acquired goodwill of firm j in year t for n year
EARNIt = Net Profit after tax of firm j in year
= error term
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7.2.2 Multicollinearity
Another major assumption of the classical regression model is that there is no
multicollinearity among the regressors included in the regression model. If multicollinearity is
perfect, the regression coefficients of the X variables are indeterminate and their standard
errors are infinite. If multicollinearity is less than perfect, the regression coefficients,
although determinate, possess large standard errors (in relation to the coefficients
themselves), which means that the coefficients cannot be estimated with great precision or
accuracy. Therefore, the presence of a severe multicollinearity problem could result in
drawing misleading inferences from sample t-statistics.
As mentioned by Kmenta (1971), "multicollinearity is a question of degree and not of kind.
The meaningful distinction is not between the presence and the absence of multicollinearity,
but between its various degrees. Therefore we do not "test for multicollinearity" but can, if
we wish, measure its degree in any particular sample". In our discussion of the data and
exploratory analysis in Chapter 6, we have show that the simple correlation of BVOA and
BVL exceeded 0.88 for the basic models in the results of our regression analysis. This
simple correlation was also supported by Spearman's p, which is significant at 1 percent for
all cases.
We also perform the variance inflation factor test (VIE) for the basic model presented in
Table 7.5. Briefly, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is a measure of how much the variance
of an estimated regression coefficient increases if the predictors are correlated
(multicollinear). The length of the confidence intervals for the parameter estimates will be
increased by the square root of the respective VIEs as compared to the case of
uncorrelated predictors. If Xl, X2, Xk are the k predictors, the VIF for predictor j is 1/(1 -
R**21 ) , where R**2 is the R**2 from regressing X on the remaining k - 1 predictors. If the
correlation of X with the other predictors is zero, the VIE will be 1. The VIF increases as X
becomes more highly correlated with the remaining predictors. Montgomery and Peck
[1982] suggest that if VIF is between 5 and 10, then the regression coefficients are poorly
estimated. Apparently, the three tests described above show that the correlation coefficients
could be considered high enough to create problems of multicollinearity.
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Table 7.5: Basic Model: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
Cum. Goodwill BVOA BVL GWn EARN N
GW 1
	 4.8	 13.6	 2.0	 1.9	 275
GW 2
	11.6	 10.7	 1.7	 1.7	 366
GW3
	5.0	 5.3	 1.5	 1.4	 391
GW 4
	5.0	 5.3	 1.5	 1.3	 395
GW 5
	 .0	 5.3	 1.5	 1.3	 399
GW6
	5.0	 5.3	 1.5	 1.3	 401
GW7
	5.0	 5.3	 1.5	 1.3	 402
GW8	 5.0	 5.3	 1.5	 1.4	 404
Model: M yE11 = ao + a B VOA11 + a2BVLft + a3 GWnp + a4 EARN11 + êj
As mentioned earlier, the presence of a severe multicollinearity problem (in this case the
correlation between BVOA and BVL) could result in drawing misleading inferences from
sample t-statistics. One possible way of increasing the precision of the estimates of the
coefficients in basic models is to estimate the model in net assets; i.e., to use BVNA or NAV
(Book Value of Equity or Net Assets Value, that is, BVOA - BVL) as explanatory variables.
In principle, BVOA and BVL are jointly determined variables, affected by many of the same
unknown exogenous variables. Treating BVOA and BVL as separate exogenous regressors
could introduce interpretative problems. Therefore, we try to improve the basic model into
the following model (Net Assets Model):
Model: MVEfl = a0 + a 1 (BVOA - B VL)ft + a2G Wn^ a3EARNft + e11
However, estimation of the above model is justifiable only if the estimated coefficients
provide statistical evidence that supports the theoretical economic model; e.g., Pr (a 1 + a2 =
0) ^ 1 - w, where w represents the confidence level imposed by the researcher (Landsman,
1986). A test of these restrictions can be readily carried out using MICROFIT. The test is a
well known as a Wald Test.
Tables 7.6 (Model 1) and 7.7 (Model 2) contains the results corresponding to the Wald Test
of restrictions imposed on a 1 + a2 = 0. The results from the test show that in all cases that
the null hypothesis that a 1 + a2 = 0 can be accepted. This result supports simplifying the
basic model by applying a single estimation coefficient to the net assets value. Following the
test, it is appropriate to extend the basic model in order to address the problem of
multicollinearity by attempting to increase the precision of the estimated coefficients. The
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summary statistics for the estimation of the net assets model appear in Tables 7.7 and 7.8
based on White's heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors.
Table 7.6: Wald Test Resiriction Imposed on Parameters of the Basic Model
Asset and Liability Coefficients Equalised (Share Price 3 months after year-end)
Coefficient
Cum. Goodwill 	 p-Value
GW1	 1.266	 -1.351
	
0.015
	
0.903
GW2	 1.473	 -1.671
	
0.152
	
0.696
GW3	 2.563	 -3.329
	
1.965
	 0.161
GW4	 2.552	 -3.244
	
1.657
	 0.198
GW5	 2.550	 -3.165
	
1.317
	 0.251
GW6	 2.547	 -3.092
	
1.050
	 0.305
GW7	 2.558	 -3.101
	
1.038
	
0.308
GW8	 2.569	 -3.122
	
1.094
	 0.296
Model: MVEfl = ao + ai B VOAft + a2BVLj + a3 GWnfl + a4EARN1t +
Restriction: ai + a2 = 0, based on Whites Heteroscedasticity Adjusted S.E.s
Table 7.7: Wald Test Restriction Imposed on Parameters of the Basic Model
Asset and Liability Coefficients Equalised (Share Price as at Year-end)
Coefficient__________________
Cum. Goodwill 	 at	 a	 Chi-square	 p-Value
GW 1 	0.813	 -0.529	 0.242	 0.622
GW2	1.047	 -0.808	 0.343	 0.558
GW3	 1.749	 -1.808	 0.021	 0.884
GW4	 1.738	 -1.733	 0.002	 0.989
GW5	1.737	 -1.665	 0.033	 0.856
GW6	1.738	 -1.604	 0.115	 0.735
GW7	1.748	 -1.613	 0.044	 0.834
GW8	1.758	 -1.628	 0.109	 0.741
Model: MVEg=ao+a l BVC)A# +a2liVLfl +a3(iWnft +a4t/tI-ffvp+ eJf
Restriction: at + a = 0, based on Whites Heteroscedasticity Adjusted S.E.s
Net assets, which are defined as BVOA - BVL, are denoted as BVNA in both tables. The
expected signs of a 1 should be positive. An examination of Tables 7.7 and 7.8 reveals that
in all cases the BVNA coefficients are significantly non-zero at the one per cent level. At an
informal level, this compares favourably with the basic model regression results (see Tables
7.3 and 7.4) in which assets and liabilities have unrestricted coefficients.
The results for the basic model show that the coefficients of liabilities are not significantly
non-zero for the first year of cumulative goodwill for Model 1 and for the first two years of
cumulative goodwill for Model 2. This differs from the net assets model. The most important
results are those regarding coefficients of goodwill, which show a positive sign which is
consistent with the basic model. Another point worth mentioning about the model is the
decreasing absolute value of the intercept from the model which the market value based on
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the share price 3 months after the year-end. The absolute value for the intercept decreases
in absolute value from 0.406 (significantly non-zero) to -0.088 (insignificantly non-zero).
Again, if we accept Kane and UnaIs (1990) arguments and interpretation, the positive and
significant non-zero intercept shows the existence of hidden reserves. However by
introducing the cumulative goodwill (year by year), the absolute value of the intercept
decreases to an insignificant non-zero. In general, the net assets model improves the basic
model. The most likely cause of the increase in robustness is the reduction in the collinearity
of the two regressors, BVOA and BVL. In addition, the VIF (Table 7.10) used to detect
multicollinearity provides results which suggest that this is not a problem with the Net Assets
Models.
Table 7.8: Net Asset Model Regression Summary Statistics
Based on White's Heteroscedasticity Adjusted S.E.'s, (Share Price 3 months after year-end)
80	 81	 82	 83
Predicted Sign	 7	 +	 +	 +	 Adj. R2	N
GW 1	0.444"	 1.212	 3.136**	 7.057***	 0.816	 275
(-statistics	 2.501	 2.446	 2.476	 9.725
p-Value	 0.013	 0.015	 0.014	 0.000
GW2	0.382"	 1 .348***	 2 . 861*	 6.966***	 0.810	 366
(-statistics	 2.698	 3.301	 2.951	 10.838
p-Value	 0.007	 0.001	 0.003	 0.000
GW3	0.148	 2.289"	 2 .095**	 5963***	 0.806	 391
(-statistics	 0.797	 5.122	 2.348	 9.768
p-Value	 0.426	 0.000	 0.019	 0.000
GW4	0.113	 2.301*	 2.0133	 5.953"	 0.805	 395
(-statistics	 0.617	 5.298	 2.365	 9.866
p-Value	 0.538	 0.000	 0.019	 0.000
GW5
	0.091	 2.325***	 1.902**	 5933***	 0.803	 399
(-statistics	 0.501	 5.515	 2.286	 9.873
p-Value	 0.617	 0.000	 0.023	 0.000
GW6
	0.073	 2.347	 1.784**	 5.917***	 0.801	 401
f-statistics	 0.398	 5.719	 2.201	 9.937
p-Value	 0.691	 0.000	 0.028	 0.000
GW 7	0.042	 2.358***	 1 .750**	 5.916***	 0.800	 402
f-statistics	 0.222	 5.826	 2.195	 9.983
p-Value	 0.824	 0.000	 0.029	 0.000
GW8	0.010	 2.364***	 1.752	 5.903***	 0.780	 404
(-statistics	 0.057	 5.873	 2.236	 10.027
p-Value	 0.955	 0.000	 0.026	 0.000
Notes: The table indicates significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% () levels.
Model: MVE,1 = a0 + a 1 B VNAfl + a2GWnji + a3EARNj ^ ejt
Where:
MVE	 = Market value of shareholders equity of firm j in year
BVNA1 1 = Book value of shareholders' equity of firm j in year
GWn	 = Cumulative acquired goodwill of firm j in year t for n year
EARN11 = Net Profit after tax of firm j in year
= error term
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Table 7.9: Net Asset Model Regression Summary Statistics
Based on White's Heteroscedasticity Adjusted S.E.'s, (Share Price as at Year-end)
ai	 a2	 a3
Predicted Sign	 +	 +	 AdJ. R 2	N
GW 1	0.406**	 0.991**	 3.295**	 7.61 6***	 0.848	 275
t-statistics	 2.653	 2.140	 2.836	 11.906
p-Value	 0.008	 0.033	 0.005	 0.000
GW2	0.340**	 1 . 197**	 2.896***	 7.342***	 0.833	 366
f-statistics	 2.838	 3.179	 3.322	 12.684
p-Value	 0.005	 0.002	 0.001	 0.000
GW3
	0.242	 1.727***	 2 . 344**	 6.652***	 0.827	 391
f-statistics	 2.020	 6.951	 3.342	 13.615
p-Value	 0.044	 0.000	 0.001	 0.000
GW4	0.202	 1.741***	 2 .255**	 6.641***	 0.826	 395
f-statistics	 1.700	 7.302	 2.341	 13.690
p-Value	 0.090	 0.000	 0.001	 0.000
GW5
	0.178	 1.763***	 2 . 148**	 6.622	 0.824	 399
f-statistics	 1447	 7.692	 3.241	 13.613
p-Value	 0.140	 0.000	 0.001	 0.000
GW6	0.156	 1.787***	 2 .023**	 6.606***	 0.821	 401
f-statistics	 1.277	 8.096	 3.104	 13.651
p-Value	 0.202	 0.000	 0.002	 0.000
GW7	0.120	 1.798***	 1 . 993**	 6.606***	 0.821	 402
f-statistics	 0.947	 8.301	 3.104	 13.703
p-Value	 0.344	 0.000	 0.002	 0.000
GW8
	0.088	 1.806***	 1 . 986**	 6.595"	 0.820	 404
(-statistics	 0.671	 8.448	 3.145	 13.780
p-Value	 0.502	 0.000	 0.002	 0.000
Notes: The table indicates significance at 1% (), 5% () and 10% (*) levels.
Model: MVEj, = a + a 1 B VNAp + a2G Wnfi + a3EARNfl +
Where:
MVE	 = Market value of shareholders equity of firm j in year
BVNA	 = Book value of shareholders equity of firm j in year
GWn	 = Cumulative acquired goodwill of firm j in year t for n year
EARN	 = Net Profit after tax of firm j in year
e	 =error term
Table 7.10: Net Asset Model: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
	Cum. Goodwill BVNA GWn EARN	 N
GW 1	2.30	 1.60	 1.80	 275
GW2
	1.90	 1.40	 1.70	 366
GW3	1.40	 1.10	 1.30	 391
GW4	1.40	 1.10	 1.30	 395
GW5	1.40	 1.10	 1.30	 399
GW6	1.40	 1.10	 1.30	 401
GW7	1.40	 1.10	 1.30	 402
GW8	1.40	 1.10	 1.30	 404
Model: M VE1r = ao + ai B VNAft ^ a2GWnjt + a3EARNfl +
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7.2.3 The Reduced Model
We have discussed the results for the basic model in the previous section. Five tests were
performed to diagnose whether the basic models met the standard assumptions of the OLS
estimation of Chapter 6. The main implications from these test results are that the models
have problems of heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity. In order to overcome the
heteroscedasticity problem, we used statistics based on White's heteroscedasticity adjusted
standard errors for the basic regression models. In dealing with the multicollinearity
problem, we estimated the model in net asset form; i.e., by netting BVOA - BVL. Before
that, we tested a necessary statistical condition for netting BVOA and BVL (coefficients
BVOA + coefficients BVL = 0) by using the Wald test. We found that the coefficients of
BVOA and BVL were equal in all cases and, thus, it was justifiable to estimate the model in
net asset form.
In general, results from the basic model and the net asset model suggest that the market
prices purchased goodwill as an important factor when determining the market value of the
companies under study. We introduced a cumulative figure for purchased goodwill in the
models that had been written off during the year of acquisition. This cumulative figure was
added (year one to year eight) in order to see whether the coefficients of GWn and the
intercept value would change the overall results and interpretation. The results from the
both models are consistent from the previous studies (for example McCarthy and Schneider
(1995) and Jennings et a!. (1996)) which show that the coefficient of goodwill is significantly
different from zero. The difference between this study and the previous ones is related to
treatment of purchased goodwill: in previous studies, purchased goodwill was recorded in
the balance sheet. However, the results reported in this thesis are based on the write-off
value of purchased goodwill; i.e., non-balance sheet items. Kane and Unal (1990) discussed
the relationship between this non-balance sheet item (purchased goodwill that has been
written off) and the market value of the companies. They considered the non-balance sheet
items (assets) to be hidden reserves. By introducing cumulative goodwill figures, the
regression results show that the intercept values decrease in value from significant non-
zero to zero. One could argue that these changes are due to the fact that purchased
goodwill is significant in determining the market value of companies. On the other hand,
purchased goodwill might also diminish in value a few years after acquisition.
As a general conclusion, the most favourable model used in this study is the net asset
model using statistics based on White's heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors.
However, the sample size employed in this study varies from 274 to 404 for the three years
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accounting period. The results reported in this chapter might be influenced by the fact that
there are difference numbers of companies for each of the years in which cumulative
purchased goodwill is recorded. To ensure that the net asset models are robust, we rerun
the regression analysis using the same sample size of 275. This sample is composed of the
companies that have purchased goodwill between 1994 and 1996. We also added back the
purchased goodwill that had been written off for the past eight years. Tables 7.11 (Model 1)
and 7.12 (Model 2) contain summary statistics for this restricted sample size. The results
from both the models seem to be consistent with the net asset models where the sample
size varies from 275 to 404.
Table 7.11: Net Asset Model Regression Summary Statistics
Based on White's Heteroscedasticity Adjusted S.E.'s,
(Share Price 3 months after Year-end, Constant Sample)
ai	 a2	 a3
Predicted Sign	 +	 +	 +	 AdJ. R2	N
GW 1	0.444"	 1 .212**	 3.136**	 7.057'	 0.816	 275
f-statistics	 2.501	 2.446	 2.476	 9.725
p-Value	 0.013	 0.015	 0.014	 0.000
GW2	0.309*	 1.278**	 2.986	 7.026***	 0.828	 275
f-statistics	 1.916	 2.856	 2.819	 10.351
p-Value	 0.056	 0.005	 0.005	 0.000
GW3	0.248	 1.342	 2.800"	 6.943*	 0.829	 275
f-statistics	 1.580	 3.254	 2.997	 10.625
p-Value	 0.115	 0.001	 0.003	 0.000
GW4
	0.207	 1.398***	 2 . 651**	 6.896*	 0.826	 275
f-statistics	 1.335	 3.523	 2.946	 9.866
p-Value	 0.183	 0.001	 0.004	 10.754
GW5	0.169	 1.427*	 2.598**	 6.880*	 0.825	 275
f-statistics	 1.079	 3.631	 2.890	 10.749
p-Value	 0.282	 0.000	 0.004	 0.000
GW6	0.122	 1.437*	 2.587**	 6.881***	 0.824	 275
f-statistics	 0.760	 3.657	 2.863	 10.763
p-Value	 0.448	 0.000	 0.005	 0.000
GW7	0.078	 1.468*	 2.530**	 6.861	 0.823	 275
f-statistics	 0.472	 3.084	 2.843	 10.827
p-Value	 0.637	 0.000	 0.005	 0.000
GW8	0.040	 1.490***	 2 .497**	 6.850	 0.780	 275
f-statistics	 0.233	 3.927	 2.859	 10.882
p-Value	 0.816	 0.000	 0.005	 0.000
Notes: The table indicates significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.
Model: MVE, a + a I B VNA1f + a2GWnp+ a3EARNp + ejt
Where:
MVE$	 = Market value of shareholders' equity of firm i in year
BVNA1, = Book value of shareholders' equity of firm j in year
GWnjt	 = Cumulative acquired goodwill of firm j in year t for n year
EARN, = Net Profit after tax of firm j in year
e	 =errorterm
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Table 7.12: Net Asset Model Regression Summary Statistics
Based on White's Heteroscedasticity Adjusted S.E.'s,
(Share Price as at Year-end, Constant Sample)
a0	 ai	 a2	 a3	 2
Predicted Sign	 +	 +	 +	 Adj. R	 N
GWi	 0.406** 0.991"	 3.295**	 7.61 6***	 0.848	 275
(-statistics	 2.653	 2.140	 2.836
	
11.906
p-Value	 0.008	 0.033	 0.005
	
0.000
OW2	0.263	 1.106**	 3.017**	 7539***	 0.858	 275
(-statistics	 2.039	 2.788	 3.165	 12.764
p-Value	 0.042	 0.006	 0.002
	
0.000
OW3	0.202	 1.184**	 2,7g5"	 7443***	 0.857	 275
(-statistics	 1.586	 3.187	
.342	 13.109
p-Value	 0.114	 0.002	 0,001
	
0.000
GW4	0.160	 1.238***	 2.650***	 7.398	 0.855	 275
(-statistics	 1.269	 3.413	
.288	 13.206
p-Value	 0.205	 0.001	 0.001
	
0.000
OW5	0.122	 1.264k	 2.608***	 7.386"	 0.853	 275
(-statistics	 0.961	 3.500	 241	 13.194
p-Value	 0.338	 0.001	 0.001	 0.000
OW6	0.074	 1.270	 2.605***	 739Q***	 0.853	 275
(-statistics	 0.576	 3.515	
.220	 13.207
p-Value	 0.565	 0.001	 0.001	 0.000
OW7	0.029	 1.300***	 2.555 k	7.372***	 0.852	 275
(-statistics	 0.222	 3.639	 3.206	 13.272
p-Value	 0.825	 0.000	 0.002	 0.000
OW8	-0.088	 1.324	 2.514*..	 7.358k	 0.852	 275
(-statistics	 -0.061	 3.759	 3.213	 13.326
p-Value	 0.951	 0.000	 0.001	 0.000
Notes: The table indicates significance at 1%	 5% (")and 10% () levels.
Model: MVEp = a + aiB VNA11
 + a2GWnjj+ a3EARNJf + Sfl
Where:
MVE	 = Market value of shareholders' equity of firm j in year
BVNA1I = Book value of shareholders' equity of firm j in year
GWn	 = Cumulative acquired goodwill of firm j in year t for n year
EARN$ = Net Profit after tax of firm j in year
= error term
7.2.3.1 Dummy Variable Regressions
The discussion has so far has focused on the model based on the pooled data from 1994 to
1996. Pooled data is also used by Landsman (1986), Aboody and Lev (1998) and Pfeiffer
(1998). However, as emphasised by previous researchers such as McCarthy and Schneider
(1995) and Jennings et a!. (1996), the year effects might influence the results presented in
this section. Since the estimation uses pooled data for three years, a time dummy is
included to allow for any significant time effects between these years. We rerun the reduced
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model by introducing three dummy variables, namely; D(94), D(95) and D(96), each of
which takes the value of one when the other two dummy variables are zero,
Tables 7.13 (Model 1) and 7.14 (Model 2) contain summary statistics for the restricted
sample size with the dummy variables. Results from both the models suggest that there are
no significant year effects in the models at the 5% confidence level. We also rerun the
reduced model, including an "industrial dummy" to allow for any significant industrial effects.
Appendix 2 reports these results, which suggest that there are no significant industrial
effects in the models at the 5% confidence level.
Table 7.13: Net Asset Model Regression Summary Statistics
with Dummy Variables, Based on White's Heteroscedasticity Adjusted S.E.'s,
(Share Price 3 months after Year-end, Constant Sample)
	
ao	 ai	 a2	 a3	 a4	 a5
Predicted Sign	 +	 +	 +
	 Adj. R2	N
GW 1	0.480'	 1.198"	 3.104"	 7.070***	 0.205	 -0.256	 0.817	 275
f-statistics	 1.840	 2.407	 2.467	 9.759	 0.726	 -1.197
p-Value	 0.067	 0.017	 0.014	 0.000	 0.468
	
0.232
GW2	0.278	 1.264"	 2.954"	 7.040'"	 0.272	 -0.145	 0.830	 275
f-statistics	 1.105	 2.818	 2.801	 10.334	 0.985
	
-0.713
p-Value	 0.270	 0.005	 0.005	 0.000	 0.325
	 0.477
GW3	 0.156	 1.323"	 2781"	 6.945"	 0.351
	
-0.062	 0.830	 275
f-statistics	 0.617	 3.179	 2.964	 10.550	 1.240
	
-0.310
p-Value	 0.538	 0.002	 0.003	 0.000	 0.216
	 0.757
GW4	0.119	 1.372***	 2.641"	 6.924'"	 0.370
	
-0.087
	 0.828	 275
f-statistics	 0.467	 3.419	 2.923	 10.683	 1.289
	
-0.432
p-Value	 0.641	 0.001	 0.004	 0.000	 0.199
	 0.666
GW 5	0.094	 1.402"	 2.587"	 6.907"'	 0.356
	
-0.107	 0.826	 275
f-statistics	 0.367	 3.529	 2.870	 10.689	 1.241
	
-0.533
p-Value	 0.714	 0.000	 0.004	 0.000	 0.216
	
0.594
GW6	0.064	 1.413***	 2.574"	 6.906***	 0.337
	
-0.131
	
0.826	 275
(-statistics	 0.246	 3.560	 2.846	 10.718	 1.181	 -0.656
p-Value	 0.806	 0.000	 0.005	 0.000	 0.239
	
0.512
GW7	0.035	 1.440'"	 2.522"	 6.889'"	 0.331	 -0.163
	 0.825	 275
(-statistics	 0.134	 3.692	 2.832	 10.791	 1.160	 -0.8 16
p-Value	 0.893	 0.000	 0.005	 0.000	 0.247
	 0.415
GW5	0.007	 1.467"	 2 .481**	 6.873"	 0.306	 -0.165
	 0.824	 275
(-statistics	 0.026	 3.833	 2.845	 10.856	 1.084	 -0.826
p-Value	 0.979	 0.000	 0.005	 0.000	 0.280
	
0.410
Notes: The table indicates significance at 1% (***), 5% (") and 10% (*) levels.
Model: MVEft = ao + a 1 B VNAp ^ a2GWnp# a3EARNft + a4D95^ a5D94 +
Where:
MVEjI	= Market value of	 shareholders' equity of firm j in year
BVNAJ1 = Book value of shareholders' equity of firm j in year
GWn	 = Cumulative acquired goodwill of firm j in year t for n year
EARN1I = Net Profit after tax of firm j in year
eji	 = error term
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Table 7.14: Net Asset Model Regression Summary Statistics
with Dummy Variables, Based on White's Heteroscedasticity Adjusted S.E.'s,
(Share Price as at Year-end, Constant Sample)
a0
	 i	 a2	 a3	 a	 a
Predicted Sign	 +	 +	 +	 Adj. R2	N
GW 1	0.464** 0.989"	 3.288**	 7.617***	 -0.017	 -0.013	 0.848	 275
f-statistics	 2.018	 2.115	 2.840	 11.792	 -0.064	 -0.631
p-Value	 0.045	 0.035	 0.005	 0.000	 0.949	 0.529
GW2	0.251	 1.104"	 3.012**	 7.542***	 0.054	 -0.014	 0.857	 275
(-statistics	 1.168	 2.758	 3.161	 12.591	 0.213	 -0.076
p-Value	 0.244	 0.006	 0.002	 0.000	 0.831
	
0.939
GW3	0.129	 1.177"	 2.800*	 7.453	 0.133	 0.067	 0.856	 275
f-statistics	 0.590	 3.128	 3.327	 12.870	 0.508	 0.345
p-Value	 0.556	 0.002	 0.001	 0.000	 0.612	 0.730
GW4	0.092	 1.229***	 2 . 653***	 7.409***	 0.153	 0.042	 0.854	 275
f-statistics	 0.414	 3.338	 3.267	 12.952	 0.572	 0.215
p-Value	 0.679	 0.001	 0.001	 0.000	 0.568	 0.830
GW5	0.066	 1.255***	 2 . 610***	 7.396*	 0.139	 0.021	 0.853	 275
f-statistics	 0.296	 3.428	 3.222	 12.949	 0.522
	 0.113
p-Value	 0.767	 0.001	 0.001	 0.000	 0.602
	 0.910
GW6	0.035	 1.262***	 2 . 604**	 7.399"	 0.119	 -0.002	 0.852	 275
(-statistics	 0.154	 3.449	 3.204	 12.974	 0.453	 -0.011
p-Value	 0.878	 0.001	 0.002	 0.000	 0.651	 0.992
GW7	0.006	 1.290***	 2 .554**	 7.382***	 0.114	 -0.035	 0.852	 275
f-statistics	 0.024	 3.566	 3.189	 13.036	 0.431	 -0.180
p-Value	 0.981	 0.000	 0.002	 0.000	 0.667	 0.857
GW6	-0.022	 1.318***	 2 . 510**	 7.365***	 0.089	 -0.036	 0.851	 275
f-statistics	 -0.098	 3.700	 3.201	 13.109	 0.339	 -0.189
p-Value	 0.922	 0.000	 0.002	 0.000	 0.734	 0.850
Notes: The table indicates significance at 1% (***), 5% () and 10% (*) levels.
Model: MVE = ao + a 1 B VNAfl + a2G Wn, + a3EARNfl + a4D95+ a5D94 ^
Where:
MVE$	= Market value of shareholders equity of firm j in year
BVNA	 = Book value of shareholders' equity of firm j in year
GWn	 = Cumulative acquired goodwill of firm j in year t for n year
EARN	 = Net Profit after tax of firm j in year
= error term
7.2.3.2 The Log-linear Model
Another possibility to test whether the model can be improved further is by transforming the
variables into natural logarithms, for which a normal plot shows a better approximation to
normality. By introducing the log model we actually test the functional form of the
regression; i.e. a choice between a linear regression model (the regressor is a linear
function of the regressors) or a log-linear regression model (the log of the regressor is a
function of the logs of the regressors). The functional form of the linear regression model
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employed in the previous section shows that just one case for the two models, the null
hypotheses that the true model is linear is rejected at the 1-% level of significance. Thus,
results based on the log model presented in this section are just another alternative to
explore the data set.
We perform a test proposed by MacKinnon, White, and Davidson (MWD test) to choose
between the two models. This test indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
true model is log-linear or linear. We then compare the two models using the residual
diagnostics test. Table 7.15 shows the residual diagnostic test comparison between the two
models. As reported in Chapter 6, the linear model suffers from a heteroscedasticity
problem that can be corrected using the White-t procedures. Heteroscedasticity is not a
problem in the log-linear model but here we face a serial correlation problem. If serial
correlation is present then the usual OLS estimators, although unbiased, will no longer
exhibit minimum variance among all the linear unbiased estimators. In short, they are no
longer BLUE (Gujarati, 1995). As a result, we conclude that the linear models are more
suitable to our study.
Table 7.15: ResIdual Test Diagnostic
Residual Test	 Linear Model	 Log-linear Model
Serial Correlation	 -
Heteroscedasticity	 -
Functional Form	 -	 -
Normality
Nonetheless, we present the results for the log-linear model from the reduced model for
comparison purposes. Two samples were eliminated because their BVNA is negative.
Tables 7.16 (Model 1) and 7.17 (Model 2) contain summary statistics for the log-linear
regression model. The results from both the models show that the entire coefficients are
significantly non-zero for the two models. According to this model, purchased goodwill is still
highly significant to investors when they are determining the value of a firm. At face value,
the intercept is decreases in value when we increase the cumulative purchased goodwill.
However, these changes are not statistically significant. Another point that should be
highlighted is the lower value of R2 compared to the linear models, which shows that the
model has lost its explanatory power.
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Table 7.16: The Log-linear Model
Share Price 3 month after year-end (Constant Sample)
a0 	a1	 a2	 a3
Predicted Sign ?	 +	 +	 +
GW 1 	0.473***	 0. 654***	 0 . 080**	 1 .565***
f-statistics	 8.650	 9.020	 3.050	 7.620
p-Value	 0.000	 0.000	 0.003	 0.000
GW2	 0.466	 0.654*	 0.089**	 1.544***
f-statistics	 8.930	 9.040	 3.140	 7.560
p-Value	 0.000	 0.000	 0.002	 0.000
GW3 	0.449k"	 0.659***	 0.084"	 1.523*
f-statistics	 8.800	 9.100	 2.830	 7.440
p-Value	 0.000	 0.000	 0.005	 0.000
GW4 	0.451***	 0.654***	 0 . 095**	 1.532*
f-statistics	 8.860	 8.990	 2.900	 7.480
p-Value	 0.000	 0.000	 0.004	 0.000
GW5 	0.438"	 0 . 660***	 0 . 089**	 1.537
f-statistics	 8.450	 9.040	 2.410	 7.460
p-Value	 0.000	 0.000	 0.016	 0.000
GW6 	0.436	 0.658***	 0 .096**	 1.545***
f-statistics	 8.490	 9.000	 2.410	 7.490
p-Value	 0.000	 0.000	 0.017	 0.000
GW7 	0.436	 0.659***	 0 . 102**	 1.551***
1-statistics	 8.610	 9.040	 2.480	 7.520
p-Value	 0.000	 0.000	 0.014	 0.000
OWB 	0.428***	 0.663***	 0 . 096**	 1 .549"
f-statistics	 8.570	 9.090	 2.320	 7.490
p-Value	 0.000	 0.000	 0.021	 0.000
Model: 1nMVE,1 = a0 + ailnB VNAp + a2!nGWnjj+ a3 InEARNg + e1t
AdJ. R2	N
0.459	 273
0.460	 273
0.456	 273
0.457	 273
0.452	 273
0.452	 273
0.453	 273
0.451	 273
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Table 7.17: The Log-linear Model
Share Price as at year-end (Constant Sample)
ao	 ai	 a2	 a3
Predicted Sign ?
	 +	 +	 +	 AdJ. R2	N
GW 1	0.452*	 0.662***	 O.075	 1.590***	 0.461	 273
f-statistics	 8.190	 9.060	 2.840	 7.710
p-Value	 0.000	 0.000	 0.005	 0.000
GW2
	0.4.44"	 0.662"	 0.084**	 1.575	 0.462	 273
f-statistics	 8.450	 9.080	 2.920	 7.650
p-Value	 0.000	 0.000	 0.002	 0.000
GW3	0.431***	 0. 666***	 0.080"	 1.556***	 0.459	 273
f-statistics	 8.380	 9.130	 2.690	 7.550
p-Value	 0.000	 0.000	 0.008	 0.000
GW4	0.434***	 0. 661*	 0.092**	 1.565*	 0.460	 273
f-statistics	 8.470	 9.030	 2.800	 7.600
p-Value	 0.000	 0.000	 0.006	 0.000
GW5
	O.425	 0.665"	 0.091"	 1.572	 0.457	 273
t-statistics	 8.160	 9.070	 2.450	 7.590
p-Value	 0.000	 0.000	 0.015	 0.000
GW6	0.424***	 0.663'	 0.099"	 1.581***	 0.457	 273
f-statistics	 8.220	 9.020	 2.470	 7.620
p-Value	 0.000	 0.000	 0.014	 0.000
GW7	0.424	 0.664***	 0.106"	 1.587***	 0.458	 273
f-statistics	 8.350	 9.060	 2.560	 7.650
p-Value	 0.000	 0.000	 0.011	 0.000
GW8
	0.415"	 0. 668*	 0.098**	 1.585***	 0.456	 273
f-statistics	 8.280	 9.020	 2.360	 7.630
p-Value	 0.000	 0.000	 0.019	 0.000
Model: mM VE = a0
 ^ a 1 InB VNAfi + a2InG Wnp+ a3 !nEARN + e11
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7.2.3.2 The Balance Sheet Identity Model
The fourth reduced model includes only the balance sheet variables in the regression
equation, as in Landsman (1986). By removing earnings as one of the explanatory
variables, there is no longer a weighted average between the income variable and the
balance sheet variable. Furthermore, we have estimated this model in undeflated form. As
explained before, this potentially leads to two scale-related problems: scale bias and
heteroscedastic disturbances. Following Pfeiffer (1998), we address scale bias by including
a proxy for size in each model. In this case we use total sales (Sales) as a size proxy.
Tables 7.18 (Model 1) and 7.19 (Model 2) contain summary statistics for the balance sheet
regression model.
The results from both models show that all the coefficients are significantly non-zero for the
two models. According to these models, purchased goodwill is still highly significant to
investors when they are determining the value of a firm. The intercept is decreases in value
when we increase the cumulative purchased goodwill for the first five years and increase
thereafter. These results show some inconsistency with our earlier arguments relating to the
relationship between the intercept value and the eliminated goodwill. This model also has a
lower value of R 2 compared to our earlier models, which show that the model has lost its
explanatory power.
The Sales coefficient which is a size proxy, is negative and significant. Nonetheless, it
suggests a cautious interpretation of the results. We then analysed the residuals from this
model and found out that the entire residual diagnostic test was statistically significant (i.e.
the model suffered serious econometric problems such as normality, serial correlation,
linearity, and heteroscedasticity). Therefore, we concluded that the combination of balance
sheet and income variables in the model specification is more suitable for our study, which
are consistent with the results of Ohlson (1989, 1995) and McCarthy and Schneider (1995).
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Adj.R2	 N
0.607	 275
0.605	 275
0.608	 275
0.617	 275
0.620	 275
0.608	 275
0.601	 275
0.594	 275
Table 7.18: Balance Sheet Identity Regression Summary Statistics
Share Price 3 month after year-end
ai	 a2	 a3
Predicted Sign ?	 +	 +	 +
GW 1	820684" 4.929***	 5545***	 0.948**
f-statistics	 2.554	 5.525	 4.562	 -1.974
p-Value	 0.011	 0.000	 0.000	 0.049
GW2	7761 05** 4. 820***	 5454***	 0.961**
f-statistics	 2.405	 5.369	 4.052	 -1.981
p-Value	 0.017	 0.000	 0.000	 0.049
GW3	 733633** 4754***	 5.423*
	 0.948**
f-statistics	 2.289	 5.386	 4.011	 -1.974
p-Value	 0.023	 0.000	 0.000
	 0.044
GW4	686994	 4.731***	 5.620***	 -1.007"
f-statistics	 2.198	 5.430	 4.376	 -2.149
p-Value	 0.029	 0.000	 0.000
	
0.032
GW5	 640085	 4.718	 5.666	 -1.055"
t-statistics	 2.144	 5.441	 4.245	 -2.378
p-Value	 0.033	 0.000	 0.000
	
0.018
GW6	756260	 4.451***	 5.280"	 -1.091
t-statistics	 2.455	 4.737	 3.135	 -2.434
p-Value	 0.015	 0.000	 0.002
	 0.016
GW7	 849475** 4 .358***	 4.826"	 -1.156"
f-statistics	 2.707	 4.469	 2.568	 -2.552
p-Value	 0.007	 0.000	 0.011
	 0.011
GW8	 84881	 4475***	 4.430*** -1 .249**
f-statistics	 2.772	 4.452	 2.309	 -2.632
p-Value	 0.006	 0.000	 0.022
	
0.000
Model: MVE, = ao + a f BVNAfl + aG Wn11 + a3 Sales/f + eg
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Table 7.19: Balance Sheet identity Regression Summary Statistics
Share Price as at year-end
ao	 ai	 a2	 a3
Predicted Sign ?
	 +	 +	 +
GW 1
	737559	 5.161	 6.441***	 -1 .062**
f-statistics	 2.364	 5.497	 4.748	 -2.232
p-Value	 0.019	 0.000	 0.000
	
0.026
GW2	 682270** 5 .017***	 6.464***	 -1 .075**
f-statistics	 2.181	 5.526	 4.580	 -2.253
p-Value	 0.030	 0.000	 0.000
	
0.025
GW3	 633373** 4945***	 6.380***	 -1 .092**	 0.654	 275
f-statistics	 2.032	 5.576	 4.490	 -2.309
p-Value	 0.043	 0.000	 0.000	 0.022
GW4
	584980	 4. 940***	 6.468***	 1.131**	 0.661	 275
f-statistics	 1.920	 5.629	 4.662	 -2.459
p-Value	 0.056	 0.000	 0.000	 0.015
GW 5
	 31 666
	
4.927***	 6.508***	
-1.187"
	 0.664	 275
f-statistics	 1.823	 5.623	 4.554	 -2.742
p-Value	 0.069	 0.000	 0.000	 0.007
GW6	 59225** 4.583***	 6.234***	
-1 .229
	 0.654	 275
f-statistics	 2.214	 5.130	 3.593	 -2.834
p-Value	 0.028	 0.000	 0.000	 0.005
GW7	 67396** 4.447
	 5.798k	 -1 .308**	 0.648	 275
f-statistics	 2.563	 4.969	 3.057	 -2.996
p-Value	 0.011	 0.000	 0.002	 0.003
GW8	 09644** 4. 581***	 5347**	 -1 .420	 0.640	 275
1-statistics	 2.643	 5.001	 2.750	 -3.057
p-Value	 0.009	 0.000	 0.006	 0.000
Model: MVEfl =ao ^ a 1 B VNAjt + a2G Wnfl + a3 Salesft + eJf
Adj. R2	N
0.649	 275
0.650	 275
7.3	 The Market Valuation of Goodwill
Given that goodwill appears to be a significant factor in the valuation of a company, our
second hypothesis examines the magnitude of the market: book multiplier compared to
other assets. This hypothesis is tested by comparing the coefficients of GWn and BVOA. If
the two coefficients are not significantly different, then this would suggest that the market
treats goodwill like other assets. Answering this question will provide an insight into the
relative importance of reported goodwill in valuing a firm compared to other assets, and,
consequently, such results will provide additional evidence for the recognition of goodwill as
required by FRS 10.
First, let us discuss the absolute values of the coefficients of BVOA and GW from the two
basic models presented in Section 7.2. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 present the pattern of both
142
3.50
3.00
2.50
2.00
C
1.5C
1 .00
0.5C
0.0c
BVOA
coefficients over changes in GW. It is obvious that the absolute values of GW's coefficients
are higher than BVOA in both models for the first three years of cumulative purchased
goodwill. This indicates that, on average, investor value purchased goodwill is higher than
the firms' BVOA. If we go into further detail for each of the models, the model using the
year-end share price reveals that the coefficient of GW is higher than that of BVOA for all
cases. However, results from the other model (share price three months after year-end)
shows that the coefficient of GW is only slightly lower than the coefficient of BVOA.
To summarise, this analysis indicates that investors value GW more highly than BVOA at a
certain point. However, it is obvious that GW decreases in value once the cumulative figure
of purchased goodwill increases.
Figure 7.1: Pattern of Coefficient Value: Goodwill Compared to Other Assets
Share Price 3 Months after year end
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
Number of Year (Cum. Goodwill)
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Figure 7.2 Pattern of Coefficient Value: Goodwill Compared to Other Assets
Share Price as at year-end
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Secondly, after considering the absolute values of both coefficients, we test the hypothesis
in order to examine the magnitude of the market perception of purchased goodwill in
relation to other assets. The results of this test are presented in Tables 7.20 and 7.21. The
null hypothesis of equal coefficients is rejected for GW 1 and GW2 for both models. Given
our earlier analysis and the results, it can be generally concluded that on average (in this
sample) the market perceives purchased goodwill as having a higher value than other
assets at a certain point in the economic life of purchased goodwill. As mentioned by
previous researchers, such as Jennings eta!. (1996) and McCarthy and Schneider (1995),
one statistical problem with this study is the use of book values to proxy for market values.
The market value of purchased goodwill is unknown. However the other variable, BVOA,
which represents the remaining assets has some components in which the market value is
equal to the book value, such as cash and debtors, as well as some components where the
market value may be greater than the book value, such as stock and property, plant and
equipment. This most likely result in measurement error. The extent of influence
measurement error has on the results is unknown.
Therefore, previous researchers have preferred a conservative interpretation, and
concluded that purchased goodwill appears to be perceived by the market with a value at
least equal to other assets and possibly greater. However, in our context, we believe that
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the rejection of the null hypothesis of equal coefficients for GW1 and GW2 signal the fact
that investors differentiate significantly the 'age' of the purchased goodwill. This analysis
gives more evidence to the proposition that investors do perceive purchased goodwill as an
asset in the determination of the firm's valuation, as raised by the first research question.
Table 7.20: Wald Test Restriction Imposed on Parameters of the Basic Model
Asset and Goodwill Elimination Coefficients Equalised (Share Price 3 months after year-end)
________________	
Coefficient	 I
Cum. Goodwill 	 ai	 a3	 Chi-square	 p-Value
GW 1 	 .266	 3.117	 8.961	 0.003
GW2 	1.473	 2.954	 9.850	 0.002
GW3 	2.563	 2.559	 0.008	 0.993
GW4 	2.552	 2.414	 0.139	 0.709
GW5 	2.550	 2.249	 0.680	 0.410
GW6	 2.547	 2.084	 1.644	 0.200
GW7 	2.558	 2.049	 2.007	 0.157
GW8 	2.569	 2.056	 2.073	 0.150
Model: MVEft = ao + ai BVOAft + aVLp + aWnp + aAHNfl
 + ejt
Restriction: ai - a, = 0
Table 7.21: Wald Test Restriction Imposed on Parameters of the Basic Model
Asset and Goodwill Elimination Coefficients Equalised (Share Price after year-end)
-	 Coeffic!ent	 ________________________
Cum. Goodwill 	 ai	 a	 Chi-square	 p-Value
GW 1 	0.813	 3.160	 15.799	 0.000
GW2 	1.047	 2.784	 15.148	 0.000
GW3 	1.749	 2.380	 3.200	 0.074
GW4 	1.738	 2.251	 2.211	 0.137
GW5 	1.737	 2.108	 1.184	 0.277
GW6 	1.738	 1.949	 0.391	 0.532
Gw7	 1.748	 1.918	 0.256	 0.613
GW8 	1.758	 1.915	 0.224	 0.636
Model: MVEfl = ac + avu + d2bVLJt 1 d3UVV(Ift + d4tfiIflVjt+ fi
Restriction: ai - a3 = 0
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7.4	 The Depletion of Goodwill
The previous two sections have addressed the first two research questions: the value-
relevance of purchased goodwill and magnitude of the relationship with other assets. This
section will present arguments relating to whether the purchased goodwill that has been
written off has declined in value or not. According to Zeff and Thomas (1973), it is over-
conservative to write goodwill off the books when it has not depreciated in value below the
purchase price. To write off goodwill in such a case creates a secret reserve while to
recognise this reserve is thought to be unorthodox accounting. Goodwill suffers no actual
decline in value so long as the earning capacity of the firm is maintained. However, there is
good reason to suspect that goodwill will decline in value.
For instance, the 'momentum theory of goodwill (Nelson, 1953) assumes that the buyer of
a company normally pays for the goodwill in order to obtain a going concern, rather than to
start fresh in similar business and devote effort over a period of time in order to develop a
market presence. In effect, the buyer acquires momentum, and this investment ought to be
charged against income over the estimated life of the momentum, which is unlikely to take a
lengthy period to build from scratch. In this context, Grinyer (1995) suggests that the useful
economic life of purchased goodwill would be shorter than that suggested by the
amortisation periods normally recommended in accounting standards.
In our study sample, all companies write-off their purchased goodwill against reserves in the
year of acquisition. If we believe that purchased goodwill is of value relevance to investors,
the coefficient of (GW), a3 should be significant and positive. On the other hand, if part of
the purchased goodwill is not recorded, and that amount still has value-relevance for
investors, then we would expect that the estimated intercept also would also be positive and
significant. This argument is consistent with that of Kane and Unal (1990) who suggested
that the estimated intercept serve as a net source of (drain on) unbookable assets and
liabilities.
The results presented in the previous section provided evidence that a 3 is significant and
positive and that a0 is significantly non-zero for the first two years of goodwill accumulation
only, suggesting that the intercept may include an amount of unbooked goodwill in excess
of that eliminated in the current and previous years. In fact, our findings show that the
intercept decreases in absolute value towards zero as the accumulation period increases.
Figures 7.3 and 7.4 present the pattern of Intercept's coefficient values over a number of
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years of cumulative purchased goodwill. The intercept decreases in absolute value towards
zero as the accumulation period increases, and the market value arising from purchased
goodwill increases asa result (see Figures 7.5 and 7.6). However, the capitalised value of
current earnings remains constant in the face of the increasing goodwill accumulation, while
the market value placed on net assets also absorbs the intercept term. In other words, the
higher the book value of purchased goodwill; i.e. the lower its book to market ratio, the more
that a (potentially synergistic) unrecorded asset is perceived as adding value to the net
asset base.
FIgure 7.3: Intercept Estimates for Goodwill Elimination Accumulations (Share Price 3 months after Year End)
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Figure 7.4: intercept Estimates for Goodwill Elimination Accumulations (Share Price as at Year End)
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Figure 7.5: Components of the Linear Predictor
Share Price 3 Months after Year-end
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Model: MVEj = ao + a 1 B VNA1t + a2GWnfi + a3EARN1t + alt
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Figure 7.6: Components of the Linear Predictor
Share Price as at Year-end
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Model: MVEj = ao + a 1 B VNAp + a2G Wnj,+ a3EARNp +
As a general conclusion, it can be said that the overall pattern of the absolute value of the
intercept (in this case represented by purchased goodwill that has been written off) declines
in value once the cumulative figures have increased. One interesting finding is that
purchased goodwill that has been written off has value-relevance to the investor. Purchased
goodwill does have a useful economic life and it seems to us, on average, that the investor
values purchased goodwill within a very limited time frame. This result might not be
conclusive because of the nature of the data; but it nonetheless it gives some empirical
support to the ASB relating to the amortisation and impairment required by FRS 10.
7.5	 Value Relevance of Oft-Balance sheet Information
This thesis examines the extent to which purchased goodwill that has been written-off is
reflected in a firm's market value. Results from the previous sections suggest that
purchased goodwill has value-relevance to the investor, and that, in term of value, it can be
considered equal to or higher, than other assets within certain useful economic life. At the
same time it can, on average, show a decline in value. All the information relating to
purchased goodwill does not appear on the face of the financial statements because it is not
capitalised or amortised. Since the coefficients of BVNA, GW and EARN are significant for
all cases, the indirect implication of this finding is that the investor considers all value-
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relevant information conveyed by firms' financial reports; that is, both the information on the
face of the financial statements and in the accompanying disclosures.
The changes in the intercept value from significant to non-significant also suggest that the
intercept picks-up some value of purchased goodwill that has been written off in the early
years. At a certain point, the increase in cumulative purchased goodwill is irrelevant to the
market value. As a general conclusion, the results indicate that, in addition to the reported
variables on the face of the balance sheet, investors use information in the accompanying
disclosures. Of course, this finding is not new. Bowman (1980), Dhaliwal (1986), Landsman
(1986), Beaver et a!. (1988), Shevlin (1990), Barth (1994), Amir and Lev (1996), and Pfeiffer
(1998), among others have reported similar findings.
7.6	 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter has presented the empirical results of the thesis. Firstly, the overall results of
this study suggest that the market perceives purchased goodwill as an asset and
incorporates information pertaining to goodwill in the valuation of a company. Secondly, the
empirical results show that the market appears to perceive purchased goodwill with a value
equal (if not higher) to other assets. Thirdly, our empirical evidence suggests that the
cumulative purchased goodwill show a decline in values over times and finally, our results
indicate that investors' decision reflect all value-relevant information conveyed by company's
financial reports, both the information on the face of the financial statements and in the
accompanying disclosures. Several implications arise from the results of this study in light of
the ASB's concerns about the accounting for goodwill saga. First, it is quite obvious that
purchased goodwill is important information to the investor. Thus, 'capitalised and
amortised' treatment should provide more useful information to them about how to motivate
or to control managers. Second, the impairment test required by FRS1O is justifiable
compared to systematic amortisation. It is reasonable to claim that the cumulative
purchased goodwill, on average, declines in value. It seems reasonable to support the
arguments of Grinyer (1995), who believes that the useful economic life of purchased
goodwill declines faster than any period suggested by any existing standards. Finally, based
on the overall results of this study, we believe that FRS 10 is theoretically and empirically
justifiable.
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CHAPTER 8
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
8.1	 Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this thesis has been to increase the general understanding of the
controversy surrounding purchased goodwill which has been eliminated in the year of
acquisition. Specifically, the goals of this study were to test the association between goodwill
accounting numbers and market values; to describe the relationship between purchased
goodwill and other assets; and to explain the pattern of goodwill values over time. This
topic is of concern to those who set accounting standards in the UK, given the new
requirement that goodwill be capitalised and amortised with an impairment test. Thus, to
demonstrate that an accounting standard is consistent with the nature of the underlying
assets would be both relevant and timely.
In essence, our market association test is able to substantiate the concerns expressed over
goodwill accounting in contemporary accounting research by providing evidence that
purchased goodwill that has been written off is an important determinant of market value.
These results are consistent with the overall findings by Henning (1994), McCarthy and
Schneider (1995) and Jennings et aL (1996) which stated that goodwill numbers are of
value-relevance to investors. However, it should be noted that their research differs from the
present study in two respects: ours is based on companies in the UK, where the accounting
treatment is to eliminate purchased goodwill through reserves in the year of acquisition,
whereas prior research has been concerned with US firms which capitalised and amortised
their purchased goodwill. Secondly, our analysis also confirms that goodwill is an asset of
considerable magnitude; however we show that although goodwill is valued higher than
other assets at the beginning of its useful economic life, it seems that much of the value in
goodwill is short-lived.
As a general conclusion, our results indicate that, in addition to the reported variables on the
face of the balance sheet, investors may usefully acquire information from the
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accompanying notes. Of course, this finding is not new to the literature: Bowman (1980),
Dhaliwal (1986), Landsman (1986), Beaver eta!. (1988), Shevlin (1990), Barth (1994), Amir
and Lev (1996), Aboody (1996), Aboody and Lev (1998) and Pfeiffer (1998), among others,
report similar findings. More specifically, however, our results suggest that not only is
unbooked goodwill of value-relevance to investors, but that the valuation ratio can also be
considered to be similar to that of other assets, while the market's perception of the useful
life is relatively short.
8.2	 Comparison with Previous Studies
The present study is similar to the previous studies by McCarthy and Schneider (1995) and
Jennings et a!. (1996) which were both conducted in the US where purchased goodwill is
capitalised and amortised. However, it is interesting to analyse and compares both results
with those of current study.
McCarthy and Schneider found that investors include goodwill when valuing a firm: the
goodwill variable was significant across all five years under study but the intercept value
was significant only for one year. In a different study, Jennings et a!. (1996) found that the
estimated coefficients for recorded net goodwill were positive and highly significant for each
of the seven years. Similar to McCarthy and Schneider, their intercept value was not
significant for any of the years except for 1988. These results would normally indicate a
good model. However, as explained earlier, the intercept value may indicate the movement
of hidden reserves.
In the UK environment, however, it is quite obvious that the amount of goodwill elimination
has some effect on the intercept value. Our preliminary analysis as reported in Chapter 6
together with the main results in Chapter 7, have proved this relationship. It might be
relevant to pose questions from previous studies - (i) is the significant value of the intercept
related to the amount of goodwill amortisation? or (ii) does the insignificant value of
intercept imply that the amortisation rate used by the US firms is consistent with the
economic value of purchased goodwill?.
Looking at the results from our main models, the intercept value is significant for the first
two years of cumulative goodwill. Once we increase the goodwill cumulative figures, the
intercept value becomes insignificant but the coefficient value for purchased goodwill
remains positive and significant. When seen in the light of the US studies, it is obvious that
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to some extent that amount of goodwill eliminated in the UK may have contributed to hidden
reserves, as described by Kane and Unal (1990).
McCarthy and Schneider examined the magnitude of the market perception of purchased
goodwill in relation to all other assets. They found that the estimated coefficient for goodwill
was greater than other assets in all five years. However, the null hypothesis of equal
coefficients was rejected in only two of the five years tested. As a result, they concluded that
goodwill appears to be perceived by the market to have a value at least equal to other
assets and possibly greater.
On the other hand, Jennings et a!. report that the absolute value for the estimated
coefficients for goodwill are generally larger than those for the book value of total assets
exclusive of goodwill and property, plant and equipment, and for the book value of net
property, plant and equipment (they segregated total assets into these two categories). No
formal test was conducted to test the null hypothesis of equal coefficients. Jennings et a!.
concluded that, on average, either purchased goodwill is amortised 'too quickly' or other
assets are expensed too slowly which is consistent with the hypothesis that investors
continue to view purchased goodwill as an economic resource after the date of acquisition.
These overall findings are consistent with McCarthy and Schneider (1995).
In the present study we found that the estimated coefficient of purchased goodwill was
higher than the other assets in all eight years of cumulative goodwill for Model 1 and for at
least the first 3 years of goodwill accumulation in second model. When we tested the null
hypothesis of equal coefficients, the first two years of cumulative figures rejected this
hypothesis for both models. In other words, investors value purchased goodwill more highly
than other assets for only two years after acquisition has taken place. We believe that the
"two year" factor in the intercept term (t-test of which is positive and significant) and this
hypothesis (hypothesis of equal coefficients) is interrelated. One possible explanation is
related to the age of purchased goodwill. In previous studies, the amount of goodwill has
been the summed amount ranging from 1 to 40 years in a single sum. In our study, the
cumulative figures represent the age of purchased goodwill. Our results show some
consistency with the findings of previous studies but further exploration has indicated that,
although goodwill is valued higher than other assets at the beginning of its useful economic
life, it seems that much of the value in goodwill is short-lived.
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Many other studies have investigated the relationship between market value and book
value. These studies have been reviewed in Chapter 4. We would like to compare the
coefficient values of the variables from the previous studies with those of the present one.
This comparison is necessary to study the pattern of the coefficient values of the previous
studies. One of the important elements that needs further consideration is whether the
deviations of the coefficient values observed in this study (theoretically BVQA and BVL
should be 1 and -1 respectively) is an isolated case or whether this is also the case in other
studies.
Table 8.1 presents this comparison. All the previous studies are based either on the share
price at year-end or on the price three months after year-end. In the present study our
results are based on two prices: the year-end price and the price three months after year-
end.
The main concern of this study is the coefficient values of purchased goodwill. The
coefficient values of purchased goodwill in this study are consistent (ranging between 1.939
and 3.309) compared with the previous studies by McCarthy and Schneider (1995) (ranging
between 1.636 and 2.637) and Jennings et aL (1996) (ranging between 1.76 to 4.00).
Secondly, the coefficient values of book value of assets in the previous studies are between
0.560 and 2.550, while in the present result, the coefficient values are between 0.81 and
2.56, and are consistent with the previous researches. Thirdly, the coefficient values of
liabilities of this study range from 0.524 to 3.123 while in the previous studies, they vary
from 0.477 to 2.87. Fourthly, McCarthy and Schneider report coefficient values of earning
between 3.343 and 9.727. In this study, however the coefficient values of earning are more
stable, ranging from 5.913 to 7.622. Finally, the coefficient values of net assets in the net
asset model in this study are range from 0.994 to 2.364 compared to 2.189 (a study by
Aboody and Lev, 1998) and 2.784 (a study by Deng and Lev, 1998). As a general
conclusion, the coefficient values of the variables in this thesis are consistent with those in
the previous studies.
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8.3	 Suggestions for Future Research
The evidence gathered in this study is based on companies which write off goodwill against
reserves in the year of acquisition. The implementation of FRS 10 which requires purchased
goodwill to be capitalised and amortised and which came into effect for financial statements
relating to accounting periods ending on or after 23 December 1998, provides an
opportunity to explore a data set which appears on the face of the balance sheet. On the
other hand, part of the goodwill will be amortised through the profit and loss using the
impairment test or systematic amortisation. This situation would enable a study based on
income statement valuation to be conducted. It would be useful to explore the relationship
between purchased goodwill, earnings and market value in the UK environment based on
that model.
Research could also be conducted into the use of the impairment test by managers as a
method of "manipulating" amortisation charges between periods. The success of the
impairment test and its application will be a significant determine in the success of FRS 10,
since the impairment test could be used as an avoidance measure by managers.. Another
area that could be explored is how managers react to FRS 10 and, consequently, how
investors react to the goodwill number in the balance sheet. Previous studies of US
Companies [for example, Hall (1991) and Henning (1994)] have suggested that managers
select amortisation periods without regard for the economic substance of the goodwill in
order to minimise the impact of amortisation expense on reported net income.
156
APPENDIX 1
ACCOUNTING FOR GOODWILL: EFFECT ON EPS, GEARING
AND RESERVES
A1.1 Background
Bryer (1990) mentioned that during the 1980s acquisitions were increasingly used as a
means of growth. Some companies had to absorb a large amount of goodwill write-off
through their shareholders' fund. According to Rutteman (1990) the consolidated balance
sheets of some companies started showing negative net worth. In extreme cases the
companies goodwill policies made their accounts look too weak; i.e., their gearing ratios
became so high as to endanger covenants or to cause acute embarrassment when raising
finance (Nobes, 1992). To avoid these phenomena, some companies tried to reflect in their
balance sheets the value of brands or trademarks (as opposed to the cost) which had
previously been considered part of acquired goodwill (the difference between purchase
price and the fair value of tangible net assets when one company acquires another
company).
The Woodhead-Faulkner Report (Brand and Goodwill Accounting Strategies: 1990)
identified 15 companies which reacted to the problem of accounting for goodwill by
introducing "brands" or "trademarks" on their balance sheets. One company, Rank Hovis
McDougall went one step further by capitalising acquired and home-grown brands. In the
early stage of our study, we attempt to analyse the effects which an alternative goodwill
accounting approach, and the inclusion of brands or trademarks onto the balance sheets,
would have had on EPS, gearing and reserves on Rank Hovis McDougall and three other
companies (for comparative purposes) against a backdrop of the issues relating to
accounting for goodwill outlined above. We consider these analyses as preliminary studies,
relevant to the controversy surrounding accounting for goodwill. Although we have not
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include these findings on the main thesis 14, the results might be useful for an overall
understanding of the issues, especially relating to the effect of the different accounting
treatments: capitalisation and amortisation v.s write-off against reserves.
A1.2 The Issues
Based on the Woodhead-Faulkner special report on Brands and Goodwill, we selected
Rank Hovis McDougall as an extreme case for this study due to the facts that they were the
first company which capitalised acquired and home-grown brands in 1988. The other three
companies (Cadbury Schweppes, Grand Metropolitan and Guinness) were selected for
comparative purposes. The accounts of these companies (198815 to 1991) drawn from
DATASTREAM and Financial Reports were analysed to gain insights on the following
issues:
1. the effect of shifting from immediate write-off to five year amortisation 16 on the published
earnings per share figures
2. the effects on the gearing ratios 17 of including brands or trademarks as an assets on the
balance sheet
3. the effects on the reserves of including brands or trademarks as assets on the balance
sheet
A1.3 Eftects on Earning per Share (EPS)
Over the period 1988 to 1991 all the selected companies adopted the immediate write-off
option for accounting for acquired goodwill. Table A1.1 presents data from 1988 to 1991 on
the reduction of EPS if the companies did not used immediate write-off but had instead
capitalised goodwill and amortised it over five years. A comparison between reported ad
adjusted EPS for individual companies can be drawn from Figure Al. Table Al .1 shows that
all the companies would have reported significantly lower EPS figures if they had chosen to
capitalise and amortise goodwill. It is also interesting to note that Grand Metropolitan and
Guinness have showed very contradictory results in EPS under both accounting treatments.
In 1989, Grandmet reported 55.6 pence in EPS. If the company had chosen to amortise
their goodwill, the EPS of the company would have been reduced to -13.5 pence. On the
other hand, Guinness also reported a positive EPS of 19 pence in 1988. After taking into
14 The main objective of this thesis is to provide empirical evidence whether the value of purchased goodwill that
has been write-off in the year of acquisition is value-relevance to the market when they determine the market
value of the firms. This analysis is not relevant to answer the research questions raised in this thesis. However
the analysis presented in this appendix is consistent with the claimed that "managers factors" might influence in
the regulation process as mentioned in chapter 2.
15 All of the selected companies (except for cadbury) started to capitalise brands and trademarks from this year.
16 Five year amortisation is chosen as suggested by lntemational Accounting Standard E32 (IASC E32).
17 Gearing Ratio is calculated based on this formula: Total Debt less Provision for Liabilities divided by total asset
(with and without brand or trademark).
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account the alternative amortisation treatment the EPS figure would have dropped to -1
pence.
Table A1.1
Percentage Reduction of EPS if Companies had Chosen to
Capitalise and Amortise Goodwill Over a Five Year period
Company	 1988 (%) 1989 (%) 1990 (%) 1991 (%)
Rank Hovis	 25	 34	 44	 42
Cadbury	 44	 92	 94	 73
Guinness	 107	 87	 71	 56
Grandmet	 63	 124	 100	 100
Figure A.1
Comparison between Reported and Adjusted EPS
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Table A1.2
Test of the Differences of Mean Values of EPS
Company	 Rank Hovis Cadbury Guinness Grandmet All Company
Mean for Reported EPS	 30.500
	
25.000	 28.000
	 58.250	 39.600
Mean for Adjusted EPS	 19.500	 6.250	 6.500	 1.000	 10.500
t-value	 5.090
	
6.540	 4.320
	
7.610	 7.820
Significance Level 	 0.004
	
0.007	 0.008
	 0.001	 0.000
Table Al .2 reports the results of the test of the difference of mean (between reported and
adjusted EPS) for each of the companies and for all the companies as a whole. The results
show that all the reported means for EPS are significantly different from the adjusted means
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for EPS. These results reveal that all the EPS figures of the companies would have reduced
significantly (using trends and t-test of the differences of means analysis), if they had
chosen to capitalise and amortise goodwill.
Al .4 Effects on Gearing Ratio
Table Al .3 presents data from 1988 to 1991 on the percentage increase in gearing ratio if
the selected companies had chosen not to put brands or trademarks on the balance sheet.
As an alternative comparison, Table Al .4 presents data from the same period on the
percentage of brands or trademarks to total assets. Comparisons of gearing ratios for
individual companies can bee seen from Figure Al.2. Table A1.3 reveals that all the
companies show a higher gearing ratio if they do not capitalise brands or trademarks as
assets. For example, Rank Hovis's gearing ratio would have risen to more than 80% in
1989 if the calculation had not take account of brands as an assets. Arguably, this figure is
less favourable than the lower figure (if the companies capitalise brands as assets) which
would be interpreted as a negative financial indicator. On the assumption that managers of
companies seek stable and low gearing ratios, the decision to include brands or trademarks
in the balance sheet can be rationalised.
Table A1.3
Percentage Increase in Gearing Ratio If Companies do not
Include Brands or Trademarks as Assets
Company	 1988(%) 1989(%) 1990(%) 1991 (%)
Rank Hovis	 28	 31	 21	 21
Cadbury	 NA	 10	 9	 8
Guinness	 15	 12	 11	 11
Grandmet	 5	 26	 20	 21
Table A1.4
Percentage Value of Brand or Trademarks to Total Assets
Company	 1988 (%) 1989 (%) 1990 (%) 1991 (%)
Rank Hovis	 41	 38	 36	 37
Cadbury	 NA	 14	 13	 12
Guinness	 29	 22	 21	 18
Grandmet	 10	 28	 25	 27
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Figure A.1.2
Comparison between Reported and Adjusted Gearing Ratio
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A1.5 Eftects on Reserves
Table Al .5 presents data from 1988 to 1991 on the reduction of total reserves if companies
had chosen not to include brands or trademarks in the balance sheet. This choice implies
that companies should classify brands or trademarks as goodwill and that the accounting
treatment for goodwill should be to write goodwill off immediately against reserves (as this
was the practice followed by all the companies during this period). As a result the total
amount of reserves will be reduced by the amount of goodwill written off. Although it can be
predicted that the total reserves figure will be decreased if companies choose not to include
brands or trademarks in their balance sheets, it is interesting to note the actual percentage
reduction as revealed in Table A1.5. The most dramatic figure is for Grandmet whose
reserves in 1989 show percentage reductions of 115%. In other words the total reserves of
that company for that particular year would have been negative!. In general all the selected
companies would had suffered a reduction of more than 40% in 1990 onwards.
Tabie A1.5
Percentage Reduction of Totai Reserves if Companies
do not Include Brands or Trademarks as Assets
Company	 1988(%)
Rank Hovis	 81
Cadbury	 NA
Guinness	 59
Grandmet	 20
1989 (%) 1990 (%) 1991 (%)
115	 80	 85
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Al .6 Conclusion
The analysis in this appendix shows that all the selected companies choose accounting
treatments for goodwill that gave favourable results to managers. A comparison between
alternative treatment show that reported earnings per share would reduce significantly if
companies choose to capitalise and amortise goodwill. There is also evidence that
acquisitive companies have reacted to the adverse impact on their balance sheets of writing
off goodwill by including brands and trademarks as assets. We hope the results will be
useful for the overall understanding of the ugoodwill issues" especially relating to the effect
each type of accounting treatment: capitalising and amortising or writing-off against
reserves.
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APPENDIX 2
Dummy Variables Regressions - Industrial Effects
A2.1 Share Price 3 Months after year-end
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on Whites Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E.s
Dependent variable is MVE (SHARE PRICE 3 MONTHS AFTER YEAR-END)
275 observations used for estimation from 1 to 275
Regressor	 Coefficient	 Standard Error	 T-Ratio[Prob]
Intercept	 -1.6582	 3.7651	 -.44042[.660]
BVE	 1.6431	 .45268	 3.62971.000]
GW1	 1.7225	 1.2128	 l.4203[.157]
EARN	 7.0553	 1.2099	 5.83141.000]
IND1	 2.4277	 3.6539	 .66441[.507]
IND2	 1.9785	 3.5850	 .55189[.582]
IND3	 2.0217	 3.5685	 .56653[.572]
IND4	 2.1176	 3.6377	 .58211[.561]
IND5	 1.3976	 3.6497	 .38293[.702]
IND6	 1.6257	 3.7024	 .43908[.661]
IND7	 3.3832	 3.6506	 .92675[.355]
IND8	 3.1119	 3.0617	 l.0164[.310]
IND9	 1.0050	 3.7003	 .27162[.786]
IND1O	 2.0708	 3.6174	 .572471.568]
IND11	 2.4656	 3.6845	 .66918[.504]
IND12	 1.5179	 3.7384	 .40603[.685]
IND13	 1.6489	 3.6973	 .445971.656]
IND14	 2.5360	 3.6487	 .695041.488]
IND15	 1.9921	 3.5926	 .554501.580]
IND16	 1.4112	 3.6530	 .386321.700]
IND17	 1.6479	 3.6652	 .449611.6531
IND18	 7.2740	 4.1218	 1.76481.079]
IND19	 2.2465	 3.5856	 .62654[.532]
IND2O	 1.6713	 3.7114	 .450301.653]
IND21	 1.8124	 3.6765	 .492961.622]
1ND22	 1.2345	 3.5924	 .343631.731]
1ND23	 1.9077	 3.6479	 .522961.601]
IND24	 2.8327	 4.2458	 .667171.505]
**	 * *** * * ************ * *************** ***** **** ************* **** **** ******* **
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Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on Whites Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E. 'S
Dependent variable is MVE (SHARE PRICE 3 MONTHS AFTER YEAR-END)
275 observations used for estimation from 1 to 275
**	 * *** * * *********** ************************************* ** ******** ****
Regressor	 Coefficient	 Standard Error
	 T-Ratio[Prob]
Intercept	 -1.6613	 3.8227	 -.43459[.664]
ByE	 1.5358	 .43589	 3.5234[.001]
GW2	 2.0619	 1.0086	 2.0442[.042]
EARN	 7.1297	 1.1430	 6.2376[.000]
IND1	 2.2465	 3.6881	 .60911[.543]
IND2	 2.0513	 3.5831	 .57250[.568]
IND3	 2.0286	 3.5919	 .56478[.573]
IND4	 2.0495	 3.6653	 .55916[.577]
IND5	 1.4462	 3.6744	 .39359[.694]
IND6	 1.6281	 3.7332	 .43613[.663]
IND7	 3.3249	 3.6910	 .90083[.369]
IND8	 3.1119	 3.1207	 99718[.320]
IND9	 .9507	 3.7287	 .254971.799]
IND1O	 2.0340	 3.6523	 .55691[.578]
IND11	 2.4826	 3.7283	 .66587[.506]
IND12	 1.5189	 3.7804	 .40179[.688]
IND13	 1.6400	 3.7279	 .43992[.660]
IND14	 2.4082	 3.6749	 .65532[.513]
IND15	 1.9282	 3.6368	 .53020[.596]
IND16	 1.3977	 3.6212	 .38597[.700]
IND17	 1.8096	 3.6320	 .49824[.619]
IND18	 6.3102	 3.9444	 1.5998[.111]
IND19	 2.1070	 3.6185	 .58228[.561]
IND2O	 1.6800	 3.7509	 .44788[.655]
IND21	 1.8011	 3.6986	 .48697[.627]
1ND22	 .9730	 3.6269	 .26828[.789]
1ND23	 1.8420	 3.7010	 49770[.619]
1ND24	 2.7983	 4.2892	 .65241[.515]
******************************************************************************
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Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on Whites Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E. s
******************************************************************************
Dependent variable is MVE (SHARE PRICE 3 MONTHS AFTER YEAR-END)
275 observations used for estimation from 1 to 275
* **** * ** * * ************** * **************** *** ********* *** **********
	 ***** ****
Regressor	 Coefficient	 Standard Error	 T-Ratio[Prob]
Intercept	 -1.7999	 3.8819	 -.46366[.643]
BVE	 1.5701	 .41349	 3.7971[.000]
GW3	 1.9994	 .89057	 2.2451[.026]
EARN	 7.0944	 1.1254	 6.3038[.000]
IND1	 2.3456	 3.7399	 .62717[.531]
IND2	 2.1369	 3.6172	
.59076[.555]
IND3	 2.1393	 3.6388	 .58790[.557]
IND4	 2.1468	 3.7141	 .578011.564]
IND5	 1.5650	 3.7216	
.42053[.674]
IND6	 1.7084	 3.7775	 .45226[.651]
IND7	 3.4396	 3.7440	 .91868[.359]
IND8	 3.2515	 3.1713	 l.0253[.306]
IND9	 1.0361	 3.7756	 .27443[.784]
IND1O	 2.1188	 3.6986	 .57287[.567]
IND11	 2.6145	 3.7808	 .69151[.490]
IND12	 1.6141	 3.8297	 .421461.674]
IND13	 1.7437	 3.7767	 .46169[.645]
IND14	 2.4661	 3.7162	 .66360[.508]
IND15	 2.0595	 3.6898	 .558171.577]
IND16	 1.4063	 3.6408	 .38627[.700]
IND17	 1.8247	 3.6265	 .503151.615]
IND18	 6.2405	 3.9686	 1.57251.117]
IND19	 2.2135	 3.6711	 .60294[.547]
IND2O	 1.8003	 3.8035	 .47334[.636]
IND21	 1.8893	 3.7417	 .50492[.614]
1ND22	 1.0094	 3.6740	 .274741.7841
1ND23	 1.9543	 3.7434	 .522061.602]
1ND24	 2.9125	 4.3505	 .669461.504]
*** * * ***** * * *** ***** *** * ********* ** ************* *********************** ***
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Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on Whites Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E. 5
* * * ********* ****** ***** *************** *********** ********* *************
Dependent variable is MVE (SHARE PRICE 3 MONTHS AFTER YEAR-END)
275 observations used for estimation from 1 to 275
******************************************************************************
Regressor	 Coefficient	 Standard Error
	 T-Ratio[Probl
Intercept	 -1.8239	 3.8953	 -.46825[.640]
ByE	 1.5611	 .40825	 3.8238[.000]
GW4	 1.9869	 .84035	 2.3644[.019]
EARN	 7.0984	 1.1237	 6.3168[.000]
IND1	 2.3584	 3.7531	 .62840[.530]
IND2	 2.1631	 3.6267	 .59644[.551]
IND3	 2.1618	 3.6499	 .59230[.554]
IND4	 2.1453	 3.7225	 .57629[.565)
IND5	 1.5944	 3.7333	 .42708[.670]
IND6	 1.7168	 3.7873	 .45330[.651]
IND7	 3.4568	 3.7558	 .9204O[.358]
IND8	 3.2786	 3.1805	 l.03O9[.304]
IND9	 1.0252	 3.7826	 .27103[.787]
IND1O	 2.1089	 3.7055	 .56913[.570]
IND11	 2.6398	 3.7928	 .69600[.487]
IND12	 1.6196	 3.8396	 .42182[.674]
IND13	 1.7538	 3.7866	 .46316[.644]
IND14	 2.4672	 3.7259	 .66216[.5O8]
IND15	 2.0869	 3.7026	 .56362[.574J
IND16	 1.4350	 3.6514	 .39301[.695J
IND17	 1.8667	 3.6369	 .51327[.608]
IND18	 6.2791	 3.9802	 l.5776[.116]
IND19	 2.2102	 3.6796	 .60067[.549]
IND2O	 1.8202	 3.8152	 .47709[.634]
IND21	 1.8960	 3.7499	 .50561[.614]
1ND22	 .8878	 3.6686	 .24200[.8091
1ND23	 1.9911	 3.7566	 .53003[.597]
1ND24	 2.9377	 4.3659	 .67287[.502]
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Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on Whites Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E. 5
**	 * * * *** ** ****** *************************** ************** *** ****** **** *****
Dependent variable is MVE (SHARE PRICE 3 MONTHS AFTER YEAR-END)
275 observations used for estimation from 1 to 275
Regressor	 Coefficient	 Standard Error	 T-Ratio[Prob]
Intercept	 -1.8709
	
3.8933	 -.48054[.631]
EVE	 1.6049	 .40458	 3.9667[.000]
GW5	 1.8959	 .83909	 2.2595[.025]
EARN	 7.0722	 1.1253	 6.2849[.000]
IND1	 2.4014	 3.7434	 .64150[.522]
IND2	 2.1501	 3.6200	 .59395[.553]
IND3	 2.1795
	
3.6437	 .59816[.550J
IND4	 2.1727	 3.7164	 .58461[.559]
IND5	 1.5796	 3.7238	 .42420[.672]
IND6	 1.7296	 3.7803	 .45754[.648]
IND7	 3.4909
	
3.7502	 .93085[.353]
IND8	 3.3197	 3.1755	 l.0454[.297]
IND9	 1.0181	 3.7709	 .26999[.787]
IND1O	 2.1117	 3.6955	 .57142[.568J
IND11	 2.6605	 3.7865	 .70264[.483]
IND12	 1.6316	 3.8319	 .42578[.671J
IND13	 1.7742	 3.7810	 .46925[.639]
IND14	 2.4679	 3.7154	 .66423[.5071
IND15	 2.1248	 3.6969	 .57475[.566]
IND16	 1.4331	 3.6448	 .39318[.695]
IND17	 1.8469	 3.6279	 .50909[.611]
IND18	 6.3407	 4.0044	 1.5834[.115]
IND19	 2.2409	 3.6722	 .61023[.542]
IND2O	 1.8546	 3.8122	 .48649[.627]
IND21	 1.9128	 3.7436	 .51095[.610]
1NO22	 .93971	 3.6586	 .25685[.798)
1ND23	 2.0255	 3.7462	 .54069[.589]
IND24	 2.9658	 4.3670	 .67913[.498]
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Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on Whites Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E. s
Dependent variable is MVE (SHARE PRICE 3 MONTHS AFTER YEAR-END)
275 observations used for estimation from 1 to 275
* **** * * * **** ************ ************* ******* ***********
Regressor	 Coefficient	 Standard Error
	
T-Ratio[Probj
Intercept	 -1.8857	 3.8945	 -.48420[.629]
BVE	 1.6073	 .40644	 3.9547j.000]
GW6	 1.8929	 .83460	 2.2681[.0241
EARN	 7.0735	 1.1225	 6.3014[.000]
IND1	 2.4076	 3.7439	 .64308[.521]
IND2	 2.0810	 3.6038	 .57745[.564]
IND3	 2.1601	 3.6379	 .59378[.553]
IND4	 2.1629	 3.7134	 .58244[.561]
IND5	 1.5929	 3.7238	 .42775[.669]
IND6	 1.7101	 3.7750	 .45301[.6511
IND7	 3.4973	 3.7504	 .93250[.352]
IND8	 3.3320	 3.1764	 1.0490[.295]
IND9	 .9881	 3.7650	 .26247[.793]
IND1O	 2.0759	 3.6887	 .56278[.574]
IND11	 2.6190	 3.7757	 .69365[.489]
IND12	 1.5943	 3.8244	 .41688[.677]
IND13	 1.7630	 3.7771	 .46677[.641)
IND14	 2.4372	 3.7140	 .65623[.512]
IND15	 2.1060	 3.6927	 .57032[.5691
IND16	 1.3813	 3.6303	 .38049[.704]
IND17	 1.8570	 3.6250	 .512281.609]
IND18	 6.3584	 4.0095	 1.5858[.114]
IND19	 2.2437	 3.6719	 .61103[.542]
IND2O	 1.8656	 3.8124	 .48937[.625]
IND21	 1.9010	 3.7395	 .508361.6121
1ND22	 .9182	 3.6560	 .25116[.802]
IND23	 2.0343	 3.7458	 .54309[.5881
1ND24	 2.9615	 4.3671	 .67813[.498]
******************************************************************************
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Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
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******* ***********************************************************************
Dependent variable is MVE (SHARE PRICE 3 MONTHS AFTER YEAR-END)
275 observations used for estimation from 1 to 275
** * * *** * * * * ** ********** ******* **************************************
Regressor	 Coefficient	 Standard Error
	 T-Ratio[Prob]
Intercept	 -1.8739	 3.8888	
-.48186[.630]
BVE	 1.6172	 .40480	 3.9950[.000]
GW7	 1.8757	 .81275	 2.3078[.022]
EARN	 7.0602	 1.1136	 6.3402[.000]
IND1	 2.3967	 3.7396	
.64089[.522]
IND2	 2.0325	 3.5883	
.56642[.572]
- IND3	 2.1272	 3.6266	
.58655[.558]
IND4	 2.1368	 3.7056	
.57665[.565]
IND5	 1.5776	 3.7152	
.42462[.671]
IND6	 1.6720	 3.7644	
.44415[.657]
IND7	 3.4731	 3.7427	
.92795[.354]
IND8	 3.3240	 3.1721	 1.0479[.296J
IND9	 .9233	 3.7518	
.24610[.806]
IND1O	 2.0087	 3.6750	
.54659[.585]
IND11	 2.5947	 3.7673	
.68872[.492]
IND12	 1.5416	 3.8123	
.40439[.686]
IND13	 1.7328	 3.7676	
.45991[.646]
IND14	 2.3715	 3.7035	
.64034[.523]
IND15	 2.0241	 3.6764	
.55056[.582]
IND16	 1.3519	 3.6183	
.37364[.709]
IND17	 1.8316	 3.6077	
.50769[.612]
IND18	 6.3634	 4.0170	 l.5841[.114]
IND19	 2.2242	 3.6665	 .60662[.545]
IND2O	 1.8501	 3.8051	 .48622[.627]
IND21	 1.8314	 3.7238	 .49180[.623]
1ND22	 .8593	 3.6477	 .23560[.814]
1ND23	 1.9904	 3.7309	 .53347[.594]
1ND24	 2.9333	 4.3630	 .67231[.502]
******************************************************************************
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Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
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******************************************************************************
Dependent variable is MVE (SHARE PRICE 3 MONTHS AFTER YEAR-END)
275 observations used for estimation from 1 to 275
Regressor	 Coefficient	 Standard Error	 T-Ratio[Prob)
Intercept	 -1.8840	 3.8892	
-.48440[.629J
BVE	 1.6216	 .40390	 4.0149[.000]
GW8	 1.8659	 .78860	 2.3660[.019]
EARN	 7.0600	 1.1090	 6.3659[.000J
IND1	 2.4079	 3.7412	 .64362[.520]
IND2	 2.0390	 3.5858	 .56864[.570]
IND3	 2.1023	 L6201	 .58073[.562]
IND4	 2.1231	 3.7026	 .57342[.567]
IND5	 1.5820	 3.7131	 .42606[.670]
IND6	 1.6637	 3.7617	 .44229[.6591
IND7	 3.4729	 3.7421	 .92807[.354]
IND8	 3.3317	 3.1726	 l.0501[.2951
IND9	 .9186	 3.7507	 .24492[.807]
IND1O	 1.9678	 3.6688	 .53636[.592]
IND11	 2.5928	 3.7654	 .68858[.492]
IND12	 1.5081	 3.8064	 .39619[.692]
IND13	 1.7268	 3.7650	 .45864[.647]
IND14	 2.3227	 3.6987	 .62797[.531]
IND15	 1.9766	 3.6681	 .53887[.590]
IND16	 1.3314	 3.6110	 .36871[.713]
IND17	 1.8343	 3.6006	
.50946[.611]
IND18	 6.3858	 4.0225	 l.5875[.114]
IND19	 2.2269	 3.6667	 .60734[.544]
IND2O	 1.8530	 3.8038	 .48714[.627]
IND21	 1.8017	 3.7169	 .48474[.628)
1ND22	 .8449	 3.6480	 .23163(.817]
IND23	 1.9969	 3.7305	 .53530[.593]
1ND24	 2.9322	 4.3640	 .67192[.502]
******************************************************************************
170
A2.2 Share Price as at Year-end
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on Whites Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E. s
Dependent variable is MIlE (SHARE PRICE AS AT YEAR END)
275 observations used for estimation from 1 to 275
** * * **** ** ****** ************** ******** ************** * **************** ******
Regressor	 Coefficient	 Standard Error	 T-Ratio[Probl
Intercept	 .60607	 3.4067	 .17790(.8591
BIlE	 1.4431	 .43858	 3.2904[.00lj
GW1	 1.8589	 1.1259	 1.6510[.l00)
EARN	 7.1156	 1.1281	 6.3078[.000]
IND1	 .0920	 3.2741	 .028116[.978)
IND2	 -.1564	 3.1094	 -.050309[.9601
IND3	 -.1131	 3.2428	 -.034881[.972]
IND4	 -.1834	 3.2380	 -.056640[.9551
IND5	 -.8060	 3.2239	 -.25003[.803]
IND6	 -.5659	 3.3011	 -.17145[.8641
IND7	 1.2895	 3.3044	 .39025[.697]
IND8	 1.9220	 2.6742	 .71873[.473]
IND9	 -1.2000	 3.3083	 -.36262[.717]
IND1O	 -.2084	 3.2209	 -.064728[.948]
IND11	 .3987	 3.3144	 .12031[.9041
IND12	 -.7254	 L3568	 -.21611[.829]
IND13	 -.6055	 3.2991	 -.18355[.8551
IND14	 -.0851	 3.1938	 -.026619[.979]
IND15	 -.2970	 32067	 -092629[.926]
IND16	 -.6260	 3.1717	 -.19738[.844]
IND17	 -2.8039	 3.3000	 -.84965[.396]
IND18	 4.6899	 3.7758	 1.2421[.215]
IND19	 .0120	 3.2044	 .0037528[.997]
IND2O	 -.5946	 3.3205	 -17909[.8581
IND21	 -.4531	 3.2615	 -.13895[.890]
IND22	 -1.0140	 3.2312	 -.31387[.7541
1ND23	 -.0307	 3.2147	 -.0095617[.992]
IND24	 .3849	 3.7112	 .10373[.917]
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Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
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Dependent variable is MVE (SHARE PRICE AS AT YEAR END)
275 observations used for estimation from 1 to 275
Regressor	 Coefficient	 Standard Error	 T-Ratio[Prob]
Intercept	 .56098	 3.4286	 .16362[.8701
BVE	 1.3976	 .39184	 3.5666[.000J
GW2	 2.0453	 .93312	 2.1919[.029]
EARN	 7.1453	 1.0790	 6.6221[.000]
IND1	 -.0399	 3.2792	 -.012186[.9901
IND2	 -.0931	 3.0976	 -.030085[.9761
IND3	 -.0882	 3.2431	 -.027220[.978]
IND4	 -.2224	 3.2424	 -.068615[.945]
IND5	 -.7447	 3.2285	 -.23068[.818]
IND6	 -.5404	 3.3084	 -.16334[.870]
IND7	 1.2682	 3.3173	 .38230[.7031
IND8	 1.9628	 2.6972	 .72772[.467]
IND9	 -1.2241	 3.3127	 -.36950[.712]
IND1O	 -.2144	 3.2295	 -.066402[.947]
IND11	 .4452	 3.3293	 .13374[.8941
IND12	 -.6931	 3.3703	 -.20567[.837]
IND13	 -.5900	 3.3060	 -.17848[.8581
IND14	 -.1773	 3.1952	 -.055511[.956]
IND15	 -.3193	 3.2196	 -.099202[.9211
IND16	 -.6533	 3.1386	 -.20816[.835]
IND17	 -2.6948	 3.2481	 -.82964[.408]
IND18	 3.8884	 3.6363	 l.0693[.2861
IND19	 -.0863	 3.2091	 -.026901(.979]
IND2O	 -.5576	 3.3328	 -.16731[.867]
IND21	 -.4451	 3.2628	 -.13643[.8921
1ND22	 -1.219	 3.2377	 -.37673[.7071
1ND23	 -.0498	 3.2265	 -.015464[.988]
1ND24	 .3909	 3.7348	 .10468[.9171
**	 * *** * * *********** ************* ** ********** *** **********
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** * * * **** ** ***** *************** ********************* * ** *** ********** **** ***
Dependent variable is MVE (SHARE PRICE AS AT YEAR END)
275 observations used for estimation from 1 to 275
** *** * ** * * ************** * * *************** ****** ***** ********* ********* ***
Regressor	 Coefficient	 Standard Error	 T-Ratio[Probj
Intercept	 .41524	 3.4759	 .11946[.905]
BVE	 1.4503	 .36799	 3.9412[.000]
GW3	 1.9347	 .82048	 2.3580[.019]
EARN	 7.0970	 1.0688	 6.6402[.000J
IND1	 .0736	 3.3193	 .022191[.982]
IND2	
-.0146	 3.1277	
-.0046871[.996]
IND3	 .0236	 3.2808	 .0072107[.994]
IND4	
-.1188	 3.2819	
-.036201[.97l1
IND5	
-.6272	 3.2680	
-.19194[.8481
IND6	
-.4563	 3.3455	
-.13642(.892J
IND7	 1.3907	 3.3592	 .41400(.679]
IND8	 2.1092	 2.7357	 .77097[.441]
IND9	
-1.1318	 3.3511	
-.33775[.7361
IND1O	
-.1229	 3.2674	 -.037631[.970]
IND11	 .5807	 3.3710	 .17229[.863]
IND12	
-.5923	 3.4109	
-.17367[.8621
IND13	
-.4827	 3.3462	
-.14426[.8851
IND14	
-.1086	 3.2288	
-.033651[.973]
IND15	
-.1793	 3.2607	
-.055005[.956]
IND16	
-.6485	 3.1576	
-.20539(.837]
IND17	
-2.6984	 3.2912	 -.81991(.413]
IND18	 3.8876	 3.6613	 1.0618[.289]
IND19	 .0312	 3.2506	 .0096268[.992)
IND2	
-.4334	 3.3757	 -.12839[.898]
IND21	
-.3542	 3.2990	 -.10737[.915]
1ND22	
-1.163	 3.2754	
-.35512[.723)
1ND23	 .0732	 3.2582	 .022474[.982]
1ND24	 .5135	 3.7885	 .13554[.892]
* **** *** * * ***** **************** **************** ************* **** ******* * * **** *
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Dependent variable is MVE (SHARE PRICE AS AT YEAR END)
275 observations used for estimation from 1 to 275
******************************************************************************
Regressor	 Coefficient	 Standard Error	 T-Ratio[Prob]
Intercept	 .39233	 3.4882	 .11247[.911]
BVE	 1.4407	 .36245	 3.9748[.000]
GW4	 1.9251	 .77108	 2.4966[.013]
EAR1	 7.1016	 1.0671	 6.6549[.000]
IND1	 .0853	 3.3319	 .0256131.9801
IND2	 .0110	 3.1364	 .0035348[.9971
IND3	 .0454	 3.2911	 .013800[.989]
IND4	 -.1206	 3.2907	 -.0366561.971]
IND5	 -.5987	 3.2786	 -.18263[.8551
IND6	 -.4484	 3.3551	 -.13368[.8941
IND7	 1.4070	 3.3705	 .41744[.6771
IND8	 2.1351	 2.7449	 .77784[.4371
IND9	 -1.1428	 3.3590	 -.34022[.7341
IND1O	 -.1329	 3.2752	 -.040582[.9681
IND11	 .6050	 3.3821	 .17890[.858]
IND12	 -.5873	 3.4207	 -.171701.864]
IND13	 -.4731	 3.3559	 -.140991.888]
IND14	 -.1082	 3.2380	 -.033415[.9731
IND15	 -.1533	 3.2725	 -.0468591.9631
IND16	 -.6205	 3.1672	 -.19592[.845J
IND17	 -2.6568	 3.2941	 -.80653[.4211
IND18	 3.9215	 3.6679	 1.06911.2861
IND19	 .0275	 32598	 .0084491[.993]
IND2O	 -.4144	 3.3867	 -.12236[.903]
IND21	 -.3479	 3.3072	 -.10520[.916]
1ND22	 -1.2820	 3.2763	 -.391291.6961
1ND23	 .1083	 3.2710	 .033125[.974]
1ND24	 .5374	 3.8027	 .14133[.8881
**	 * ** * * * ******** ***** **** ** **** 	 ****************************** ***** *
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***	 * * ****** * *** ****************** ******* ****** *************** *************
Dependent variable is MVE (SHARE PRICE AS AT YEAR END)
275 observations used for estimation from 1 to 275
* **** * *** * * ********** * ** * ************** ** * ************** *****************
Regressor	 Coefficient	 Standard Error
	 T-Ratio[Prob]
Intercept	 .34962	 3.4882	 .10023[.9201
BVE	 1.4755	 .36062	 4.0914[.000]
GW5	 1.8565	 .76946	 2.4127[.0171
	
7.0816	 1.0684	 6.6284[.000]
IND1	 .1210	 3.3261	 .036396(.971)
IND2	 .0013	 3.1333	 .4249E-3[l.00]
IND3	 .0620	 3.2878	 .018867[.9851
IND4	 -.0968	 3.2878	 -.029462[.9771
IND5	 -.6127	 3.2734	
-.18719[.852]
IND6	 -.4376	 3.3515	
-.13059[.896]
IND7	 1.4368	 3.3674	 .42669[.670]
IND8	 2.1722	 2.7430	 .79190[.4291
IND9	 -1.1531	 3.3523	 -.34396[.731]
IND1O	 -.1334	 3.2696	 -.040815[.967]
IND11	 .6236	 3.3787	 .18458[.854]
IND12	 -.5782	 3.4168	
-.16924[.8661
IND13	 -.4549	 3.3534	 -.13566[.8921
IND14	 -.1122	 3.2321	 -.034738[.972]
IND15	 -.1200	 3.2698	 -.036727[.971)
IND16	 -.6205	 3.1640	 -.19612[.845]
IND17	 -2.6678	 3.3036	 -.80754[.420]
IND18	 3.9532	 3.7000	 1.0684[.286]
IND19	 .0524	 3.2559	 .016110[.987]
IND2O	 -.3825	 3.3860	 -.11298[.910]
IND21	 -.3328	 3.3043	 -.10073[.920]
1ND22	 -1.2411	 3.2706	 -.37948[.705]
1ND23	 .1374	 3.2658	 .042077[.966]
1ND24	 .5612	 3.8050	 .14750L8831
** *** * *** ** ********* ***************** ********** **** * ** * ****** ********** *******
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******** ***** **** * * ********* * *************** **************** *** ********** ** ***
Dependent variable is MVE (SHARE PRICE AS AT YEAR END)
275 observations used for estimation from 1 to 275
Regressor	 Coefficient	 Standard Error
	 T-Ratio[Prob]
Intercept	 .3369	 3.4890	 .096586(.923]
BVE	 1.4724	 .36242	 4.0628[.000]
GW6	 1.8676	 .76553	 2.4396[.015)
EARN	 7.0867	 1.0652	 6.6529[.000]
IND1	 .1229	 3.3272	 .036953[.9711
IND2	
-.0647	 3.1222	
-.020755[.983J
IND3	 .0425	 3.2839	 .012951[.990]
IND4	
-.1085	 3.2860	
-.033029[.974)
IND5	
-.5994	 3.2729	
-.18316[.855]
IND6	
-.4581	 3.3478	
-.13685[.891]
IND7	 1.4408	 3.3683	 .42775[.669]
IND8	 2.1824	 2.7441	 .79531[.427]
IND9	 -1.1850	 3.3486	
-.35388(.724]
IND1O	 -.1709	 3.2653	
-.052367[.958]
IND11	 .5816	 3.3695	 .17261[.863]
IND12	 -.6168	 3.4118	
-.18081[.857]
IND13	 -.4671	 3.3505	 -.13943[.889]
IND14	
-.1459	 3.2316	
-.045166[.964]
IND15	 -.1411	 3.2672	 -.043186[.966)
IND16	 -.6702	 3.1524	
-.21263[.832]
IND17	 -2.6520	 3.3000	 -.80364[.422]
IND18	 3.9506	 3.7046	 1.O664[.287]
IND19	 .0517	 3.2562	 .015891[.987]
IND2O	
-.3727	 3.3859	 -.11008[.912]
IND21	 -.3453	 3.3013	 -.10461[.917]
1ND22	 -1.2691	 3.2695	 -.38815(.698]
1ND23	 .1430	 3.2658	 .043801[.965]
1ND24	 .5546	 3.8050	 .14576[.884]
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* *** * * ***** * ********** * ***** *********************** ************* **** **********
Dependent variable is MVE (SHARE PRICE AS AT YEAR END)
275 observations used for estimation from 1 to 275
* *** * * ** * ** ******** ** **** *
Regressor	 Coefficient	 Standard Error	 T-Ratio[Prob]
Intercept	 .3515	 3.4847	 .10087[.920]
BVE	 1.4745	 .36141	 4.0797[.000]
GW7	 1.8705	 .74588	 2.5O78[.O]3]
EARN	 7.0791	 1.0571	 6.6966[.000]
IND1	 .1060	 3.3246	 .031889[.9751
IND2	 -.1110	 3.1101	 -.O357O1[.9721
IND3	 .0089	 3.2758	 .O027465[.998]
IND4	 -.1374	 3.2803	 -.041915[.967]
IND5	 -.6142	 3.2660	 -.18807[.851]
IND6	 -.4980	 3.3401	 -.14912[.882]
IND7	 1.4134	 3.3622	 .42038[.675]
IND8	 2.1718	 2.7413	 .79226[.429]
IND9	 -1.2534	 3.3396	 -.37533[.708]
IND1O	 -.2416	 3.2561	 -.074220[.941]
IND11	 .5553	 3.3633	 .165111.8691
IND12	 -.6723	 3.4033	 -.19756[.844]
IND13	 -.4990	 3.3435	 -.14926[.881]
IND14	 -.2167	 3.2240	 -.067239[.9461
IND15	 -.2266	 3.2559	 -069602[.945]
IND16	 -.6981	 3.1426	 -.22216[.824J
IND17	 -2.6689	 3.2871	 -.81193[.4181
IND18	 3.9270	 3.7103	 1.0584[.2911
IND19	 .0273	 3.2526	 .0084153[.993]
IND2O	 -.3896	 3.3803	 -.11526[.908]
IND21	 -.4162	 3.2897	 -.126521.899]
IND22	 -1.3377	 3.2647	 -.40974[.682]
IND23	 .0949	 3.2551	 .029170[.977]
1ND24	 .5229	 3.8017	 .13756(.891]
******************************************************************************
177
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
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Dependent variable is MVE (SHARE PRICE AS AT YEAR END)
275 observations used for estimation from 1 to 275
* *** ** * *** * * **** *** ******* *** *** ******************************* ********** 	 **
Regressor	 Coefficient	 Standard Error	 T-Ratio[Prob]
Intercept	 .3403	 3.4844	 .097679[.922J
BVE	 1.4820	 .36061	 4.1097[.000]
GWB	 1.8527	 .72209	 2.5657[.0llJ
	
7.0766	 1.0530	 6.7206[.000]
IND1	 .1196	 3.3250	 .035974[.971]
IND2	 -.1052	 3.1071	 -.03386l[.9731
IND3	 -.0152	 3.2707	 -.0046650[.996]
IND4	 -.1497	 3.2778	 -.045691[.964]
IND5	 -.6099	 3.2635	 -.l8690[.852]
IND6	 -.5053	 3.3375	 -.15141[.880]
IND7	 1.4147	 3.3615	 .42085[.674]
IND8	 2.1806	 2.7412	 .79549[.427]
IND9	 -1.2563	 3.3384	 -.376321.707J
INDI	 - .2Q5	 3.25€	 -
IND11	 .5543	 3.3612	 .16494[.8691
IND12	 -.7042	 3.3991	 -.20720[.836]
IND13	 -.5041	 3.3409	 -.15091[.880]
IND14	 -.2628	 3.2205	 -.081610[.935)
IND15	 -.2718	 3.2501	 -.083647[.933]
IND16	 -.7189	 3.1362	 -.22925[.819]
IND17	 -2.6695	 3.2829	 -.81315[.4l7]
IND18	 3.9608	 3.7122	 l.0670[.287]
IND19	 .0322	 3.2524	 .0099068l.992
IND2O	 -.3861	 3.3786	 -.11428[.909)
IND21	 -.4447	 3.2845	 -.13541[.892]
1ND22	 -1.3477	 3.2652	 -.41276[.6801
1ND23	 .1034	 3.2539	 .031781[.975}
1ND24	 .5234	 3.8026	 .13766[.891]
** ** * * ** * * * ********************************* ** ***** *** ************ **
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